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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: 
A Quality of Will Approach 
By Philip Robichaud 
 
My central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of 
moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance.  
The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores 
moral reasons that underlie her epistemic norms or obligations.  This view is a quality-of-
will theory of moral responsibility that emphasizes the agent’s reasons-responsiveness.  It 
holds that only relevant epistemic obligations are those that require acts of investigation 
or reflection.   
 In the dissertation, I examine extant theories of culpable ignorance and suggest 
that they all fall short in some important respect.  Then, I propose and defend an account 
in which epistemic norms play a leading role.  I analyze the nature of epistemic norms 
and their normativity, and I argue that agents who ignore or flout actional investigative 
norms and then act on subsequent false beliefs are connected to the wrongness of their 
action in a way that establishes their blameworthiness.  I also argue that epistemic norms 
that require agents to hold certain beliefs or make certain inferences are not relevant to 
culpable ignorance.  Finally, I explore the implications of my view for certain interesting 
cases of moral ignorance.  I discuss ignorance that results from an agent’s social or 
historical circumstances, ignorance that stems from pure moral deference, and ignorance 
that is explained by epistemic difficulty of getting certain moral facts right.   
 There are two striking outcomes of my research.  The first is that reflection on the 
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epistemic condition shows that one cannot think deeply about moral responsibility 
without also engaging issues in epistemology relating to the nature and normativity of 
belief, and issues in normative ethics relating to what our moral obligations actually are.  
The second striking outcome is that bringing these rather disparate topics together, as I 
attempted to do, reveals that much of our ignorance is actually non-culpable, and that 
many of our beliefs about the blameworthiness of ignorant agents are unwarranted. 
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Chapter 1: Theories of Culpable Ignorance 
 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
1.2 THE MANY FACES OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE EPISTEMIC CONDITION 
1.4 CULPABLE IGNORANCE: VOLITIONISM 
1.5 CULPABLE IGNORANCE:  BENIGHTING ACCOUNT 
1.6 CULPABLE IGNORANCE: ATTRIBUTIONISM 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
Philosophical discussions about moral responsibility have traditionally been comprised of 
arguments about freedom.  Specifically, philosophers have argued about what kind of 
freedom an agent must have in order to be morally responsible and whether this kind of 
freedom is compatible with causal determinism.  Much less attention has been given to 
the epistemic condition of moral responsibility, which concerns questions about what an 
agent needs to know or believe in order to be responsible.  Any theory of the epistemic 
condition must distinguish between ignorance is exculpating and ignorance that it is 
inculpating.  Blameless ignorance about the harmful nature of an action or its 
consequences seems to be exculpating in the same way and perhaps for the same reasons 
that the lack of freedom is exculpating.  Agents who act on blameless ignorance seem to 
be disconnected from the badness or wrongness of their actions in a way that makes 
ascriptions of moral responsibility problematic.  If, for example, I simply didn’t know 
that the bottled water I offered you had been tainted at the bottling plant, then I am not 
morally responsible if you get sick.  The same cannot be said for agents who act from 
culpable ignorance.  If I knew that there was a problem of toxic water coming from this 
bottling plant and if I knew that I could easily assess whether the bottle was tainted, but I 
!!
2 
!
simply failed to do so, then, intuitively, I would be blameworthy if you get sick.  My 
ignorance in this case seems culpable because I knew your health was at stake, and I 
knew that my ignorance about whether you would be drinking tainted water could have 
easily been avoided.  An account of the epistemic condition should explain the difference 
between blamelessly ignorant agents and culpably ignorant ones in a way that illuminates 
why it is fair or reasonable to blame me in the latter case but not the former.  The 
questions and problems associated with the epistemic condition of moral responsibility 
are distinct from concerns about freedom and determinism, and, fortunately, their 
philosophical neglect has recently abated.  This dissertation contributes to this newly 
thriving body of literature by defending a novel account of the epistemic condition for 
moral responsibility. 
1.2 THE MANY FACES OF FREEDOM AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Before I can either defend my own account of the epistemic condition or criticize existing 
accounts, I will first clarify the concepts that are central to this strand of philosophical 
inquiry.  The term “freedom” is by no means univocal in the free will literature.  
Candidate definitions include: “the ability to do otherwise”, “the ability to do otherwise if 
one chooses to”, “the ability to have one’s actions respond to reasons”, etc.  Fortunately, 
for the purposes of my inquiry I do not have to tackle this issue.  The reason is that 
questions of culpable ignorance, and more generally, questions about the epistemic 
condition of moral responsibility arise whatever conception of freedom one favors.  As 
will become clear below, I think that the relevance of ignorance to questions of moral 
responsibility will involve issues that stand apart from whatever metaphysical conception 
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of freedom holds true.  That is, the question of whether ignorance can excuse or exempt 
agents from moral responsibility will be a live one under all of the foregoing conceptions 
of freedom.  For this reason, I am happy to remain agnostic about what sort of freedom is 
required for moral responsibility. 
 The term moral responsibility is also non-univocal.1  As will be apparent from my 
discussion below, our discourse on moral responsibility is frustratingly hazy and 
ambiguous.  The claim that “X is morally responsible” is frequently taken to be 
synonymous with “X is praiseworthy/blameworthy”.  Other times it is taken to be 
synonymous with “X is the appropriate target of emotional reactions, such as anger and 
resentment, to their action”.  Still other times it seems to be the weaker claim that “X is 
answerable for their action”. Gary Watson has attempted to make some headway in this 
conceptual morass. In his article “Two Faces of Moral responsibility”2 he argues that 
there are two perspectives from which one can understand an agent to be responsible.  
Judgments made from what Watson calls “the aretaic perspective” are claims are 
grounded on the act being the expression or indication of a fault in the agent.  These 
judgments are concerned with agency and attributability.  Actions that are attributable in 
this sense ‘flow’ from our commitments; they “implicate our practical identity”.3 To say 
that an agent is aretaically responsible for an action is to say something about the relation 
that the action stands to the agent’s “fundamental evaluative orientation”.4  The second 
perspective elucidated by Watson focuses on judgments that involve the practices of 
                                                
1 See: John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini, “The Physiognomy of Responsibility,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (2011); N.A. Vincent, “A Structured Taxonomy of Responsibility Concepts,” Moral 
Responsibility (2011): 15–35. 
2 Gary Watson, “Two Faces Of Responsibility,” Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1998): 227–248. 
3 Ibid., 271. 
4 Ibid. 
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holding someone accountable. To hold someone accountable is to judge her to be liable 
to sanctions such as blame.  Therefore, holding accountable is judging that someone is 
liable to blame for her action.  Watson maintains that judging them liable and then 
actually carrying out the blaming behaviors seems to require the control condition.  As 
such, it is only from the accountability perspective that avoidability is relevant to 
judgments of responsibility.  The agent may still be responsible in the attributability 
sense, since the acts are thought to be expression of their practical identity, even if there 
is an important sense in which she was not in control of the formation of this identity.5 
 For the purposes of my dissertation, I will utilize a more robust notion moral 
responsibility that encompasses both “faces” of responsibility.  I will assume something 
like the following account of moral responsibility. 
 (M)  X is morally responsible for act A if and only if X is a reflection of the 
 agent’s practical identity and X is liable to blame (or praise) for A-ing. 
Whereas Watson's discussion is helpful because it clarifies the differences between an 
agent having an action attributed to them and their being liable to blame for them, I think 
that this way of carving things up misses something important.  There are several reasons 
why I don’t follow Watson’s taxonomy.  The first is that I do not think that aeretaic 
responsibility is sufficiently robust.  I take it that one of the driving concerns behind an 
inquiry into the conditions for moral responsibility in the face of ignorance or 
determinism is that judgments of moral responsibility necessarily entail claims about 
reacting to agents for their wrongdoing.  When we judge that some belief or action is a 
                                                
5 For a similar account of these two ‘faces’ of moral responsibility, see Angela M. Smith, “On Being 
Responsible and Holding Responsible,” The Journal of Ethics 11, no. 4 (January 2007): 465–484. 
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reflection of her practical identity, however, we are not thereby committed to any robust 
normative claim about how we should or should not respond to her. Since nothing deeply 
normative follows from aretaic assessment and since I think that the concern with getting 
judgments of moral responsibility right is motivated by such deep normative concerns, I 
will adopt a conception of moral responsibility that embodies both attributability and 
accountability.  
 A second reason to adopt (M) is that the attribution of an act to an agent on the 
grounds that the act ‘flowed’ from her commitments and her practical identity 
immediately raises the issue of whether the agent is responsible for their practical 
identity.  Susan Wolf raises this objection against accounts of moral responsibility that 
are best characterized as aeretaic.  In an influential critique of this type of view, which 
she calls the deep self view, she writes: 
“Nonetheless, we sometimes question the responsibility of a fully developed 
agent even when she acts in a way that is clearly attributable to her real self.  For 
we sometimes have reasons to question an agent’s responsibility for her real self.  
That is, we may think it is not the agent’s fault that she is the person she is – in 
other words, we may think it is not her fault that she has, not just the desires, but 
the values she does.”6 
Although she is talking about determinism in this passage, the same worry applies in the 
discussion of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility.  If elements of an agent’s 
practical identity, such as their values and commitments, lead them to hold false beliefs, a 
                                                
6 S. Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993), 37. 
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question remains about whether they are responsible for their practical identity and for 
the commitments that caused them to have false beliefs.  For example, a male raised in a 
rigidly patriarchal society may falsely believe that, a woman's interests can be discounted 
if they conflict with his own.  An argument could be made that since they are related to 
the commitments and values that constitute his practical identity, he is aretaically 
responsible for any actions based on his false beliefs.  Wolf’s objection is that this is too 
superficial to ground responses to him that are central to moral responsibility – questions 
about why he has the commitments and values he does seem relevant.  This is not the 
place to discuss whether or not this person is in fact morally responsible, but it illustrates 
that aretaic responsibility leaves open questions of blameworthiness and punishment.  By 
working with a conception of moral responsibility that builds in the blameworthiness 
component, I can forestall objections that my account of the necessary conditions for 
moral responsibility only grounds superficial assessments of agents.  Hence, in what 
follows, the sense of moral responsibility that I employ is (M). 
 
 1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE EPISTEMIC CONDITION 
 
Any account of the epistemic condition for responsibility will be disjunctive; it will be 
met when the agent under appraisal either knowingly does something wrong or is 
culpably ignorant about some feature of the act in virtue of which it is wrong.  Since the 
first disjunct is uncontroversial and theoretically straightforward, most of the discussion 
about the epistemic condition is focused on the issue of establishing the conditions that 
must be met if ignorance is to count as culpable.  In its most general formulation, the 
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epistemic condition is as follows: 
(EC): X is morally responsible for A-ing only if either X knew that it was wrong 
to A or X was culpably ignorant about whether it was wrong to A. 
It follows that if an agent acts wrongly on the basis of non-culpable ignorance, she fails 
to meet EC and is not morally responsible.   
 The remainder of this chapter is entirely critical.  I will examine several of the 
most important and influential attempts to provide an account of the epistemic condition 
of moral responsibility.  I’ve divided the views into benighting accounts, attributionism, 
and volitionism.  My task for the rest of the chapter is to argue that they all fail in some 
important respect.    
1.4 CULPABLE IGNORANCE: VOLITIONISM 
In this section of this chapter, I will argue that an influential account of the epistemic 
condition for moral responsibility is not acceptable.  I will first describe and motivate a 
theory of culpable ignorance called volitionism, which is, roughly, the view that for 
ignorance to be culpable it must trace back to a previous action that was under the agent’s 
control.  Second, I document what I take to be the strongest reason to accept volitionism 
– namely an argument that any non-volitionist alternative makes unfair epistemic 
demands on agents.  For example, a non-volitionist account of culpable ignorance might 
state that agents are culpably ignorant by falling short of an expectation to form beliefs in 
a non-arrogant manner.  On such a view, an agent may arrogantly manage her belief 
formation processes without necessarily being in control of that process – her arrogance 
might be a character trait that it is beyond her control to completely eliminate.  
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Volitionists argue that the epistemic demand not to form beliefs arrogantly is unfair 
unless the agent has control over whether or not she possesses the trait of epistemic 
arrogance.  Having described volitionism and detailed its motivation, I argue both that the 
volitionist’s insistence that epistemic demands be fair is ultimately misguided and that, in 
any case, many such demands are fair, even by volitionists’ lights.    
1.3.1 The structure of volitionism 
Volitionism, which is defended by Gideon Rosen7, Michael Zimmerman8, and Neil 
Levy9, is an account of the epistemic condition shaped by the intuitive notion that a given 
agent is responsible for an action only if the action was under her control.  More 
formally: 
Control Condition: X is responsible for Φ-ing at t only if X was in control of Φ-     
ing at t. 
The requisite control is absent if, for example, an agent is under hypnosis, brainwashed, 
or being manipulated by crafty neuroscientists.  The control condition is motivated by 
the fact that that we typically see processes or situations that diminish or eliminate an 
agent’s control as responsibility-mitigators.   
 When volitionists appeal to the control condition in their account of the epistemic 
condition they are immediately confronted with a problem.  If agents are only responsible 
for whatever falls within the sphere of their volitional control, they will be responsible for 
too little of their ignorance.  After all, as many philosophers have pointed out, there is an 
                                                
7 Gideon Rosen. (2004). “Skepticism about moral responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1), 295-313. 
8 Michael Zimmerman. (1997). “Moral responsibility and ignorance,” Ethics, 107(3), 410-426. 
9 Neil Levy. (2009). “Culpable ignorance and responsibility: a reply to Fitzpatrick,” Ethics, 119(4), 729-741.  
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important sense in which agents are not in control over their beliefs.10  Belief formation is 
typically conceived of as a passive process that is not directly subject to our will.11  We 
may be in control of performing certain actions that provide us with our evidence, but the 
beliefs that we form on the basis of our evidence is not up to us.  If these observations 
about belief are right, then we almost always lack the kind of control over our beliefs that 
the control condition for responsibility requires.  It follows that we are rarely if ever 
culpable for any of our beliefs.  This outcome obviously allows volitionists to classify 
brainwashing and manipulation cases the right way.  Such agents obviously fail to meet 
the control condition with respect to their beliefs, and it would be absurd to claim that 
these agents were culpably ignorant.  The problem is that this result comes at a cost - the 
volitionist account of culpable ignorance does not classify beliefs of gratuitously 
negligent agents as culpable.  The reason volitionists are vulnerable here is that beliefs 
are notoriously not up to us.  As literature on doxastic voluntarism has documented, the 
beliefs that even the most negligent physician forms fall outside their sphere of control.  
Here is Rosen on this point: 
(B)elief revision is a passive matter.  I can take various active steps to influence 
the content of my opinion: I can consult my guru; I can read a book; I can sit and 
think about a question. But once I have taken these active measures, the change in 
view itself is something that simply happens in me or to me. It is not something I 
do.12 
If responsibility requires control and if belief formation is a passive process that we don’t 
                                                
10 William Alston. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (1989, Cornell UP) 
11 Pamela Heironymi. (2008). “Responsibility for believing,” Synthese, 161, 357-373. 
12 G. Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 302. 
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control, then how could anyone be responsible for her ignorance?  Volitionists are right 
to recognize this potential problem with their view and are motivated to develop their 
account of the epistemic condition in a way that accords more closely with the thought 
that certain grossly negligent agents are culpably ignorant even though they are not in 
direct control of their beliefs.  
 The volitionist's solution to this problem is to see if any of the agent’s false beliefs 
trace to some aspect of the agent’s deliberative history that does meet the control 
condition.  If the agent’s ignorance can be traced to a prior action over which she was in 
control, then she is culpable for it. The class of actions to which volitionists typically 
appeal is epistemic norm violations.  Thus, for a given false belief to be culpable, it must 
stem from the act of violating an epistemic norm.  The resulting view of culpable 
ignorance is: 
Volitionism: X is culpable for believing falsely that p only if  
(1) X’s belief is the effect of an epistemic norm violation and  
(2) X was in control of this epistemic norm violation 
 
Consider, once more, the lazy physician who shirked her epistemic obligation to keep up 
with the latest research in her field and becomes ignorant of new, widely-published 
research showing that a popularly prescribed therapy is actually toxic.  Assume further 
that she acts on this ignorance and harms a patient of hers.  According to volitionism she 
is culpably ignorant so long as she was in control of whether or not she acted in such a 
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way as to meet her epistemic obligations.13  It is important to note that according to 
volitionism, the agent is not presumed to be in direct control of her beliefs.  Even the 
culpably ignorant agent forms her beliefs on the basis of the evidence she has acquired, 
and she makes inferences from one belief or set of beliefs to another.  These are largely 
passive processes over which agents have little control.  The negligent physician’s 
ignorance is owed both to these passive processes and to her failure to accord with the 
norms of investigation that apply to physicians.  These norms, which Rosen calls 
“procedural epistemic norms”, govern actions over which the agent is presumed to have 
control.  The physician was in control over whether she read her journals, but she chose 
not to.  Her ignorance is culpable according to volitionism because it can be traced to an 
action for which the agent is plainly responsible.  This is a welcome refinement to the 
naïve application of the control condition to the problem of ignorance and responsibility 
considered above.  Although we are typically not in control of our doxastic economy, it is 
at least plausible that much of our ignorance is owed to epistemic norms violations.  If 
agents control how much effort they devote to scrutinizing their beliefs and how 
thoroughly and carefully they conduct the relevant research, then they are in control over 
whether they meet the investigative epistemic norms that apply to them. 
 Although the turn to epistemic norms makes volitionism seem more plausible, 
another worry immediately presents itself.  What if the agent did not know that she was 
under an epistemic norm that required her either to scrutinize her beliefs or to conduct a 
bunch of research?  Imagine that the physician was not only ignorant about the safety of 
the therapies she prescribes, but was also ignorant about her epistemic obligation to stay 
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current on her journals.  This physician’s ignorance is deeper than the first physician who 
knew she should have done her research but just didn’t do it.  In order to determine 
whether the second, more deeply ignorant physician is culpable for her ignorance about 
the safety of her therapies, we need to establish whether she is also culpable for the 
ignorance of her epistemic obligation to stay current on the latest findings in her field.  
This requires another application of volitionism.  Call the ignorant action (harming the 
patient) Z, and the ignorance-producing epistemic norm-violation (not doing research) Y.   
In order to determine weather the agent is responsible for the ignorant action (Z), he must 
establish that the ignorance-producing epistemic norm violation (Y), was either done 
knowingly or not.  Y may have been done knowingly, as would be the case if the 
physician knew she was under the relevant epistemic norm but violated it anyway.  In this 
case, the agent is responsible for Z because her ignorance is traced to a witting violation 
of an epistemic norm, namely, Y.  However, if Y is also done from ignorance, the 
volitionist must now determine whether the agent is culpable for this ignorance.  In order 
to ground culpability for the ignorance attending the performance of Y, volitionism states 
that the ignorance must trace to a prior epistemic norm violation, call it X.  This is an 
altogether different epistemic norm violation from Y.  The physician may have been 
under an obligation to remember her professional obligation to stay current on her 
research.  You can think of the norm violated in X as a second-order epistemic norm – an 
epistemic duty to recall/remember other epistemic duties.  Again, X may have been done 
wittingly or not, and the same series of questions can be asked with respect to it.  In order 
to ground culpability for ignorance, the volitionist shifts the focus to a prior ignorance-
producing action.  But if that action is itself done from ignorance, then the focus must 
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shift to a still prior ignorance-producing action, and so on, until an agent acts without 
ignorance. 
The regress can only be stopped by establishing the existence of a prior non-
ignorant failure to act in accordance with epistemic obligations.  Once this is established, 
culpability transfers to all future ignorance.  Thus, a culpably ignorant agent cannot be 
ignorant all the way back.  This feature of volitionism is well known to its defenders.14  
Zimmerman, for example, has argued that all culpability for ignorant action must trace to 
a previous action done without ignorance - done from the belief that it is wrong.  He has 
named this feature the ‘origination thesis’: 
Origination Thesis: “Every chain of culpability is such that at its origin lies an 
item of behavior for which the agent is directly culpable and which the agent 
believed at the time at which the behavior occurred, to be morally wrong”. 15 
 
It follows from volitionism, and the origination thesis that is implied by it, that ignorance 
is only culpable if it is traceable to action that was performed with the belief that it was 
wrong.  Since one species of akratic action involves believing an action is wrong and 
doing it anyway, Levy notes that “holding (ignorant agents) responsible requires holding 
them responsible for akratic actions.”16  It bears mentioning here that on other accounts 
of akrasia, Levy’s claim is not exactly correct.  One might think that akratic action 
requires acting against one’s judgments of where the balance of reasons lies.  Consider 
Donald Davidson’s account of akratic action (which he labels ‘incontinent’ action): 
                                                
14 Rosen, Levy, and Zimmerman have each accepted this feature of their views. 
15 Zimmerman, p.176 
16 Neil Levy, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick,” Ethics 119, no. 4 (July 1, 
2009): 730. 
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In doing b an agent acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent 
does b intentionally; (b) the agent believes there is an alternative action a open to 
him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to 
do a than to do b.17 
On this view of akratic action, an agent who believes that there are decisive moral 
reasons to do action a, but who does b instead, does not necessarily act akratically, since 
there might be other reasons to do b that outweigh the moral reasons to do a.  For 
example, an agent who believes that morality requires her to turn a friend over to the 
authorities, but who thinks the duties of friendship require otherwise does not seem 
obviously to act from weakness of will if she sides with her friend.18  From her 
perspective, she may be acting in accordance with what the balance of reasons supports, 
even though she does not act in the way that moral reasons seem to require.  Not much 
turns on this, since volitionists can simply stipulate that they are using the term “akrasia” 
in a more restrictive sense, according to which an agent acts akratically if and only if she 
acts against what she takes to be a moral requirement.  For the sake of brevity, I will 
follow the volitionists in using “akrasia” in this different sense.   
 The volitionists are right that the structure of their theory seems to commit them 
to the position that culpable ignorance must trace back to akratic action – an action done 
in the belief that it is wrong.  So far, I have not entertained any arguments for volitionism.  
I have merely detailed its motivation and structure.  Now that the contours of the position 
are in view, the stage is set for an examination of the strongest case for volitionism.  In 
the next section I argue that it is undermined by several important objections. 
                                                
17 Donald Davidson, Essays on actions and events (Oxford University Press, 2001), 21–42. 
18 For more on this topic see: Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 97, no. 5 (May 1, 2000): 278-296. 
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1.3.2 the argument for the origination thesis  
The strongest argument for volitionism is actually a general argument against non-
volitionism.  Volitionists have a powerful argument against any account of the epistemic 
condition that does not ground culpable ignorance in akrasia.  Neil Levy put the most 
recent and well-argued version of this argument forward.  His specific target is a non-
volitionist account of culpable ignorance recently defended by William Fitzpatrick, 
though the problem he raises is a general one that applies to any account of the epistemic 
condition that does not ground culpable ignorance in akratic action.  In this sub-section I 
will explicate the structure of one non-volitionist view and detail the volitionist’s case 
against it. 
One way of avoiding the origination thesis is to defend an account of culpable 
ignorance that does not require the trace to an akratic action.  Fitzpatrick, for example, 
recently defended an account of culpable ignorance according to which ignorance is 
culpable, if the agent  
Could reasonably have been expected to take measures that would have corrected 
or avoided it, given her capabilities and the opportunities provided by the social 
context, but failed to do so either due to akrasia or due to the culpable nonakratic 
exercise of such vices as overconfidence, arrogance, dismissiveness, laziness, 
dogmatism, incuriosity, self-indulgence, contempt and so on.19 
 
I will refer to this account as “hybrid” because of its disjunctive character – it includes 
                                                
19 William Fitzpatrick. (2008).“Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical. 
Challenge”, Ethics 118(4): 589–614. 
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the akratic condition in the first disjunct and a non-akratic condition in the second.  One 
important difference between hybrid and volitionism is that agents who never believed 
that they were acting wrongly can satisfy the second disjunct of hybrid.  An agent who 
forms beliefs dogmatically, lazily, or arrogantly may come to hold and act on many false 
moral beliefs without ever believing, occurantly or otherwise, that they are either acting 
wrongly or violating an epistemic norm.  As such, their ignorance is not traceable to any 
akratic act.  Fitzpatrick and Levy both discuss an imaginary case where a ruthless 
businessman named Potter falsely believes that exploitative business practices are 
morally permissible.  We are to imagine that he forms his beliefs arrogantly and that he 
never really questioned his moral views or took them to be disputed.  He just failed to 
recognize any opportunity to reflect deeply on whether his views were right.  If Potter 
never even saw this opportunity, then there is definitely no time at which he believed that 
he should have taken an opportunity to scrutinize his moral views.  Thus, even if there is 
an epistemic norm that calls for scrutinizing one’s moral views, he never violated it 
akratically.  His ignorance is not traceable to an akratic act.  This is of no import, 
however, if hybrid is true.  Because of the vicious way in which he formed his beliefs, 
Potter is culpably ignorant about the permissibility of exploitation. 
Levy maintains that hybrid and any other view that does not ground culpability 
for ignorance on akratic action are deeply problematic.  He argues that it is not reasonable 
to expect agents to take measures to modify their belief formation in cases where agents 
did not form them akratically.  There are two central claims in his argument.  First, he 
claims that it is unfair to expect agents to form their beliefs in accordance with some 
standard so long as the agent lacks the capacity to do so.  Second, he claims that agents 
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have the capacity to modify their beliefs in the expected way only if they can conform to 
the expectation in a rational way.  If it would not be rational for the agent to rethink and 
reexamine her dogmatically held views, then she doesn't actually have the capacity to 
manage her beliefs in accordance with our expectations.  If the agent lacks the capacity to 
manage her beliefs in accordance with our expectations, then it is unfair to expect her to 
do so.  Thus, the fairness of any expectation to conform to this or that epistemic norm 
turns on whether the agent can rationally conform to the expectation.  Importantly, Levy 
argues that the relevant sense of rational is internal.  He writes: 
“The point is merely that what agents can do rationally – that is, by way of a 
reasoning procedure – is a function of their actual representations and pro-
attitudes”.20 
The real crux of Levy’s argument against non-volitionist accounts of culpable ignorance 
is the internalist reading of rationality.  If a dogmatic believer simply does not believe 
that it is incumbent on her to re-examine her dogmatically held beliefs, then she cannot 
decide to re-examine her beliefs via rational deliberation.  The underlying thought is that 
one cannot deliberate about what are non-options from the perspective of the agent.   
 This is not to deny that the agents are forming or maintaining beliefs in 
epistemically vicious ways.  Levy is just claiming that our expectation that such agents 
think in epistemically virtuous ways is valid only if the agent sees that she has a reason to 
think differently.  If he is right about this, then hybrid must be false because the 
expectation that an agent avoid forming beliefs in epistemically vicious ways is not 
conditioned on facts about how things appear from the agent’s perspective.  Importantly, 
this objection generalizes to every account of the epistemic condition that does not 
                                                
20 Levy, pp.735-36 
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ground culpability in an akratic action, for it is only in cases where agents know that they 
are subject to an epistemic norm that they possess a deliberative pathway towards 
conforming to the norm.  Of course, akratics do not take that deliberative pathway, but 
the point is that this pathway is an option from their perspective.  Since the non-
volitionist’s expectation cannot be met rationally, it is unfair. On the internalist 
conception of rationality, the class of rational actions is limited by the agent’s internal 
reasons, which Levy understands roughly as determined by the agent’s actual beliefs.  
Unless Potter takes himself to be forming beliefs in epistemically vicious ways, he cannot 
rationally deliberate toward the belief that exploitation is wrong.  The case against non-
volitionism rests on this internalist account of reasons and rationality and the view that 
only internally rational expectations are fair. 
  
1.3.3 Resisting the volitionist’s argument  
Before moving on to discuss the merits of Levy’s position, it is important to 
quickly note that there are two kinds of expectations he and Fitzpatrick may have in 
mind.  The following passage from Levy is subject to more than one interpretation:  
  
Potter, I argue, could not rationally have taken advantage of the opportunities for 
moral improvement that were (in some sense) available to him; hence, we cannot 
reasonably expect him to do so.21  
 
One interpretation of this passage is that Potter could not rationally comply with an 
expectation to initiate a deliberative process that would have corrected or improve his 
                                                
21 Levy, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility,” 735. 
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moral beliefs.  On this interpretation, we do not expect Potter to succeed in changing his 
mind.  The opportunities of which Potter is supposed to take advantage are opportunities 
to subject his current moral views to scrutiny.  On this interpretation, Fitzpatrick’s non-
volitionist view holds that Potter is culpably ignorant because he arrogantly failed to 
initiate the re-evaluation of his moral views.  By contrast, Levy seeks to establish that 
these expectations are unfair on the grounds that Potter can’t rationally meet them – that 
Potter has no reason to begin scrutinizing his moral beliefs.  A second interpretation of 
Levy’s claim that Potter cannot rationally comply with the expectation to “take advantage 
of moral improvement” holds that the relevant expectation is for Potter to succeed in 
changing his mind.  The idea here is that we expect more of Potter than merely to start 
thinking about his moral views.  In addition to expecting this, we also expect him to come 
around to the view that his moral beliefs were mistaken.  On this interpretation of 
Fitzpatrick’s non-volitionism, Potter is culpably ignorant because he arrogantly failed to 
form true moral beliefs about how his employees deserve to be treated.  By contrast, 
Levy must argue that Potter cannot rationally come to hold different moral beliefs.    
 With this distinction on the table, it is easier to think through the volitionist’s 
complaint about non-volitionism, which turns on the idea that these expectations are fair 
only if it would be rational from the perspective of the agent to comply with them.  I do 
not deny that there is something to be said for this line of response to the non-volitionist, 
and much of what I say in later chapters (especially chapters 3 and 5) is consistent with 
this internalist constraint.  My worry is that the emphasis on internalism is misplaced, 
given the issue at hand, which is the question of how agents who fall short of these 
expectations can be culpably ignorant and blameworthy for actions on that ignorance.  If 
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the relevant expectation is only that the agent investigates then how does culpability 
transfer from their akratic failure to comply with the expectation to investigate to 
subsequent wrong action?  There is still a gap in the volitionist’s account between being a 
lazy thinker and being responsible for the serious harms that are committed in ignorance.  
Simply requiring the former does not suffice to establish the latter.  The same question 
arises if the relevant expectation is that the agent actually succeeds in forming the right 
beliefs.  How is it that witting failures to comply with a norm requiring a certain belief 
count as moral as opposed to merely epistemic failures?  Simply to raise these objections 
suggests that any adequate account of culpable ignorance must make clear just how 
witting failures to comply with epistemic obligations connect the agent to her the 
wrongness of her ignorant action.  Levy’s internalist requirement, though important in 
order to avoid the regress problem, is on only an initial step in the development of a 
complete theory.    
 A further problem with Levy’s view concerns his claim that agents lack reasons to 
investigate their moral beliefs.  The non-volitionist can simply reply that, in fact, agents 
such as Potter actually have internal reasons to examine their beliefs.  After all, unless an 
agent is completely sheltered from people who hold contradictory beliefs, she will 
believe that her views are not universally shared.  Even if Potter does not believe that he 
is epistemically vicious, he probably believes that others disagree with him about the 
permissibility of exploitation.  This belief itself seems like it can function as an internal 
reason.  It opens up the requisite deliberative pathway toward meeting the expectation to 
form beliefs non-viciously.  Levy considers this response and argues that our awareness 
of the fact that our beliefs are challenged by the beliefs of others does not by itself 
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generate an internal reason to reassess them.  He notes that, “we dismiss the views of 
Holocaust deniers and racists without pausing to consider whether there is a grain of truth 
in their claims (and we are right to do so)".22 
I think that this reply is too quick for several reasons.  First, I think that what is 
going on when we rightly dismiss the beliefs of Holocaust deniers and racists is rather 
more complicated than Levy lets on.  It is true that we dismiss their beliefs without seeing 
their disagreement as a reason to reconsider our own.  But, our grounds for doing this are 
that we have strong antecedent reasons to think they are unreliable sources.  I think that 
astrologists are unreliable sources of information about future events, so I put no stock in 
their beliefs about who will win the Super Bowl or whether I will get a job I applied for.  
I do this without seeing their beliefs as providing reasons to re-evaluate my own.  But, 
this kind of dismissal only seems warranted if the belief that they are unreliable sources 
of information is itself warranted.  It is true that racists and Holocaust deniers allow 
hatred to influence their belief formation processes, and for this reason we do not see 
their disagreement with us as a reason to examine our own beliefs.  However, in the 
absence of a prior reason to dismiss the beliefs of others as unreliable, our awareness that 
others disagree with us certainly does seem to provide us with an internal reason to 
examine our beliefs.  So long as a sufficiently large set of disagreements are not 
explained away by writing off our interlocutors as unreliable, we seem to have abundance 
of internal reasons that can function as a deliberative starting points for the self-
examination of our beliefs.  If this is right, then non-akratic agents actually can rationally 
conform to the expectation that they re-examine their views in the face of disagreement.  
Our awareness of the fact that people disagree with us can provide us with the 
                                                
22 Levy, p. 737. 
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deliberative pathway to conforming to epistemic expectations.  It follows from this that 
non-akratic agents can have the capacity to conform to this expectation and, thus, can be 
fairly expected to do so.  Levy’s case against the non-volitionist is undercut by the fact 
that in most cases, our awareness that someone disagrees with us generates an internal 
reason to scrutinize our beliefs.  If I am right about this, then volitionism is not the only 
way to meet the fairness condition on epistemic expectations.   
The non-volitionist has a stronger response yet.  It involves establishing that 
agents have internal reasons to subject all of their beliefs to scrutiny because of what it is 
to be a believer.  David Velleman has famously argued that it is constitutive of being a 
belief that the agent "aims at the truth”.23 Very roughly, we, qua believers, are committed 
to a concern that our beliefs be true.  Agents who form beliefs without a concern for their 
beliefs being true are simply not in the business of believing.  One might then ground an 
internal reason for an agent to scrutinize her beliefs on the nature of belief itself.  Pace 
Levy, one might argue that there is a rational deliberative pathway available to non-
akratic agents like Potter that turns on the commitment that is constitutive of being a 
believer.  Although Potter believes occurantly that he need not subject his beliefs to 
scrutiny, as a believer he is committed to doing so because he is committed to securing 
beliefs that are true. Even if he does not have before his conscious mind any reason to 
reconsider his specific belief about the morality of exploitation, he seems perfectly 
capable of calling on his general commitment to have beliefs that aim at the truth.  In as 
much as commitments seem by their nature to be internal, they seem obviously to provide 
reasons of the kind that required by Levy’s argument above.  A Vellemenian take on the 
nature of belief is another powerful way to diffuse Levy’s critique of hybrid and indeed 
                                                
23 Velleman, J. D. (2000). “On the Aim of Belief.” In The$Possibility$of$Practical$Reason, (2004, Clarendon). 
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of any theory of culpable ignorance that grounds the ignorant agent’s culpability on 
something short of clear-eyed akrasia. 24  
Thus, contra Levy, there are at least two ways of establishing the existence of 
internal reasons for the ignorant agents to take measures that would have corrected their 
ignorance even if the existence of their ignorance is not owed to some akratic action.  If I 
am right, then even on the internalist reading of hybrid, which is the one endorsed by 
Levy, agents who are ignorant can rationally deliberate in a way that could lead to the 
correction of their beliefs.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable or unfair to expect them to 
revise or attempt to revise their beliefs even when those demands seem unreasonable 
from the perspective of the agent.  Whatever an agent occurantly believes, she has 
internal reasons from which she can reason her way to different beliefs.   
 
1.4 CULPABLE IGNORANCE: SMITH’S BENIGHTING ACCOUNT 
The next account of culpable ignorance that I discuss is defended by Holly Smith in her 
groundbreaking article “Culpable Ignorance”.25  My first unanswered question about 
Levy concerns his failure to clarify how an agent’s willing failure to investigate connects 
him to the wrongness of subsequent wrong action.  Smith’s account provides a 
                                                
24 There is yet a third way to resist Levy’s claim that agents have internal reasons to examine their beliefs only if 
they formed them akratically.  Philosophers writing on the topic of on epistemic rationality have argued that we 
ascribe reasons for an agent to believe that p only if agents have an antecedent desire to have true beliefs.  On 
this view, the fact that the ignorant agent believes for reasons at all entails that he desires to have true 
beliefs.  Therefore, Potter and others who hold beliefs dogmatically certainly can initiate a rational deliberative 
process by calling on this desire, together with general beliefs about the relevance of evidence to truth.  If 
Potter desires to have true beliefs and believes that true beliefs are better secured by subjecting them to 
scrutiny, then he has a reason to subject each individual belief to scrutiny.  Obviously, this would include his 
belief about exploitation.  Again, it may not be before her conscious mind that she should think more carefully 
about her beliefs regarding the exploitation of the poor, she nonetheless possesses that reason in a way that 
seems to meet the standards for being internal. 
25 H. Smith, “Culpable Ignorance,” The Philosophical Review 92, no. 4 (1983): 543–571. 
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straightforward answer to this question.  On her view, ignorance is culpable if it can be 
traced to a prior act for which the agent is blameworthy, which she dubs a “benighting 
act”.  The idea is that, in becoming ignorant, an agent can increase the risk that she will 
act wrongly at a later time.   Smith summarizes her view as follows: 
To say the culpably ignorant agent is to blame for his unwitting act is to say 
nothing more than that he was culpable in performing the benighting act, that it 
gave rise to the unwitting act, and that he knew at the earlier time that he risked 
this outcome.26  
This account handles many standard cases of culpable ignorance. The physician who 
wittingly ignores her journal reading in order to play golf may be ignorant of new 
research showing that a particular drug is dangerous.  Intuitively, she is blameworthy for 
unwittingly harming patients who receive that prescription.  However, in order to meet 
the epistemic condition for moral responsibility, her ignorance about the drug’s toxicity 
must be culpable.  On Smith’s view, we would need to locate a benighting act that meets 
two conditions.  First, the benighting act itself must be blameworthy.  On this score, 
Smith’s view is correct, since knowingly shirking one’s professional duties is a plausibly 
blameworthy action.  So far, so good.  The second condition that must be met is that the 
subsequent act must be “within the known risk of the benighting act”27.  This condition 
also seems to be met, since the doctor knew that she increases the risk of harming her 
patients when she chooses not to stay up-to-date.  Importantly, it is a feature of Smith’s 
view, and indeed of most others, that the motives and intentions of the agent that 
                                                
26 Ibid., 566. 
27 Ibid., 551. 
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accompany the ignorant act need not be evil or otherwise objectionable.  In fact, the 
specific motives attending the ignorant action may be admirable.  Presumably, this holds 
in the case under discussion.  During the time that the negligently ignorant physician is 
administering treatment, she may be acting from an earnest desire to help her patients.  
What matters from the standpoint of meeting the epistemic condition for responsibility is 
whether the ignorance bears a special relation to a prior culpable action, not whether the 
motives that attend the ignorant action are admirable or otherwise reflective of moral 
concern.  If the ignorance is related to a prior culpable action, then it is not an excuse. 
Before raising some objections to Smith’s account, I want to emphasize two of its 
most important features.  The first is structural – establishing the culpability of ignorance 
requires tracing that culpability back to a prior blameworthy action.  This tracing feature 
is significant because it represents common ground between Smith and many of her 
competitors.  The centrality of tracing to theories of the epistemic condition has not been 
overlooked, and, indeed it is the focal point of recent criticism.28  The second important 
feature of Smith’s view that I would like to highlight is that the nature of the relation 
between the benighting act, for which the agent is blameworthy, and the subsequent, 
unwitting act involves foreseen risk.  In order for the agent’s ignorance to be culpable, 
she must know that there is some risk that her actions now will lead to ignorance and 
subsequent impermissible actions on that ignorance.  By linking culpable ignorance to 
foreseen rather than foreseeable risk, Smith’s account captures our intuitions about cases 
like the negligent physician who knew the risks of falling behind on her research.  In 
                                                
28 The following have been critical of this structural feature of the epistemic condition: M. Vargas, “The 
Trouble with Tracing,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2005): 269–291; G. Sher, Who Knew?: Responsibility 
Without Awareness (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), footnote in chapter 1; J. M Fischer and N. A 
Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing,” Nous 43, no. 3 (2009): 531–556. 
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what follows, I will raise three objections to Smith’s account, all of which center on her 
claim that culpable ignorance must trace back to foreseen risk of ignorance.      
It is a feature of Smith’s view that in order for ignorance to be culpable, an agent 
must have foreseen that the risk of being ignorant was increased by a prior act.  Though 
this view may do well in classifying ignorance that results from a certain class of 
negligent actions, there are many other types of intuitively culpable ignorance that do not 
typically fall under the known risk of any benighting act.  I take it to be uncontroversial 
that each human has her fair share of false moral beliefs.  The problem is that the kind of 
witting benighting acts that Smith’s account requires seems not to figure very 
prominently in the formation of one’s moral beliefs.  The formation of an agent’s moral 
character seems to take place via a process that involves accretions of beliefs, habits, and 
dispositions that are frequently not the foreseen effects of prior blameworthy actions.  For 
example, a selfish businessman’s belief that the value of satisfying his own interests far 
exceeds the value of satisfying the interests of others may be the outcome of many non-
blameworthy, yet character forming actions taken in pursuit of a career in corporate 
finance.  Unlike cases of negligence in the management of one’s belief (such as the 
doctor case above), there probably was not a time that the businessman’s current selfish 
treatment of others was foreseen as the likely effect of his prior choices.  Of course, it 
may have been foreseeable, but, this would be no help for Smith’s account since she 
requires the more stringent epistemic standard, namely that the risk of ignorance was 
actually foreseen.  But, if we think that most of our moral beliefs are formed through 
similar causally opaque processes, and if we think, nevertheless, that agents can be 
responsible for acting false moral beliefs formed in this way, then Smith’s account falls 
!!
27 
!
short.  The requirement that agents foresee the ways in which their current actions can 
cause them to be ignorant seems to exclude too much.   
I offer this as merely a worry for Smith’s view for two reasons.  First, proponents 
of a view such as hers might maintain that enough of our normative ignorance is related 
in the right way to benighting acts.  Since this is not the place to adjudicate this largely 
empirical debate, I will only register a note of skepticism about the prospects of such an 
endeavor.  My skepticism is based on the obvious difficulties of predicting how certain 
acts and decisions now will collectively influence the general character traits and 
dispositions we will have in the future.  Moreover, it seems even harder to predict how 
the character traits and dispositions we will come to have will interact with our personal 
history and social context to produce false moral beliefs.  There is a second response to 
my worry about the rarity of foreseeing the risk that current actions pose for subsequent 
moral ignorance. Smith might stick to her guns and accept that agents such as the selfish 
businessman whose false moral beliefs do not arise by way of benighting acts simply are 
not culpably ignorant.  The implication of course is that he fails to meet the epistemic 
condition and is not morally responsible for his wrongdoing.  The extent to which this 
view is revisionist will depend on what our intuitions are about the relevant cases and 
how the empirical work related to moral belief formation turns out.  I think that given the 
plausible story told above about the causal opacity of belief formation that I discuss 
above, such a view would actually be highly revisionist, but this may be a bullet that 
Smith and her proponents are willing to bite.  An interesting and somewhat paradoxical 
implication of this response is that people, who were cavalier in the formation of those 
aspects of our character that are under our control, would be non-culpable for more of 
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their ignorance.  Because of their cavalier attitude toward the downstream moral and 
epistemic effects of the character traits and dispositions that they strive to form, they will 
be less likely to foresee the ways in which they might be ignorant about moral matters.  
Because of their failure to foresee this, their acts of character formation will not be 
benighting acts for subsequent ignorant acts and their ignorance will be non-culpable.  
Indeed, someone might explicitly adopt a policy of avoiding readily available information 
about character development as a strategy for avoiding culpability.  The natural way to 
avoid this implication is to say that agents who were cavalier about the risk of ignorance 
may not have actually foreseen that they would be ignorant but that their ignorance was 
foreseeable.  Again, however, Smith’s account leaves no room for this response.  The 
agent who can’t be bothered to think about the degree to which her character traits 
promote false beliefs will fail to meet Smith’s version of the epistemic condition and 
would not be morally responsible for her impermissible ignorant actions.    
Now, for the objection.  The point of weakness in her view is her claim that 
ignorance is culpable if it “within the known risk of the benighting act”. This condition 
will turn out to be too easy to satisfy in some cases, given that nearly every action seems 
to have knowable epistemic effects.  Consider the following case: 
Ignorant cheat: Gary is taking a course on moral theory and is presented with a 
modified Jim and the Indians case.  In this case, a vicious kidnapper tells Jim that 
if he can’t identify the difference between act utilitarianism and rule 
utilitarianism, then five Indians will be killed.  Jim is also told that he can save 
their lives by simply stating the difference between act and rule utilitarianism.  
Gary is bored by fantastical philosophical examples like this, and decides that 
!!
29 
!
rather than studying for the quiz on act vs. rule utilitarianism later that week, he 
will cheat off of his classmate.  Amazingly, Gary is accosted by a real-life 
kidnapper later that day and put in the same position as Jim.  Since he can’t 
answer the question, five Indians are murdered.   
Intuitively, Gary is not morally responsible for the deaths of the five Indians.  After all, 
the incredibly low likelihood that Gary would find himself in Jim’s position, seems to tell 
strongly against Gary having any epistemic obligation to know the difference between act 
and rule utilitarianism.  Although Gary acted impermissibly by choosing to cheat rather 
than learn about the various brands of utilitarianism, his ignorance does not reflect 
anything like a lack of moral concern for potential abductees.  However, if the intuition 
that Gary is not morally responsible is veridical, it presents a problem for Smith’s view 
since he plainly seems to meet her conditions for culpable ignorance.  Ignorance is 
culpable only when an unwitting wrong act falls within the foreseen risk of the 
benighting act, which itself is wrong or bad.  Gary’s wrongful benighting action is his 
choice to cheat on his exam.  This action had an epistemic upshot, namely, that he was 
ignorant about the difference between act and rule utilitarianism.  Because of Gary’s 
particular circumstances, the unwitting wrong action was a foreseen risk of his choice to 
cheat rather than study act and rule utilitarianism.  Since he had earlier in the day 
entertained the unfortunate scenario into which he was placed, it was known to him that if 
he did not learn about act and rule utilitarianism, he would not be in a position easily to 
save the Indians’ lives.  However astronomically improbable his predicament was, the 
risk that his ignorance could contribute to the loss of five human lives was known to him.  
Gary meets this condition simply by entertaining the thought experiment in class.  Thus, 
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on Smith’s view, Gary is in all relevant respects similar to the physician who neglects his 
research.  His ignorance is culpable, and on the basis of this, he meets the epistemic 
condition for morally responsibility. 
 There is an obvious reply to this objection that I must consider.  Someone might, 
rightly, point out that there is actually a significant difference between the negligent 
physician and Gary, the cheater.  The obvious difference is that the likelihood that Gary’s 
foreseen ignorance will result in subsequent wrongdoing is astronomically low, whereas 
the likelihood that the physician’s foreseen ignorance will result in subsequent 
wrongdoing is much higher.  We don’t inhabit a world where philosophy students are 
kidnapped and coerced into living out philosophical thought experiments.  By contrast, 
physicians are regularly confronted with patients whose treatment plan might be altered 
in light of recent scientific findings.  This point can be put in terms of risk.  A physician 
who neglects her research runs a significant risk of causing harm to future patients by 
acting on her ignorance, whereas Gary the cheater runs a negligible risk of causing harm 
by failing to learn moral theory.  Armed with this distinction, Smith might maintain that 
the case of Gary does not constitute a counterexample to her view.  The fact that Gary’s 
benighting act lead to a vanishingly small chance of acting wrongly on his ignorance 
entails that he is not culpably ignorant. 
 I have two things to say in response.  First, I would merely point out that the 
appeal to risk might only be persuasive when the consequences of the wrong action are 
not severe.  As the gravity of the subsequent ignorant action goes up, it’s reasonable to 
think that that the low risk of harm is consistent with culpable ignorance.  If this is right, 
then there are actually two dimensions along which we must evaluate foreseen ignorance 
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before we can determine whether it is culpable.  Second, and more substantively, once 
Smith’s benighting account is expanded this way it leaves unexplained both where the 
thresholds of risk and severity should be.  The simplicity of her account was its virtue – 
an agent who foresees that she runs the risk of acting ignorantly in the future if she acts 
wrongly now is culpably ignorant.  The connection between the agent and the wrong 
action was clear.  Supplementing Smith’s view in the way I have just described leaves 
one wondering why certain risk-thresholds are drawn where they are – why Gary’s 
foreseen ignorance is not culpable but some other agent’s foreseen ignorance is.  
Moreover, even if one could draw a principled risk threshold, agents who fall just above 
the threshold would be culpably ignorant and those who fell just below the threshold 
would not.  Given that they are so similar with respect to foreseen risk that they were 
willing to run, why should our judgments about their culpability be different?  Indeed, it 
seems like facts not having to do with the agents themselves – namely differences in risk 
– will determine which agents are culpable and which ones aren’t.  This is a significant 
shortcoming of the supplemented view since a hallmark of any adequate theory of moral 
responsibility and, more specifically, of culpable ignorance, is that attributions of moral 
responsibility should rest primarily on facts about the agent herself and not about risks of 
wrong action.29        
  
1.5 CULPABLE IGNORANCE: ATTRIBUTIONISM 
The final account of culpable ignorance that I will consider in this chapter has it that 
                                                
29 For more on this requirement see: Sher, Who Knew?, Chapter 4. 
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agents are morally responsible for their ignorance when it stems from their rational 
judgments.30  The first two accounts that I considered attempted to connect the ignorant 
agent to the wrongness of her actions via their will.  More specifically, they both traced 
culpable ignorance to the witting choices of the agent.  Volitionists trace culpably 
ignorance to an akratic action, and Smith traces to actions that the agent knew would 
increased the risk ignorance and ignorant wrong action.  The view I consider in this 
section is that it takes questions of responsibility for beliefs to turn on what we are 
warranted in attributing to the agent given her agential activity.  Attributionists take 
agential activity to be comprised principally of the agent's evaluations and judgments 
about what attitudes to adopt or which actions to perform.  This view possesses the 
theoretical virtue of simplicity; actions, beliefs and other attitudes are attributable by 
virtue of the judgments the agent makes.  Angela Smith summarizes the central tenets of 
the view here: 
In order for a mental state to be attributable to a person in the sense necessary for 
it to be a legitimate basis of (moral) appraisal, it need not arise from conscious 
judgment, choice, or decision. But it must be the kind of thing that either directly 
reflects, or is supposed to be governed by, her evaluative judgments. This 
condition of moral attributability is appropriate, because moral criticism addresses 
a person qua rational agent and asks her to acknowledge and to defend or disavow 
the judgments implicit in her responses to the world around her.31 
                                                
30 See: T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press, 1998); Angela M. Smith, “Responsibility for 
Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 236-271; Smith, “On Being 
Responsible and Holding Responsible”; Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing,” Synthese 161, no. 3 
(December 2006): 357-373. 
31 Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes,” 256. 
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One of Smith’s examples is of person who forgets her friend’s birthday.  The fact that an 
agent fails to remember a friend’s birthday reflects a judgment that the friend is perhaps 
not so important to her.  She is responsible for failing to occurently believe that it is her 
friend’s birthday and for omitting to call or send her good wishes.  Attributionism is a 
very influential take on questions of responsibility.  Though there are subtle differences 
among its proponents, their underlying theme is that moral appraisal is directed at agents 
whose judgments are subject to rational criticism for their attitudes or actions that stem 
from their evaluative judgments. On their view, so long as a belief, attitude or action is 
“normatively connected” to the agent's judgments, she is morally responsible for it.  
Instructively, Scanlon summarizes attributionism as it relates to blame in the following 
passage: 
It is clear that the kind of responsibility required for blame is what I have called 
“responsibility as attributability”.  All that is required is that the attitudes that 
make blame appropriate can in fact be attributed to the person as “his”.32 
 In this subsection I will first motivate attributionism as it informs the epistemic 
condition by showing that it has intuitively plausible results for common sense cases of 
culpable ignorance.  Then I will argue that the view is ultimately unacceptable.  For 
example, it fails to distinguish between cases of culpable and non-culpable ignorance.  I 
also argue that despite their claims to the contrary, attributionists establish a connection 
between acts and agents that is at once too shallow and insignificant from the standpoint 
of moral appraisal. 
                                                
32 Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008), 202. 
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Attributionism, like the other theories I've discussed, rightly sees claims about 
moral responsibility as coming down to the establishment of a particular relation between 
the agent and the mental state, attitude, or action under appraisal.  Of course, in the 
process of making judgments, agents will come to hold many false beliefs, and agents 
will be responsible for those that meet the attributionist’s conditions.  This immediately 
raises the question what possible account the attributionist could provide of non-culpable 
ignorance.  Let’s reconsider the case of the negligent physician.  Rather than reading her 
journals, she repeatedly decides to play golf and eventually comes to hold false beliefs 
about the safety of several drugs she regularly prescribes.  We can assume for the sake of 
argument that her choice to neglect her research was not akratic and that it stemmed from 
a genuine lack of concern for having true beliefs about drug safety.  Attributionists seem 
to get this case right because the physician's false beliefs about how best to treat her 
patients are a reflection of at least two different judgments.  First, she made a judgment 
about the relative importance of leisurely pursuits in the face of her professional duty to 
stay current on the latest research in her field.  Second, her false beliefs were a reflection 
of her judgment that the evidence supports her belief that a given drug is safe.  These 
evaluative judgments, both about the permissibility of leisure and about what she ought to 
believe given her evidence, lead her to have false beliefs.  The attributionist will claim 
that this suffices to establish her responsibility for her ignorance.   
The problem is that something similar also applies to the diligent physician whose 
false beliefs were the result of simply being unable to achieve complete and veridical 
knowledge of her field despite her strong commitment to stay informed.  Her diligence, 
which manifests in serious and frequent study of the latest findings reflects the moral 
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concern she has for her patient’s well being.  In addition, her false beliefs about the safety 
of a given drug are also based on judgments about which beliefs are best supported by the 
evidence.  The problem for attributionism is that her belief, though false, is no less 
rationally related to the judgments she’s made than the negligent physician’s false belief 
is.  There appears to be no relevant difference between the two cases on which the 
attributionist can ground the claim that the non-negligently ignorant physician is not 
responsible for her ignorance while also maintaining that the negligent physician is 
responsible for hers.   
 It might be objected that there is an obvious and important difference between the 
two.  The negligent physician’s ignorance is owed to her judgment that leisure is, in this 
instance at least, permissible even in light of the risks it poses to her patients.  By 
contrast, the diligent physician’s ignorance seems to be owed to judgments she makes 
about what she should believe in light of the best evidence.  The false beliefs in each case 
trace back to a judgment, but the judgments are very different.  My claim here is that the 
attributionist has not provided a principled reason for thinking that the false belief is 
attributable to the negligent physician but not attributable to the much more diligent one.  
To ground this claim, it is instructive to consider what attitudes are ruled in and ruled out 
by the attributionist’s theory of responsibility.  Here is Smith: 
This rules out most sense perceptions, random thoughts, and mental images, 
appetitive desires, and “implanted” attitudes, since we do not expect these states 
to reflect or to be governed by our judgment.  What gets ruled in, however, are 
ordinary cases of belief, intention, most desires, fear, indignation, admiration, and 
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guilt, among others…33   
This passage clearly shows that Smith’s account of attributionism would be unable to 
deny that the diligent physician’s false beliefs can be attributed to her.  Since it is natural 
to think that there is an important difference between the two, namely that the negligent 
physician is, whereas the diligent physician is not, responsible for her ignorance, there is 
pressure to supplement attributionism in a way that preserves this intuition.   
 The attributionist response to these worries is to emphasize the fact that meeting 
the conditions for moral responsibility merely makes one open to moral appraisal without 
implying anything about actual blameworthiness.  For example, Hieronymi makes clear 
in the following passage that she thinks it is a mistake to conflate moral responsibility, 
which turns on attributability, and blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness).  She states 
that: 
To be responsible for something is to be, on account of that thing, open to 
assessment and, depending on the outcome of that assessment, the appropriate 
target of certain responses.  On such an understanding, one is responsible for 
things that are morally innocuous.  One is open to assessment on account of them; 
the outcome of the assessment (in this case) would be neutral, and no particular 
reactions would be warranted.34  
The picture that is being revealed is of a two-step procedure of moral appraisal.  First, in 
order to determine an agent’s responsibility for a belief, attitude, or action, we assess 
whether it reflects the agent’s judgments or assessments about reasons.  Second, we 
                                                
33 Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes,” 262–263. 
34 Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing,” 363, n.13. 
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determine whether an agent is blameworthy for one of these beliefs, attitudes, or actions 
that is attributed in the first step.  As Heironymi makes clear, the outcome of step two – 
assessing someone as blameworthy, praiseworthy or neutral – is not a matter of 
attribution, which is to say it’s not a matter of responsibility, though attribution is 
necessary for it.  This move directly addresses the worry I expressed above that 
attributionists cannot distinguish between the negligent and diligent physician.  They can 
accept that both are responsible for their false beliefs since their beliefs are a reflection 
both of their judgments about moral obligations to investigate and their judgments about 
what beliefs are best supported by the evidence they possess.   
 Since we have established that their beliefs are attributable to them, we can now 
ask whether they are culpable or blameworthy.  It is at this point that the attributionists 
offer much less explicit guidance.  There is an obvious difference between the physicians 
that could function as grounds for appraising each one differently.  In the case of the non-
negligent physician, the fact that her false beliefs about the safety of the drug is not 
traceable to any failure to take her investigative responsibilities seriously might lead us to 
appraise her ignorance as morally neutral.  Her ignorance is not a reflection of the lack of 
moral concern for the well being of her patients, and so she would not be blameworthy 
for it.  Nor would she be blameworthy for the act of harming the patients who take the 
drug.  This is contrasted with the negligent physician whose ignorance was the result of 
the judgment that her investigative responsibilities were not of prime importance.  
Because the negligent physician’s false beliefs stem from this lack of moral concern, she 
might be held blameworthy for it and for subsequently harming the patients who take the 
drug.  On the basis of this difference – ignorant action that is rooted in the lack of moral 
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concern - the attributionist could maintain that both are responsible for their ignorance, 
though only the negligent agent is blameworthy for it.  All of this is pure speculation 
about what attributionists would say about the blameworthiness of ignorant action since 
they do not provide a complete account of it.  Indeed, in the context of a structurally 
similar case of moral ignorance, Smith argues that an agent will be responsible for the 
false belief that the pain and suffering of others does not matter morally.  But, she states 
explicitly that attributionism does not speak directly to the question of the 
blameworthiness or culpability of the agent’s moral ignorance.  Indeed she states that: 
(Attributionists), can acknowledge the existence of epistemic conditions when it 
comes to determining whether a person is blameworthy for her actions and 
attitudes; these conditions do not seem to be relevant to determining whether a 
person is responsible for her actions and attitudes, however.35 
The fundamental problem is that the conditions of blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness) 
are precisely what most philosophers working on questions of moral responsibility in 
general and on the epistemic condition in particular are trying to account for.  At the heart 
of attributionism is a conceptual gulf between moral responsibility and the judgment that 
agents are either blameworthy or praiseworthy.  That Smith countenances an epistemic 
condition for blameworthiness, which needs to be defended over and above her 
attributionist account of responsibility, reveals that her project and my own have different 
targets.  Indeed, the attributionist may adopt the epistemic condition that I defend as their 
epistemic condition of blameworthiness while they retain their own theory of moral 
responsibility spelled out on attributionist grounds.  In any event, attributionists like 
                                                
35 Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes,” 390, n.30. 
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Smith and Hieronymi must accept that an account of culpability for ignorance or ignorant 
action requires further theoretical resources than they offer.  If my interpretation of their 
position is right, then the concerns I raise in this section may not function as an objection 
to their view but as a call for more theory. 
    
CHAPTER 2: A QUALITY OF WILL ACCOUNT OF THE 
EPISTMIC CONDITION  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.2 ARPALY’S QUALITY OF WILL THEORY 
2.3 THE QUALITY OF EPISTEMIC WILL VIEW 
2.4 COMPARISON WITH RIVAL THEORIES 
2.5 REPLY TO AN OBJECTION 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I critically explored several attempts to defend the epistemic 
condition of moral responsibility, and I argued that each was flawed.  In this chapter, I 
will defend my own account of culpable ignorance.  In essence, I will argue that 
ignorance is culpable, and thus non-exculpating if and only if the agent’s false belief is 
traceable to belief acquisition processes carried out with good will.  More specifically, if 
an agent comes to hold a false belief via a process that does not display ill will or an 
absence of good will, then the ignorance will be blameless.  This kind of blameless 
ignorance can function as an excuse, and agents who act upon it will not be morally 
responsible for her actions.  I will also argue that agents whose ignorance is traceable to 
an ill will or the absence of a good will do meet the epistemic condition for moral 
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responsibility - their ignorance is culpable.  Agents who act on culpable ignorance can be 
morally responsible so long as the other necessary conditions for responsibility are met. 
 Before mounting a defense of my view I will discuss the best recent attempt to 
defend an account of the conditions for moral responsibility for which the quality of the 
agent’s will plays and important role.  Arguments that an agent’s quality of will is 
relevant to questions of moral responsibility have been a staple in the literature.  The 
unifying theme present throughout is the claim that an agent’s actions or attitudes are 
related to her qua agent when they reflect a quality of the agent’s will.  The reason why 
an agent is blameworthy for her wrong or bad actions is that the action stems from a will 
that is deficient in some way.  Where this connection between the act and the agent’s will 
is absent, there is room for excusing the agent.  When the wrong act stems from 
manipulation by neuroscientists, for example, there is no salient link between the 
wrongness of act and the agent.  Since, it is far beyond the scope of my dissertation to 
engage all of the quality of will relevant literature, I will limit my focus to theory of 
relatively recent vintage that has achieved prominence.  In this chapter, I build upon 
Nomy Arpaly’s quality of will account of moral responsibility, which draws heavily on 
the notion of reasons responsiveness.  I will argue that her view fails to draw important 
distinctions between the culpability of ignorance and its rationality.  The stage will then 
be set for me to defend my own view.  It bears many similarities to Arpaly’s account, but 
it incorporates the notion of epistemic norms.  On my view, which I call the quality of 
epistemic will view, culpability for ignorance will depend on the agent’s responsive to the 
reasons that ground epistemic norms and obligations.   
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2.2 ARPALY’S QUALITY OF WILL THEORY  
 Arpaly has recently defended an account of the conditions of moral responsibility 
that appeals centrally and explicitly to the agent’s quality of will.36  She argues that an 
agent’s quality of will is to be cashed out in terms of her responsiveness to reasons.  
Agents are praiseworthy if they act rightly in response to the moral reasons that make the 
action right.  This is a quality of will view because Arpaly simply equates acting for the 
right reasons to acting from a good will.  Arpaly says that an agent is blameworthy if she 
fails to respond to the moral reasons that rule out acting the way she did.  There are two 
ways that an agent can be blameworthy on her view.  First, an agent can act wrongly 
from a lack of good will, which means that they act for reasons other than the reasons that 
support the morally right action.  Second, an agent can act wrongly from an ill will, 
which means they act because of the moral reasons that rule out her action.  Arpaly’s 
disjunctive view can be summarized in what I call Quality of Will for Actions (QWA): 
 
QWA: A person is blameworthy for a morally wrong action iff  (i) she acts from a 
deficit of moral reasons-responsiveness (an absence of good will) or (ii) she acts 
for the reasons that make the action wrong (ill will). 
 
Since Arpaly sees having good will as being essentially equivalent to acting in response 
to the moral reasons that justify the relevant moral requirement.  An agent who acts from 
an absence of good will acts in a way that is unresponsive to those reasons.37  On her 
                                                
36 N. Arpaly, Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral agency (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003), Chapter three; 
N. Arpaly, Merit, meaning, and human bondage: an essay on free will (Princeton University Press, 2006), Chapter one. 
37 It is important to emphasize that she interprets ‘acting in response to the moral reasons’ in the de re and not 
de dicto sense.  On her view, an agent’s own beliefs about the reasons for which she is acting are not relevant to 
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view, there are two ways in which an agent can be unresponsive to the relevant moral 
reasons.  First, the agent might not ‘perceive’ the moral reasons that her situation 
presents.  This failure to respond is complete, in the sense that the moral reasons do not 
factor into her deliberations, conscious or otherwise.  An example of this kind of absence 
of good will is an agent who simply fails to see that racial oppression is a moral issue.  
Arpaly’s example is of an overly paternalistic parent who simply fails to see the value of 
autonomy despite repeated efforts by others to impart it to her.  In these two examples, 
the racist and the paternalist lack a good will because during deliberation and at the time 
of acting, they fail to see the relevant moral reasons for what they are.  This type of 
unresponsiveness is contrasted with the second type wherein agents are motivationally, 
rather than perceptually faulty.  An agent with this type of absence of good will perceives 
the moral reasons that are in play but is not sufficiently strongly motivated to act on 
them.  Having registered that there are moral reasons, they act on other non-moral 
reasons that they take themselves to have.  An example of this type is an agent who 
recognizes that another person will undergo substantial pain and suffering if she acts for 
self-interested reasons.  Despite recognizing the moral import of this other person’s pain, 
the agent may still act selfishly and thereby betray a motivational rather than perceptual 
deficit.  Arpaly’s own example is a roommate who makes a promise to mail a book and 
recognizes that there are moral reasons to keep the promise.  We are to imagine that she 
decides not to mail it because it is quite cold outside and because she would rather finish 
writing her book.  In both of these examples, the agent is not sufficiently responsive to 
                                                
whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy.  Her position is motivated by cases where agents either aren’t 
aware of the reasons for which they act, or they are aware of them, but do not think of them as moral reasons.  
What is important is that the reasons for which she acts are the moral reasons. 
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the relevant moral reasons even though she perceives them.38 
 As a general theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
blameworthiness, Arpaly’s theory should be applicable to cases where agents act from 
ignorance.  One straightforward way of applying it is to include it in the ignorant action 
schema I introduced in chapter one.  According to that schema, an agent is responsible 
for acting from ignorance when her ignorance is itself culpable.  A quality of will theorist 
might then hold that ignorance is culpable only if, in forming and maintaining her beliefs, 
the agent possessed an ill will or otherwise lacked a good will.  Since Arpaly understands 
quality of will in terms of reasons-responsiveness, an Arpalyan theory of culpable 
ignorance would look like this: 
QWB (quality of will for belief): An agent’s ignorance is culpable only if (i) she 
formed her beliefs via a process that was non (moral) reasons-responsive 
(indicating the absence of good will) or (ii) she formed beliefs via a process that 
was responding to the reasons that make the process morally wrong (indicating 
the presence of ill will).   
To establish responsibility for actions on ignorance, QWB must be satisfied, and the 
following must be true: 
EC: X is morally responsible for A-ing only if either X knew it was wrong to A, 
or X is culpably ignorant about whether it was wrong to A. 
This is just a general statement of the epistemic condition for moral responsibility that 
was discussed in chapter 1.   An ignorant agent is responsible so long as she satisfies the 
                                                
38 These two ways of failing to respond to reasons are also discussed by Fisher and Ravizza.  The ability to 
perceive the relevant moral reasons is called ‘receptivity’, and the ability to conform actions to the perceived 
moral reasons is called ‘reactivity’. See: J. M Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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conditions in QWB.  QWB together with EC constitute one straightforward way of 
defending a quality of will-based account of the epistemic condition for moral 
responsibility.  Although Arpaly does not spell out her view in exactly this way, I think 
that the theoretical elements I have just elucidated are faithful to her view. 
     In order to see how this account of culpable ignorance works in specific case, 
consider the negligent physician who is ignorant about how safely to treat her patient and 
whose ignorance traces to a motivational deficit.  Imagine that she noticed that she had 
moral reasons to stay current on the latest research, but she was moved instead by her 
desire to watch a movie.  Assume that because of this, the physician has a false belief 
about whether a particular common medication is safe.  Also assume that the act of 
prescribing the medication was done from a good will.  This physician is intuitively 
blameworthy for harming her patients, even though she wrote the prescription in part 
because she was concerned about her patient’s well being.  When the physician is in the 
treatment room, we can presume that she is responding the moral reasons to help her 
patient with her problem, in a way that would in most circumstances be praiseworthy. 
Because of this, the negligent physician’s blameworthiness cannot rest her meeting the 
first disjunct of QWA, which states that an agent is blameworthy for an action if and only 
if she acts from a deficit of reasons-responsiveness.  If the ignorant physician in this case 
is blameworthy for harming her patient, it must be grounded on something other than her 
reasons-responsiveness at the time she unwittingly gives her patient a toxic drug.  The 
natural response to this is to focus on the quality of the agent’s will at the time that she 
forms the false belief, which is precisely what QWB does.  In this case, the physician 
plainly seems to meet the condition for culpable ignorance in QWB, since she fails to 
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react to the moral reasons that require her to stay current on her research.  Though she 
noticed that there were reasons to take time out of her day and study, she wasn’t 
sufficiently moved by them, and instead was moved by her desire to see a film.  
 So far, I have been considering a quality of will account of the epistemic 
condition in a fairly abstract fashion.  I have tried to imagine what such an account would 
look like and the tentative result is expressed by QWB.  In what follows I will look more 
carefully at Arpaly’s explicit treatment of the matter of ignorance and moral 
responsibility.  I will interpret her as offering an account of how an agent’s quality of will 
might affect both the beliefs she will come to hold and her blameworthiness for unwitting 
wrong action on those beliefs.  I will argue that her approach to these issues falls short, 
but that it paves the way for a better theory, which I explore later in the chapter.   
 
2.2.1 Honest ignorance and motivated ignorance 
Arpaly takes up these issues in a discussion of the contrast between “pure 
ignorance” and what I call motivated ignorance.  She argues that a case of action on 
falsely held empirical beliefs is excusable if the false belief is “epistemically rational”.39 
Although she does not provide an account of exactly what conditions a false belief must 
meet in order to qualify as epistemically rational, she suggests that it has something to do 
with responding to available evidence and deferring to reasonable epistemic authorities.  
Here is her example: 
   
Boko Fittleworth (a character in a P.G. Wodehouse novel) overpowers and traps a 
                                                
39 Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, 103. 
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man whom he spots hiding in his would-be father-in-law’s garden shed at 
midnight, because he believes the man to be a burglar.  In fact, the man is not a 
burglar but a business tycoon whose presence in the shed is part of a secret, 
unlikely, and harmless plot in which the father-in-law is a willing participant.40 
 
Arpaly states that Boko’s mistake is honest and because it is epistemically rational.  The 
idea seems to be that there is nothing in Boko’s motivational set that implicates him in his 
unwittingly trapping an innocent person.  Given Boko’s evidence, it was perfectly 
legitimate for him to believe that something untoward is taking place.  I will return to 
Arpaly’s discussion of honest ignorance below, but, first, I will discuss her analysis of 
motivated ignorance.   
 Arpaly’s treatment of motivated ignorance also appeals to the notion of epistemic 
rationality.  On my reading of Arpaly, the epistemic rationality of a belief functions as an 
indicator of the fact that the agent’s ignorant action stems from either the presence of an 
ill will or an absence of good will.  This is especially clear in her discussion of the false 
factual beliefs held by racists and bigots.  Arpaly argues that the best explanation for why 
many racists hold false beliefs about the intellectual abilities of blacks is not that they are 
just making honest mistakes like Boko.  Their beliefs are irrational “prejudices” that they 
hold because sinister motivations are affecting their belief-formation. Actions on such 
ignorance are still blameworthy because of the presence of this motive.  When discussing 
the case of motivatedly ignorant anti-Semite who believes all manner of false things 
about Jews, Arpaly says: 
 
                                                
40 Ibid., 102. 
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“The anti-Semite mistreats the Jew because she wants to mistreat someone and is 
therefore ready to believe anything about the Jews, as long as it is bad.  Thus the 
anti-Semite is not doing what she does because of an honest mistake, but because 
of a sinister motive.”41 
 
In such a case, the anti-Semite’s ill will towards Jews causes her to believe all manner of 
falsehoods about them.  However, Arpaly maintains that ignorance that is rooted in the 
presence of ill will does not excuse the racist or anti-Semite.  An agent, who acts on such 
‘motivated’ ignorance can be blameworthy for her unwitting action, provided there are no 
other excusing conditions.   
There is a second way in which ignorance can be impure and potentially 
inculpating.  This ignorance is not motivated by the presence of an ill will, but instead it 
has its roots in her failure to respond to moral reasons.  Someone might come to hold 
racist beliefs, not because they possessed an antecedent hatred for blacks, but because 
they just don’t take relevant inquiry seriously.  In these cases, the agent’s ignorance is 
traceable to what Arpaly calls a lack of concern for morality.  She asks us to imagine an 
anti-Semite whose belief-formation processes are not motivated by antecedent hatred of 
Jews, but simply by a desire to fit in with her social group, all of which happen to be anti-
Semites.  When discussing this type of case, Arpaly states: 
 
“If respect for persons is a deep concern for you – deeper than the desire to be 
popular with your anti-Semitic friends – you will think more than twice before 
accepting the view that Jews are not persons in the face of powerful evidence to 
                                                
41 Ibid. p.106 
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the contrary.”42 
  
So rather than tracing back to the presence of a sinister will, the ignorance in this case is 
traceable to the anti-Semite’s lack of serious concern for morality.  The notion of moral 
concern is central to this aspect of Arpaly’s account of moral responsibility.  She seems 
to think that an absence of moral concern in cases of ignorance involves either the failure 
to notice the relevant moral reasons or the failure to be sufficiently motivated by moral 
reasons when one is forming and revising one’s beliefs.  Thus, her account of moral 
concern bears a significant relationship to reasons-responsiveness.  Indeed, the relation 
seems to be identity.  At one point she states explicitly that she “takes good will to be the 
same thing as moral concern and as responsiveness to moral reasons”.43  It follows then, 
by lacking moral concern, the second anti-Semite was not responding to the right reasons 
when she formed her beliefs about the qualities of Jews.  If she were more responsive to 
the reasons that make anti-Semitism wrong, it would have been much more difficult for 
her to acquiesce in her belief that Jews were not persons.  It is this lack of reasons-
responsiveness that makes her blameworthy for her ignorant action.  
 
2.2.2 Moral concern and epistemic rationality 
As I mentioned above, Arpaly seems takes the notion of moral concern to be 
tightly bound up with epistemic rationality.  If you have moral concern, that is if you are 
responsive to the relevant reasons, “you will think more than twice” before believing 
certain things on scant evidence or unreliable authority.  Certain cases of ignorance are 
                                                
42 Ibid. p.110 
43 p.79 
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“pure” because they are epistemically rational.  In these cases there is no failure to 
respond to moral reasons that is fouling up one’s belief formation processes.  Other cases 
of ignorance are “impure” on her view because they are epistemically irrational in a 
special way – agents come to hold a false belief because they fail to respond to moral 
reasons.  This moral failure makes agents vulnerable to epistemic error.  This connection 
between an important kind of rationality and reasons-responsiveness is an attractive 
feature of her view.  It allows for the possibility of epistemically rational ignorance 
(Boko’s) that does not indicate a failure of reasons-responsiveness.  It also captures what 
seems right about common sense cases of blameworthy ignorance.  Agents who are less 
concerned about getting things right (the negligent physician or the impressionable anti-
Semite) will be especially vulnerable to epistemic irrationality.  Thus, Arpaly’s view 
seems to establish a salient connection between the ignorant agent and the wrong action.  
Culpable ignorance is irrational and traceable to the very features of the agent that justify 
ascriptions of responsibility in non-ignorant cases, namely the agent’s reasons-
responsiveness.  In what follows, I will argue that despite these attractive features, 
Arpaly’s account gets something importantly wrong.  I will argue in the end that the 
connection she wishes to establish between the ignorant agent’s false beliefs and her 
reasons-responsiveness is too tight and fails to capture an important class of intuitively 
blameless beliefs.     
 Before raising specific objections to the quality of will view, I will first tease 
apart the notion of epistemic rationality and moral reasons-responsiveness in a way that 
begins to elucidate problems with Arpaly’s approach. Although the notion of epistemic 
rationality certainly seems relevant to the question of whether an agent’s ignorance is 
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exculpating, it is not entirely clear just what role it should play in a theory of culpable 
ignorance.  In particular, if it is possible for epistemic rationality and moral reasons 
responsiveness to come apart, then the theoretical landscape might be more complex than 
Arpaly’s discussion seems to countenance.  Her discussion of the false beliefs held by 
racists and sexists suggests that their epistemic rationality is affected by deficits in their 
moral reasons-responsiveness.  They form beliefs in epistemically irrational ways 
because they are not responding to the relevant moral reasons.  This much seems exactly 
right.  Arpaly suggests that the racist’s and sexist’s false beliefs are not honest (they are 
culpable) either because the cognitive processes that formed the beliefs are stunted by a 
sinister background motive (e.g. Hatred for Jews) or the cognitive processes that formed 
the false beliefs were affected by the agent’s lack of sufficient moral concern (e.g. they 
just don’t care that much about respecting others).  Since she equates lacking moral 
concern with failing to respond to moral reasons, these cases involve the agent’s 
believing in ways that are epistemically irrational because they are not responding to 
reasons that should influence their belief formation activities.  Cases where agents are 
both non-reasons-responsive and epistemically irrational may get a grip on our intuition 
that the agent is blameworthy because the agent is doubly less than ideal – she exhibits 
both moral and epistemic shortcomings.  But, since epistemic rationality and moral 
reasons-responsiveness are completely different categories of evaluation, what ought we 
to conclude about cases where agents fall short of one standard but not the other? 
Unfortunately, Arpaly’s view does not provide much guidance on these important 
cases.  This is problematic, since it seems obvious that judgments of epistemic rationality 
seem to be based largely on the process by which agents form beliefs, and judgments that 
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they are not moral reasons-responsive are based on their capacities to recognize moral 
reasons or be motivated by their recognition.  Epistemic rationality involves assessments 
of the agent’s epistemic behavior, while reasons-responsiveness involves her capacities.  
Since these are assessments of fundamentally different capacities and dispositions, we 
should expect that they will vary independently of one another.  More importantly, it 
seems possible and perhaps obligatory to evaluate an agent’s epistemic rationality, given 
what her capacities are, limited though they may be.  When agents are not capable of 
responding to the reasons for believing whether some complicated scientific theory is 
true, we might think that their beliefs, false or otherwise, are nonetheless rational given 
their limited capacities.  Similarly, might it be the case that an agent can rationally hold a 
false moral belief despite the fact that they are not responding to the moral reasons that 
bear on the issue?  I will now turn to an exploration of this question.  To anticipate, 
failures to respond to moral reasons that lead to false moral beliefs can be rational in just 
the same way that failures to respond to existing evidence about complicated scientific 
theories are rational.  I argue that once we have a clear understanding of these issues it 
will reveal important problems for Arpaly’s account.   
 First, consider agents who are fully responsive to the moral reasons but who fall 
short on the dimension of epistemic rationality.  For this case to stand apart from 
Arpaly’s examples, the agents must have the utmost concern for morality, they must have 
some proficiency at perceiving moral reasons, and they must be sufficiently strongly 
motivated by them.  This agent might nonetheless be epistemically irrational in some 
non-controversial sense.  Agents who are thinking about how best to apply their moral 
principles, might make simple mistakes as they answer morally relevant questions, such 
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as what the likelihood that a certain bridge type will collapse or which charity will most 
effectively address destruction caused by a natural disaster.  Even the most morally 
upstanding person is liable to suffer from memory lapses and the occasional invalid 
inference.   How should the quality of will theorist handle cases of simple epistemic 
mistakes?   
 Before answering this, it is important to note that this class of cases differs from 
what Arpaly calls honest mistakes, which involve ignorance that is epistemically rational.  
Recall that given Boko’s evidence, it was perfectly rational to believe something was 
afoot and that trapping the intruder was a reasonable response.  By hypothesis, the agents 
who make simple mistakes are plainly not epistemically rational.  Given their evidence, 
their beliefs are not rational.  Though they made a mistake, they also seem not to possess 
an absence of good will (nor do they possess an ill will).  Agents who make simple 
epistemic mistakes are interesting cases since their quality of will, understood in terms of 
responsiveness to moral reasons, seems to be beyond reproach.  Rather, it is their ‘quality 
of rationality’, or ‘quality of mind’ that is substandard in such cases.  Arpaly might 
simply grant that agents who respond to moral reasons, but whose ignorance is traceable 
to a simple epistemic mistake, are not blameworthy because they possess neither the 
absence of good-will nor ill will.  But, this would require expanding the palate of 
blameless ignorance beyond honest epistemically rational mistakes.  I do not raise these 
cases in order to argue that Arpaly cannot handle them.  I only wish to note that they do 
not seem to fit the classificatory scheme she defends.     
     The second and more problematic class of ignorance also involves epistemic 
rationality coming apart from reasons-responsiveness.  These ignorant agents are not 
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moral reasons-responsive but they are nonetheless epistemically rational, again, in some 
non-controversial sense.  Recall that on Arpaly’s view, these agents, simply by virtue of 
being non-reasons responsive will have ‘impure’ ignorance and will presumably be 
blameworthy for their acting on it.  Cases like this have been at center of much discussion 
in the moral responsibility literature.  Consider Susan Wolf’s example of Jojo.44  He was 
the son of a brutal dictator who was taught to disvalue the lives of members of his 
society’s lower class.  The reader is supposed to imagine that Jojo’s (im)moral education 
was effective in the sense that he was not capable of recognizing the fact that members of 
the underclass would suffer under some oppressive policy as a reason not to implement it.  
He seems to be just blind to the relevant moral reasons that should influence him.  For the 
sake of argument, we should also stipulate that he is not acting from an ill will in 
Arpaly’s sense – he is not thinking about implementing the policy because it will cause 
members of the underclass to suffer.  Gideon Rosen and Fischer and Rivazza have 
discussed similar cases.45  These authors conclude that in Jojo-like cases, the agent’s false 
moral beliefs are in some sense rational – given the evidence available to these agents, 
they make reasonable inferences to false moral beliefs.  In these cases, the agents are 
plausibly thought to be epistemically rational for holding their false beliefs, despite the 
fact that they are not capable of seeing the relevant reasons as relevant or, as the case may 
be, dispositive.  If an agent’s quality of will turns on her ability to respond to moral 
reasons, and if part of responding to reasons requires recognizing those reasons, then 
agents like Jojo will be understood at least to have an absence of good will.  The problem 
                                                
44 S. Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays 
in Moral Psychology, ed. F. Schoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 46–62. 
45 Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility”; Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, Chapter 
seven. 
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is that Arpaly’s proposed treatment of these cases seems too insensitive to their epistemic 
rationality.  At the very least, we might think that Jojo’s ignorant action is less 
blameworthy, given that he’s acting from epistemically rational beliefs.  This move, 
however, is unavailable to Arpaly, since whatever else we say about Jojo’s epistemic 
situation, he is still failing to respond to the rather strong reasons not to treat people the 
way he does.  This ‘absence of moral concern’ is a fact about Jojo, not his situation, and 
so, Arpaly seems badly positioned to maintain that Jojo’s blameworthiness is mitigated 
by the eminent rationality of his false moral beliefs. 
 This problem is more readily apparent in cases where the ignorance in question is 
not the result of moral insensitivity that was forged by a twisted upbringing.  Some of our 
ignorance stems from the profound difficulty of getting things right morally speaking.   
An agent may try her best to consider all the morally relevant factors that her situation 
presents, and still have false beliefs.  This possibility is readily apparent given 
widespread disagreement about what first order moral theory is the best.  Assume for the 
sake of argument that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory, but that a philosopher 
named Kris has convinced herself after careful study that some version of Kantian 
deontology is right.  Assume further that if Kris was to keep a promise to her friend that it 
would cause all manner of unnecessary suffering.  Because of this, the right thing to do 
according to the true moral theory is not to keep the promise.  However, Kris’ Kantian 
predilections cause her to dismiss the consequences of lying as morally irrelevant given 
the importance of respecting her friend’s rational humanity by keeping the promise.  Kris, 
ex hypothesi, has a false moral belief, but given the fact that she came to it by carefully 
weighing the evidence and by striving to locate and weigh the morally relevant features 
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of the situation, it sounds strained to say that her belief is epistemically irrational.  I take 
it as a given that for extraordinarily difficult areas of inquiry, false yet epistemically 
rational beliefs are the norm.  In the moral case under consideration here, the agent’s 
false moral belief will stem from being insensitive to the moral reasons that are relevant 
to the case – she simply failed to see that the outcome of the utility calculation was 
morally decisive.  Kris is in many respects like the pre-Copernican astronomer who 
despite all of her dedicated work, failed to notice that a reorientation of the earth’s 
position relative to the sun better explained the astronomic data.   
 Arpaly would be committed to the view that the Kris’ ignorance is the result of 
her non-responsiveness to moral reasons.  And, since non-responsiveness to moral 
reasons is equivalent with the absence of moral concern, Arpaly is also committed to 
saying that Kris lacks moral concern and would be blameworthy for acting on her false 
belief and failing to maximize utility.  Arpaly must maintain these claims despite the fact 
that the false belief in question, that it she should keep her promise, is manifestly 
epistemically rational given how opaque the moral evidence is.  She must maintain that 
Kris lacks moral concern despite the fact that she has given her life over to the rigorous 
exploration of moral questions. Arpaly’s view seems to entail that only agent’s who adopt 
the true first order moral theory will can avoid being un-responsive to moral reasons, 
which is equivalent to the claim that only true-believers will have moral concern.  Agents 
who justifiably hold a rival moral theory will by definition lack a good will, and thus will 
be blameworthy for acting wrongly on the basis of their false beliefs. 
 I have raised several worries for Arpaly’s account of blameworthy wrong action.  
The feature of Arpaly’s view that is problematic in ignorance cases is her way of 
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understanding moral concern.  Because an agent’s blameworthiness depends so 
intimately on her moral reasons-responsiveness, problematic cases will arise wherein 
agents fail to respond to moral reasons but seem to be blamelessly ignorant.  While the 
relevance of an ignorant agent’s concern for morality seems prima facie relevant to 
assessing whether the ignorant agent acts culpably, it is not at all clear that Arpaly’s 
proposal best captures it.  When moral concern is understood as de re reasons-
responsiveness, the bar is set fairly high.  Although it seems to capture important cases of 
motivated ignorance and ignorance owed to intellectual laziness, it also impugns agents 
who, owing to the difficulty of getting things right morally speaking, come to hold a false 
belief about what morality requires.  In the second half of this chapter, I will propose a 
refinement to Arpaly’s quality of will view that avoids these problems.  
  
2.2 Introducing the New Quality of Will View 
 In this section I will defend a modification of the quality of will view of the epistemic 
condition of moral responsibility.  My account combines the core element of Arpaly’s 
quality of will view, namely that an agent’s blameworthiness is tied to her reasons-
responsiveness, with the appeal to epistemic norms and duties that was central to the 
volitionist view that I discussed in chapter one.  One of the most important desiderata for 
any plausible theory of moral responsibility is that it must connect the act, or more 
specifically, the wrong-making features of the act, to the agent.  A straightforward 
connection of this morally salient kind is difficult in the case of ignorant action, because 
the agent may be acting ignorantly from non-vicious or even laudable motives.  The 
clearest example of this is the negligent physician discussed above.  When she is treating 
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her patients her proximal motive is to relieve the patient’s suffering and improve the 
patient’s health prospects.  It is only by focusing on the physician’s prior behavior that 
one locates her absence of good will.  I agree with Arpaly that the best way of forging the 
requisite connection between the agent and the wrongness of her act is by reference to the 
agent’s quality of will at the time she is forming beliefs.  I think, however, that we must 
focus on the degree to which the agent fell short of epistemic duties or obligations.  What 
I hope to show in this chapter and, indeed, over the subsequent three chapters, is that 
epistemic norms play an in ineliminable role in any claim that an agent is responsible for 
unwitting wrong or bad actions.   
As we saw above, there are important problems with Arpaly’s treatment of 
ignorance and moral responsibility.  I argued that her account commits her to the 
implausible position that agents who act from justifiably held but false moral theories are 
acting from an absence of good will.  I contend that what is driving the intuition that such 
ignorant agents are not blameworthy is the idea that even though they are not aware of 
nor fully responsive to the actual moral reasons when they formulate their beliefs, they 
have nonetheless met all plausible and relevant epistemic obligations to which they are 
subject.  If this is right, then the quality of will theorist should augment their view in a 
way that makes reference to norms and obligations that govern the way we form beliefs.46  
In a word, my theory is that agents are culpably ignorant if they failed to respond to the 
reasons underlying their epistemic obligations.  
 
2.2.1 New Quality of Will View 
The structure of my view is familiar by now.  Like the volitionists, I will attempt to forge 
                                                
46 Arpaly argues explicitly against this move on ibid p. 109-110.  I will discuss her argument below. 
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a connection between an ignorant agent and the wrongness or badness of her action by 
relying on the notion of epistemic norms.  Recall that the volitionist’s proposal was that 
ignorance is culpable when it can be traced to a witting failure to form beliefs according 
to what Rosen called procedural epistemic norms.  The volitionist’s view was that an 
agent who akratically fails to comply with one these epistemic norms is culpably 
ignorant.  Although, my view is structurally identical to the volitionist’s, I think that 
rather than requiring an akratic failure to comply with epistemic norms, we need only 
find a failure that occurred because of the agent’s poor quality of will.  The view of 
culpable ignorance that I will defend for the rest of the dissertation is:    
 
QW: An ignorant agent is culpable for her false beliefs only if her ignorance is 
traceable to an epistemic norm violation that occurred because the agent lacked 
good will or possessed ill will.  
 
 I will follow Arpaly in identifying the agent’s quality of will with her reasons-
responsiveness. Substituting such an account of quality of will into QW yields the 
following:  
 
QR: An ignorant agent is culpable for her false beliefs only if her ignorance is 
traceable to an epistemic norm violation that occurred because the agent either (1) 
failed to respond to the reasons that underlie the norm or (2) responded to the 
reasons that make non-compliance with the norm wrong. 
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Consider how QR would treat the negligent physician case.   It is incumbent on 
physicians to keep abreast of new data regarding the risks and benefits of the treatment 
she regularly prescribes.  Although this is vaguely formulated, I take it that the existence 
of this epistemic obligation is uncontroversial.  When the lazy physician chooses to watch 
a movie rather than read through the latest journals, she is falling short of this epistemic 
obligation.  In order to meet QR, however, it is not enough that she fall short.  She must 
fall short because she is unresponsive to the reasons that underlie the epistemic 
obligation.  It is this failure to see or react to the moral reasons that ground the epistemic 
obligation that establishes the requisite connection between the ignorant action and the 
agent.  The precise content of these norms and the nature of the reasons that underlie 
them is a topic that I address in chapters three and four.  For current purposes, however, 
we can assume that the epistemic obligation in question is an obligation to engage in the 
act of investigation and that it is supported at least by the risk of harm to patients of 
acting on false beliefs about the safety of the popular treatments.  If the physician failed 
to recognize or react to these reasons, then she counts as unresponsive to the reasons 
underlying her epistemic obligations, and is culpably ignorant according to QR.  In either 
case, the physician’s ignorance is tied to her responsiveness to reasons.   
 It should be obvious that, so far, QR treats this negligence case in much the same 
way as Arpaly’s quality of will view does.  On her view and mine, the agent is 
blameworthy because of her failure to respond to reasons.  The important difference is 
that on my view the relevant reasons are those that ground the agent’s epistemic 
obligations that, when complied with, are supposed to diminish the likelihood of 
ignorance.  On Arpaly’s view, it is not necessary that reasons to which the agent fails to 
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respond underlie an epistemic obligation.  This difference will have a significant impact 
in the discussion of several cases below. 
 One of the central advantages of QR over Arpaly’s view is how it treats cases 
where agents have false beliefs that are in some important sense epistemically rational.  I 
argued above that Arpaly’s view lacks the resources to classify these cases in an intuitive 
fashion because an agent counts as non-responsive to the moral reasons and, thus, 
culpably ignorant, whether or not her belief is rational given her circumstances, 
experience, and store of knowledge.  Her view just is not sensitive to the fact that there 
are central cases where epistemically poorly positioned agents are doing all that we could 
reasonably expect of them but still fail to recognize or react to certain reasons.  On my 
view, the question of culpability for ignorant action turns on the question of whether the 
agent meets her epistemic obligations, not the simpler question of whether she failed to 
respond to reasons, full stop.  In some cases, the very fact that an agent has met all of her 
epistemic obligations gives us a reason to classify any lingering false beliefs as rational.  
These cases are interesting because the agents may be responsive to the reasons to take 
their inquiry seriously, yet, while they are actually engaged in their inquiry, they fail to 
respond to certain reasons and come to accept certain false beliefs.  As I discussed above, 
there are several circumstances in which this scenario is likely to arise.  For example, in 
certain domains of inquiry it is very difficult to form true beliefs in non-lucky ways 
because of the opacity of the evidential reasons.  As long as the epistemic obligations are 
not too demanding, it is possible, and indeed, it may be common, for agents to hold false 
beliefs, despite having done what could reasonably have been expected of them.  The 
motivating thought behind my view, as expressed in QR, is that our assessments of 
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whether an agent’s ignorance is culpable should be sensitized to their concern for getting 
things right morally speaking.  If someone fails to form correct moral beliefs because 
they failed to respond appropriately to moral reasons, we cannot assume that they thereby 
lack moral concern.  To the contrary, this failure may have occurred in the context of a 
period of sustained inquiry that the agent undertook in response to the moral reasons that 
support obligations to engage in such an inquiry.     
 Consider how this view treats the cases I discussed in section 2.2.  Wolf’s Jojo is 
ignorant about how people in his society deserve to be treated.  As the case is described, 
Jojo’s environment and influences have been so carefully controlled that it was nearly 
inevitable that he would come to hold this false belief.  Importantly, this near inevitability 
follows from the fact that, barring some miraculous epistemic insight, Jojo was bound to 
believe this.  The sense in which he was bound to believe moral falsehoods is that despite 
meeting all plausible epistemic obligations to which he is subject, Jojo would 
nevertheless be ignorant.  Having met his obligations with respect to formulating and 
managing his moral beliefs, Jojo’s ignorance fails to meet the conditions in QR and is 
thereby non-culpably ignorant.   
It should be easy to see that my view also yields a different, and I would argue 
more intuitive verdict on the hard and controversial cases that philosophers routinely 
discuss.  Recall that on Arpaly’s view, the philosopher who still comes to hold a false 
moral belief, despite thinking deeply and carefully on the subject is still not responding to 
the right moral reasons.  As such, their ignorance is culpable and they have no excuse 
should they act on it.  My view generates the opposite verdict.  The thinker who comes to 
the debate over whether active euthanasia is morally permissible with an open mind may, 
!!
62 
!
through her investigations and reflections, meet all reasonable epistemic duties and still 
come to believe falsely.  On my view this philosopher is like the 15th century astronomer 
who believed in a geo-centric cosmology – given the best attempts to gather and process 
the relevant evidence, false beliefs are to be expected.  I would argue that in cases like 
this, that an agent holds a false moral belief do not reflect on who she is.  The answer to 
the question why a given philosopher, who has met her epistemic obligations, holds a 
false moral belief should be that the domain of inquiry lends itself to such outcomes, not 
that the philosopher failed to respond to the reasons for holding the true belief.  That 
would be akin to saying that the reason why the 15th century geo-centrist is not a helio-
centrist is that she failed to respond to the reasons for believing helio-centrism.  One 
promising feature of my quality of epistemic will view is that our assessments of 
culpability for ignorance reflect the better explanations for the existence of the ignorance.  
The best theory of culpable ignorance should establish a tight and morally significant 
connection between the agent, the ignorance producing action, and the ignorance itself.  
When facts such as the impenetrability of the domain of inquiry play such a significant 
role in explaining the ignorance, then there is reason to wonder whether such a 
connection has been established. 
At this point, I must make a series of important promissory notes.  So far, I have 
been using the term epistemic obligations ambiguously.  There are at least two different 
applications the term ‘epistemic obligation’.  One might think of epistemic obligations as 
obligations to hold certain beliefs in light of the available evidence or background beliefs.  
We appeal to this sense of epistemic obligation when we say the following: if you believe 
that it’s raining outside and you believe that you car window is open, then you ought to 
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believe that the inside of your car is getting wet.  The ‘ought’ in this claim applies to an 
obligation to hold certain beliefs.  By contrast, one might think of epistemic obligations 
as obligations to perform certain actions that have epistemic upshots.  We appeal to this 
sense of epistemic obligation when we say: if you are going on a cross-country trip, you 
ought to verify that your tires are properly inflated.  The sense in which it is an epistemic 
obligation is that the relevant action is required because of the value or importance of the 
belief likely to be formed by that action.  Since I have not yet stated which type of 
epistemic obligation is relevant for the theory of culpable ignorance that I’ve proposed, it 
is difficult to assess the degree to which it is an improvement over Arpaly’s view, and 
indeed, over all the views I discussed in chapter one.  In the next two chapters, I will take 
up this issue.  In chapter three, I examine epistemic obligations of the latter kind, namely, 
obligations to perform actions with epistemic upshots, and in chapter four, I explore 
epistemic obligations to hold certain beliefs.  In each chapter, the guiding question is 
whether agents who fall short of their epistemic obligations by failing to respond to the 
reasons that underlie them are thereby revealing a quality of will that licenses attributions 
of blameworthiness.  In chapter five, I will return to a specific discussion of the new 
quality of will view, and I show how it is impacted by the conclusions I draw regarding 
epistemic obligations.  In that chapter, I will also discuss how the new quality of will 
view will handle certain interesting cases of normative ignorance.   
Before making good on any of these promises, I will close this chapter 
considering and responding to an important objection to the New Quality of Will view. 
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2.4 REPLY TO AN OBJECTION 
 The objection I want to rebut is the claim that there simply is no substantive difference 
between my view and an ordinary quality of will view of culpable ignorance.  The quality 
of will account to which I am most indebted holds that and agent’s quality of will just is 
her reasons responsiveness.  The objector may maintain that my focus on responsiveness 
to reasons that underlie epistemic obligations does little to distinguish my view from 
Arpaly’s.  This objection can be buttressed by the argument that Arpaly’s view can 
incorporate the epistemic norm and reason talk in a straightforward fashion.  The reasons 
that support the epistemic norms will just be part of the class of reasons that determines 
the degree to which the agent is morally responsible.  What I have put forward as my own 
view simply focuses the reader’s attention to an extant feature of Arpaly’s theory. 
 My first reply to this objection is that Arpaly does not take herself to be defending 
a theory in which epistemic norms play a prominent role.  Indeed, Arpaly has explicitly 
disavowed this way of accounting for responsibility for ignorant actions.  She writes: 
 
Another claim I wish to avoid is the claim that we are responsible for our 
irrational beliefs in the way that one is responsible for “culpable ignorance” or 
criminal negligence – the view that we have a duty to “check on our beliefs the 
way that we have a duty to check the brakes on our cars.47 
 
Her reasons for rejecting the idea epistemic obligations or duties are relevant to moral 
responsibility is that “we do not even know which of our beliefs need checking more than 
                                                
47 Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, 109. 
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others”.48  I am not sure I feel the force of her objection, and she does little to develop it.  
One reason to reject it is it simply that it doesn’t follow from her claim that we often do 
not know which beliefs to scrutinize that we therefore don’t have any epistemic 
obligations at all.  For example, it strikes me as uncontroversial that parents have 
obligations to investigate the safety profile of car seats and swing sets.  Even if Arpaly is 
right that it often difficult to ascertain which beliefs are more likely to be false, there are 
areas of our doxastic economy that obviously call for close scrutiny, given the obvious 
moral risks posed by ignorance.  Her general skepticism about epistemic obligations 
seems unmotivated at best, and simply false at worst.  I want to flag this passage as 
evidence that my own view stands as a marked departure from Arpaly’s, at least on her 
own interpretation of her view. 
 My second reply to this objection is simply to elucidate the difference between 
my view and Arpaly’s quality of will theory of culpable ignorance by reviewing the 
different verdicts that they yield for standard cases of ignorance.  Recall the case of agent 
whose ignorance about what morality requires in a specific case survives deep and 
prolonged scrutiny.  Assume that S believes falsely that it is morally permissible to Φ and 
that, given the weightiness of the issue, there is a fairly strong moral obligation to engage 
in just the degree and amount of moral reflection that she performed.  On Arpaly’s view 
this agent is not responsive to the reasons why it is wrong to Φ.  Should she act on this 
false belief, her wrong action would be blameworthy according because the agent failed 
to respond to the reasons that make her action wrong.  By contrast, my own view entails 
that the agent’s ignorance is non-culpable since she did not fail to meet her epistemic 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
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obligations.49  In this case, her ignorance is indicative of the difficulty of her epistemic 
situation rather than the quality of her epistemic agency.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Of course, I am assuming here that the relevant epistemic obligation is the obligation to engage in the act of 
moral investigation and reflection and not the epistemic obligation to hold a certain moral belief.  If there were 
an epistemic obligation to believe that it is wrong to phi, then, this agent actually would have fallen short of an 
epistemic obligation and would potentially be blameworthy for her ignorant action even on my view.  This 
suggests, consistent with the objection that I am entertaining in this section, that there might not be much 
difference between Arpaly’s view and my own after all.  Again, a complete response to this must wait until I 
complete the examination of epistemic obligations and norms in the subsequent two chapters.  By way of 
preview, I will argue over the course of the next two chapters that the type of epistemic obligation that is 
relevant to my view involve obligations to act not obligations to believe.  This preserves my response to the 
objection that my view and Arpaly’s are too similar. 
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CHAPTER 3: EPISTEMIC OUGHTS AND IGNORANT 
ACTION 
3.1) Introduction 
3.2) Transferring Culpability from Ignorance to Action 
3.3) The Normativity of Epistemic Norms 
3.4) Aim-Relative Actional Norms and Culpable Ignorance 
3.5) Aim-Neutral Actional Norms and Culpable Ignorance 
3.6) Conclusion 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Many theorists who work on moral responsibility argue that agents are culpably ignorant 
in virtue of falling short of some epistemic obligation.50  If an ignorant agent acted 
wrongly or badly, and if we want to know whether she is morally responsible for that 
action, then it seems natural to inquire into the nature and origin of the ignorance.  One 
burden of any account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that appeals to 
epistemic duties or obligations is to motivate and explain how epistemic failures establish 
the act-agent relation that is required for moral responsibility.  How is it that the failure to 
comply with an epistemic obligation, which may come at a significant temporal remove 
from the subsequent ignorant action, shows that the agent is blameworthy for action done 
later?  Indeed, one might hold the view that ignorance does excuse the agent from her 
wrong action, but that she is blameworthy for the prior ignorance producing action.  One 
                                                
50 Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility”; “Rosen - Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility - Journal of 
Philosophy”; Dana Kay Nelkin, “George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness,” Ethics 121, no. 3 
(April 1, 2011): 675–680; Levy, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility.” 
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of the tasks of this chapter is to show how culpability ‘transfers’ from the ignorance itself 
to the subsequent ignorant action.   
 Another related burden on theorists who appeal to epistemic obligations is to 
provide a precise account of the kind of epistemic ought claims that are relevant to moral 
responsibility assessments in cases of ignorant action.  This is no easy task, given the 
wide use that “epistemic norm” and “epistemic obligation” receives in the philosophical 
literature.  These norms are multitudinous, and they can be sorted into several different 
classes.  For the purposes of this discussion I will use the term “epistemic norm” as 
synonymous with “epistemic obligation” and “epistemic duty”.  Evidentialism is a theory 
of epistemic justification according to which beliefs are justified so long as they are 
supported by evidence.  This view of epistemic justification, when combined with the 
normative claim that it is in some sense better to have justified beliefs rather than 
unjustified ones, entails that it would be better for our beliefs to be supported by 
evidence.  Alternatively, we might conclude that one should hold only those beliefs that 
are supported by evidence.  Though this theory has its roots in John Locke51, W.K. 
Clifford captures it succinctly when he says, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”.52  There are many contemporary 
proponents of evidentialism.53  Though there are subtle differences in the way that they 
would formulate the evidentialist epistemic norms, the following list54 of norms would 
                                                
51 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Penguin Books Ltd, 2004), Chap. XVIII, section 24. 
52 William Kingdon Clifford, Lectures and Essays (Macmillan and co., 1886), 346. 
53 Roderick M. Chisholm, “Epistemic Statements and the Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 16, no. 4 (June 1, 1956): 447–460; Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical 
Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 48, no. 1 (July 1, 1985): 15–34; R. White, 
“Epistemic Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives 19, no. 1 (2005): 445–459; N. Shah, “How Truth Governs 
Belief,” The Philosophical Review 112, no. 4 (2003): 447. 
54 I hope that the norms I’ve listed below are non-controversial.  Many of them are ‘common sense’ and many 
others have analogs in the literature on epistemic norms.  For a nice discussion of these and other epistemic 
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likely be affirmed by each of them: 
  
S should believe that p only if S's evidence for p is strong. 
The degree to which S believes that p should be apportioned to S's evidence that 
p. 
If S believes that the evidence for and against p is equally strong, S should 
suspend judgment about whether p.  
If S is exposed to conclusive evidence that p, and if S has the capacity to respond 
to this evidence, then S should believe that p. 
 
 Other epistemic norms have a similar structure in that they also call for agents to 
hold a particular belief.  They differ in that they are not so straightforwardly about the 
evidence for the truth of a particular proposition.  Rather they seem to be norms of 
theoretical reason or theoretical rationality.  Since the beliefs that we already hold have 
conceptual and logical relationships to other candidate beliefs, rationality might require 
agents to hold or refrain from holding certain beliefs, given their current stock of beliefs.  
For example, 
 
If S believes p, then S should not believe not-p. 
S should believe q if S believes p and if p, then q. 
 
Still other epistemic norms require agents to perform certain actions that have epistemic 
                                                
norms see: Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Fall 2010., 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/ethics-belief/; Christopher 
Hookway, “Epistemic Norms and Theoretical Deliberation,” Ratio 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 380-397. 
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upshots.  These upshots might constitute evidence for a target belief or that might 
perform that affects what evidence she has.  These are structurally distinct from the 
norms above, since what is required is an action.  For example, 
 
S should investigate whether p.55 
S should reflect carefully on whether p, when her belief that p is challenged by an 
epistemic peer or an epistemic authority.56 
S should defer to epistemic authorities.57 
 
Lastly, and more controversially, epistemic norms might be related to moral or prudential 
concerns.  They might require that the agent hold certain beliefs if it would be 
prudentially or morally good for them to do so.  They might also require actions whose 
doxastic upshots have prudential or moral import.58  Consider: 
 
S should believe that p, if S's life hangs on whether S believes that p. 
S should believe that p, if an evil demon threatens to destroy all life unless S 
believes that p. 
If S's believing falsely that p increases the risk that S will Φ, and if Φ-ing causes 
suffering, then S should be diligent about investigating whether p. 
                                                
55 Hall and Johnson, “The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence.” 
56 David Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass 4, no. 
5 (September 1, 2009): 756-767. 
57 The literature on expertise and epistemic deference is vast.  For a representative discussion of a norm like 
this see: Robert Pierson, “The Epistemic Authority of Expertise,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (January 1, 1994): 398-405. 
58 Again, the literature on pragmatic or moral reasons for belief is vast.  For a representative sample, see: 
Andrew Reisner, “The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem,” 
Philosophical Studies 145 (June 14, 2008): 257-272. 
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 In listing out these epistemic norms, I am not endorsing them, nor am I 
committing to any particular view about their strength.  I merely want to show that there 
are a substantial variety of epistemic norms.  There are no doubt many ways one might 
try to group and cross-categorize these epistemic norms, and later in this chapter I will 
attempt to defend a classification scheme that is relevant to the issue of moral 
responsibility for ignorant action.  My agenda for the rest of the chapter is as follows:  In 
section 3.2, I state in the clearest terms just how an agent’s falling short of an epistemic 
norm relates to questions of moral responsibility.  In particular, I offer reasons for 
thinking that culpability for ignorance can be transferred to culpability for subsequent 
ignorant action.  In section 3.3, I offer an account of the nature of epistemic normativity 
and the relationship between reasons and epistemic norms.  This background is necessary 
in order to motivate the distinction between epistemic norms that require actions and 
those that require that the agent hold certain beliefs.  In section 3.4 and 3.5, I discuss the 
prospects of two different kinds of actional epistemic norms for establishing an agent’s 
culpable ignorance.  I argue that, of the two, only aim-neutral actional epistemic norms 
are relevant to the epistemic condition of moral responsibility.   
 
3.2 TRANSFERRING CULPABILITY FROM IGNORANCE TO 
ACTION 
In this section, I hope to clearly articulate the theoretical burdens of any theory of the 
epistemic condition that appeals to epistemic norms.  A central claim of such theories is 
that culpability for ignorant action is related to culpability for ignorance in the following 
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way: 
Ignorant Action Thesis: Agents who act wrongly from ignorance are culpable 
for their action only if they are culpable for their ignorance.59 
 
The ignorant action thesis, is formulated in terms of wrongful action mostly because most 
of the extant literature on the epistemic condition, and indeed, much of the literature on 
moral responsibility more generally, focuses on cases of wrongful, bad, or, to a lesser 
extent, imprudent actions.  I will follow this tradition, though I think that right, good, or 
prudent actions that are performed out of ignorance raise interesting issues that I hope to 
explore in future work.  The ignorant action thesis manifestly reveals the pertinence of 
epistemic assessments to the question of whether she is responsible for actions.  In cases 
of ignorant action, a necessary condition for moral responsibility is that the ignorance 
itself is culpable.  For example, if an actor falsely believes that her gun is merely a prop, 
and if she actually shoots and harms another actor, she is morally responsible only if she 
is culpable for holding the false belief about her gun.  Many theorists think that some sort 
of control condition must also be met in order to rule out moral responsibility in standard 
cases of manipulation, brainwashing, etc.  Even if the actor’s ignorance was culpable 
(perhaps she purposely allowed herself to become reckless about grabbing the prop gun 
and not the real gun because she was envious of her co-star’s success), she would 
arguably fail to meet a control condition on moral responsibility if, just before shooting 
her, neuroscientists took control of her arm and trigger finger, and caused her to shoot her 
                                                
59 This formulation is explicitly found in Rosen “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.” and Smith, 
“Culpable ignorance.” It is implicit in Sher, Who knew?.; William J. FitzPatrick, “Moral Responsibility and 
Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge,” Ethics 118, no. 4 (July 1, 2008): 589–613.; and 
Levy, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility.” 
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co-star repeatedly.  In what follows, I will remain uncommitted to any particular account 
of the control condition or any other necessary condition on moral responsibility.  What 
is important for present purposes is that so far as the epistemic condition is concerned, 
culpability for ignorant actions requires culpability for the ignorance.  
 The ignorant action thesis states that questions of culpability for ignorant actions 
turn on culpability for the ignorance itself, a claim that seems plausible on its face, but it 
does not explain why this is so.  As I mentioned above, one of the tasks before us is to 
show how an ignorant agent who acts wrongly can be connected to the features of her 
action that make it wrong.  While it is intuitively appealing to think that culpability for 
ignorance infects downstream actions on that ignorance, an actual argument is needed to 
support this intuition.  After all, there seem to be many cases where culpability is 
‘contained’ to specific actions or outcomes even when these outcomes play a role in later 
actions.  In order to see this, consider the case of Esther.  Assume that Esther is morally 
responsible for locking her keys in her car – she meets all relevant control and epistemic 
conditions with respect to that action.  If in the next moment her house catches fire and 
she is unable to unlock it to let out her cat, is she culpable for not saving her cat?  If she is 
not culpable for her cat’s demise, then we have a case where culpability remains ‘local’.  
Although Esther is morally responsible for being presently unable to unlock her door, this 
does not entail that she is culpable for an event that follows causally from this inability.  
If this is right, then we cannot assume that culpability for actions, ignorance, or whatever 
else automatically transfers to causally downstream wrongful or bad actions.  So far, we 
have no positive reason to accept that culpability for ignorance will transfer to subsequent 
ignorant action.   
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 If this case is not convincing, imagine instead that after culpably locking her keys 
in her car, Esther notices that someone placed a remote control on her front seat with a 
note telling her that a bomb will destroy her house and kill the cat unless she presses a 
button on the remote within five seconds.  In this case, if Esther had not culpably locked 
her keys in her car, she would have been able to save the cat.  Still, her inability to save 
the cat is traceable to her act of locking the keys in the car, for which she was 
responsible.  It seems fairly intuitive that in both cases Esther is not culpable for being 
unable to save her cat and, so, not blameworthy for her demise.  If these intuitions are 
right, then more needs to be said about why culpable ignorance is relevant to downstream 
actions on it.  In both cases, there is a ready explanation for why we might want withhold 
the judgment that Esther is culpable for being unable to help her cat.  In both cases, the 
fact that Esther was locked out of her car led to her cats demise only because of the 
terribly unlucky and unforeseeable situation that she found herself in immediately upon 
locking her keys in her car.  Whether this is the right explanation for the fact that Esther’s 
culpability does not transfer from her culpable action to subsequent ones is not a question 
I want to take up here.  I am simply appealing to intuitions the reader might have about 
these cases and to the existence of plausible culpability ‘localizers’ in order to underline 
the need for a positive account of culpable ignorance that succeeds in transferring 
culpability to ignorant action.  How can culpability for ignorance ramify in a way that 
make connects the agent to the wrongness or badness of her actions? 
 If one accepts the ignorant action thesis and affirms the view that culpability for 
ignorant actions is based on culpability for ignorance, then everything hangs on the 
account of culpable ignorance that one is ready to defend.  For the rest of this section, I 
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examine the initial prospects of the theory of culpable ignorance that I favor and that 
figures in the account of the epistemic condition that I defend over the course of this 
dissertation: 
 
Culpable Ignorance Thesis: Agents are culpably ignorant if and only if they 
violated some epistemic norm or obligation.60 
 
It is immediately clear, however, that the Culpable Ignorance Thesis, even if true, does 
not specify the nature and force of the epistemic obligations that are relevant to 
establishing the culpability of ignorance and actions on or from such ignorance.  The first 
question to ask regarding these epistemic norms concerns the activity that they govern.  
As I see it, three options suggest themselves: purely mental activity, perceptual activity, 
and practical activity.  All three kinds of activity can result in belief formation, 
preservation, or revision.  Here, I will briefly discuss how each of these epistemic 
activities can be norm-governed.   This will set the stage for the task of determining 
which norm type is relevant to the culpable ignorance thesis.  As I emphasized above, 
this examination of candidate epistemic norm types should be guided by the need to show 
how culpability of an agent’s ignorance, which is established by falling short of some 
norm, can transfer to culpability of her ignorant action.   
 The first norm type governs the entirely cognitive activity of modifying, 
preserving, and forming beliefs as one might do during an interval of reflection.  After I 
have acquired new beliefs about when my flight is supposed to leave, I should modify my 
                                                
60 Something along these lines has been defended by: Sher, Who Knew?, 88; Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral 
Responsibility”; J. M Fischer, “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 110, no. 1 (1999): 179–188. 
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beliefs about when I should arrive at the airport and whether I should expect traffic along 
the way.  That this is a norm-governed endeavor should be obvious. Examples of the 
relevant epistemic norms include the requirement for consistency among one’s beliefs 
and for carrying out certain valid deductive and inductive inferences.  These norms 
govern purely theoretical reasoning, and their violation may lead to false beliefs.  The 
central question for my purposes is whether ignorance that is traceable to such violations 
is culpable. 
 Another category of epistemic-norm governed activity involves belief acquisition 
that is more akin to perception.  An agent in the presence of evidence for or against some 
belief should formulate or modify their beliefs accordingly.  For example, if I am 
listening to a really loud concert, I should form the belief that the concert is loud.  At the 
very least, I should, in the presence of my evidence to the contrary, cease to belief that I 
am in a quiet environment.  This type of norm is distinct from the first in that it governs 
belief formation given that an agent possesses certain evidence.  The first epistemic norm 
type governed belief formation given what other beliefs the agent has.  One might say 
that the primary purpose of perceptual epistemic norms is to secure some degree of 
correspondence between the agent’s beliefs and the world, whereas the primary purpose 
of the theoretical epistemic norms is to secure some degree of logical consistency or 
perhaps theoretical simplicity between and among an agent’s beliefs.  In either case, at 
this point, it is an open question whether violations of these perceptual epistemic norms 
are relevant to the culpable ignorance thesis. 
 The third and final epistemic norm-governed activity involves actions that an 
agent performs that have epistemic upshots.  The most obvious example of this type of 
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norm would require agents to reflect, investigate, or otherwise attempt to acquire 
evidence.  Examples include a pilot’s obligation to check the landing gear and a job 
applicant’s obligation to verify application deadlines.  An agent who falls short of one of 
these norms fails to act, where the required action has epistemic upshots.  I will call this 
class of norms actional epistemic norms.  These norms are similar to the perceptual 
norms in that their primary purpose seems to be to secure a degree of correspondence 
between the agent’s beliefs and the world.  They differ in that this correspondence is 
secured via the production of evidence, whereas the perceptual epistemic norms secure 
belief-world correspondence via attention and responsiveness to evidence at hand.  The 
activity governed by actional norms is purely practical, involving physical and mental 
actions that may eventually result in the formation or modification of beliefs. 
 This brief and admittedly rough classification of epistemic norms lays bare the 
various options for differing accounts of the culpable ignorance thesis.  As might be 
expected, authors who accept something like the culpable ignorance thesis, and thereby 
acknowledge the centrality of epistemic norms and obligations, differ in their views about 
which epistemic norm violations are relevant.  For instance, Rosen argues that an agent is 
culpably ignorant only if she is responsible for failing to act in accordance with some 
procedural epistemic obligations that led to her ignorance.61  On Rosen’s account, the 
relevant procedural epistemic obligations are obligations to act in ways that have 
epistemic upshots.  By contrast, Sher argues that an agent is culpably ignorant only if in 
becoming ignorant, the agent falls short of some applicable epistemic norm or standard.62  
On Sher’s account, the standards of awareness apply to the agent’s perceptions, thoughts, 
                                                
61 Gideon Rosen, “Skepticism about moral responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004), pp. 7-9. 
62 George Sher, Who knew? (Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapters 6-7. 
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and beliefs.  Before I can assess the merits of each position in this debate, we need to 
better understand the fundamental differences between the norm types.  Rather than 
examining specific violations of each of these norm types in order to see whether the 
agents seem, intuitively, to be culpably ignorant, I think that the better approach is to dig 
deeper and explore what grounds or justifies these norms.  Once we understand the nature 
of the normativity at stake for each of these norms, we will have a basis on which to 
judge what epistemic norm violations say about the agent.  This exploration of the 
normativity of norms may seem like a departure from the question at hand, which is what 
kind of epistemic norms result in culpable ignorance, but, I will show that attention to 
these issues affords the best way of understanding how a culpability for ignorance can 
transfer from ignorance to subsequent action.     
 
3.3 THE NORMATIVITY OF EPISTEMIC NORMS 
I will call all norms that govern belief (all the claims listed above that end with some 
variant of “X should believe that p”) belief norms, and I will call all norms that govern 
actions with belief-upshots (all the claims listed above that end with some variant of “X 
should Φ”, where Φ is understood to be an action) as actional norms.  Since both of these 
are species of the genus epistemic norms and since I want to focus on differences 
between the two species, I will try to avoid calling anything an epistemic norm.  With 
these preliminaries aside, it should be noted that the surface features of belief norms and 
actional norms are similar.  As they are expressed in language, the norms share certain 
structural features.   For instance, belief and actional norms require something.  This 
feature of norms is significant because it classifies the norm as either belief (if the norm 
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says A should believe) or actional (if the norm says A should Φ, where Φ is some action).  
An agent falls short of a belief norm because of something she believes or fails to 
believe, and an agent falls short of an actional norm by performing or failing to perform 
some action.  What makes it the case that someone falls short of a belief norm is different 
than what makes it the case that someone falls short of an actional norm.  Recognizing 
this difference is an important first step towards coming to understand deeper differences 
having to do with the kind of normativity that lies at the heart of our epistemic 
obligations.  
 If we can get a grip on what justifies epistemic norms, or more strongly, what 
makes them true, we then we might be able to better identify which norms fit with the 
culpable ignorance thesis.  The central thesis I accept is that all norms are underwritten 
by reasons.  The account of the relationship between norms and reasons that I am inclined 
to hold is not universally accepted, but there is much to be said for it.  Before getting 
clear on this relationship, I must discuss what I mean by the increasingly multivocal term 
‘reason’.  In the next several subsections I will discuss several central distinctions 
between reason types, and I offer a framework for understanding how norms earn their 
normative authority from reasons.  Once I have done all of this background work, I will 
be able to argue that ignorant agents who fall short of a specific type of actional epistemic 
norm are failing to respond to the same kind of reason as someone who wittingly violates 
a moral obligation.     
3.3.1 Reasons 
For my purposes, I will follow Scanlon, Parfit, and others and conceive of reasons as 
considerations that standing in a triadic relationship between an agent and an action or 
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belief.  The nature of this relation is difficult to explicate, though I accept Scanlon’s 
suggestion that reasons favor the action or belief for the specified agent.63   
3.3.2 Objective and subjective reasons 
Reasons, so understood, can be classified according to several different distinctions 
several of which are helpful for understanding how reasons can justify or ground 
epistemic or practical norms.  The first such distinction is between objective and 
subjective reasons.  Focusing for the moment on the realm of belief, if S is an objective 
reason for A to believe that p, S is given by facts that are distinct from A’s other beliefs 
or desires.  For example, the fact that it is raining outside is an objective reason for me to 
believe that it is raining outside, whereas my desire to believe that it’s raining is not.  By 
contrast, one of the agent’s other beliefs might be a subjective reason for believing that p 
if it is given by one of her other beliefs.  That I believe that it is raining outside is a 
subjective reason for me to believe that the streets are wet.  In this cases, there may be no 
objective reason to believe that the streets are wet, if my belief that it’s raining is false.  
The objective/subjective distinction works similarly for reasons for action.  S is an 
objective reason for A to Φ, where Φ is an action if and only if S is given by facts outside 
of A’s desires or aims.  This distinction, which picks out two different ‘sources’ of 
reasons, will become relevant in subsequent discussion about different epistemic norm 
types.   
3.3.3 Normative reasons, motivating reasons, and coincidence 
Another relevant distinction is between normative reasons and motivating reasons. This 
                                                
63 Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other Harvard University Press Chapter 1.  See also: Dancy, Moral Reasons and 
Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume I (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011). 
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familiar distinction allows us to differentiate between considerations that actually make 
some belief, desire or action good (the normative reasons), and the considerations in light 
of which the agent believed, desired, or acted (the motivating reasons).  Dancy’s 
helpfully characterizes this distinction as falling out of two different questions you might 
ask about a reason for action: 
“There is the question what were the considerations in the light of which, or 
despite which, he acted as he did.  This issue about his reasons for doing it is a 
matter of motivation.  There is also the question whether there was a good reason 
to act in that way, as we say, any reason for doing it at all, one perhaps that made 
sense in the circumstances, morally required, or in some other way to be 
recommended… This second question raises a normative issue.”64 
 
Transposed to the belief case, we might ask what were the considerations in the light of 
which the agent believed something.  Because it is awkward to characterize this an issue 
of motivation, since motivation seems intrinsically linked to intentional action, rather 
than belief, it should be clear that Dancy’s question still applies.  It is different from the 
question whether there are good reasons to hold the belief in question.  It is instructive for 
my purposes to point out when normative and motivating reasons come together and 
when they diverge for a given agent and her belief or action.  For the sake of simplicity, I 
will focus on a case of belief.  Normative and motivating reasons come together in the 
case where an agent forms a belief that p by responding to the reasons that are normative 
reasons for believing that p.  If the fact that the streets are wet outside is a good reason for 
believing that it is raining outside, and if it is my cognizing of this fact that leads me to 
                                                
64 Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003), 2. 
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form the belief that it is raining outside, then my motivating reason for holding my belief 
is also the normative reason to hold my belief.  In the case of actions, if the fact that the 
streets are a good reason to wear galoshes, and if my cognizing this fact leads me to put 
on my galoshes, then my motivating reason for acting is a normative reason to act.  The 
possibility of this kind of congruence plays an important role in philosophical discussions 
of epistemic justification – an agent’s belief is justified if only if she believes it on the 
basis of evidence, which is a type of normative epistemic reason.65  It also plays an 
important role certain theories of morally worthy action – an agent’s action is morally 
worthy if it is performed for the reason that makes the act right, which is another way of 
saying that the agent’s motivating reason for acting is the normative reason that makes 
the action good or right.66  
 This coincidence between normative and motivating reasons frequently fails to 
obtain.  Imagine that I believe that it is raining outside because a friend, who I mistakenly 
believe to be a reliable psychic, tells me, in the absence of any other evidence that it is 
raining, that her tealeaves indicate non-figuratively that stormy weather has arrived.  
Since this is not a normative reason for holding that belief, the motivating reason for my 
belief fails to coincide with any normative reason to believe.  The relevance of the 
coincidence thesis to justification of belief is made plain by this example, since it seems 
that my belief is not justified in this case.  In the case of action, Kant’s greedy shopkeeper 
fails to act for the reasons that make his action right since his concern for maintaining a 
healthy bottom line have nothing to do with the categorical imperative.  The concepts of 
                                                
65 This theory of epistemic justification is typically called evidentialism.  The definitive treatment of this theory 
is found in Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 24. 
66 J. Markovits, “Acting for the Right Reasons,” Philosophical Review 119, no. 2 (March 2010): 201-242; Arpaly, 
Unprincipled Virtue, Chapter one. 
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normative and motivating reasons are relevant for these and other important 
philosophical issues.  I do not intend to challenge these formulations, and, indeed, I 
accept them and try to show that they can also be put to work in our understanding of the 
epistemic condition of responsibility.  Although, I will not offer further good epistemic 
reasons to believe in the distinction, I hope to show that there are at least pragmatic 
reasons to accept it.  
3.3.4 Reasons for belief and reasons for action 
With the objective/subjective and normative/motivating distinctions on board, we can 
begin to understand the relationship that holds between reasons and ought claims.  My 
thesis is that epistemic norms earn their authority from normative reasons that underlie 
them.  Belief norms earn their authority from normative reasons for belief, and action 
norms earn their authority from normative reasons for action.  These claims will only be 
illuminating if we already have some grip on what makes a certain consideration a reason 
for belief as opposed to a reason for some other attitude or action.  Pamela Heironymi 
recently developed an influential account of reasons for belief according to which reasons 
are considerations that bear on the question “whether p”.67  Within the context of doxastic 
deliberation, wherein an agent is trying to figure out what to believe, the relevant 
considerations are those that would help them answer the question “whether p”.  For 
example, if p is the proposition “Climate change is anthropogenic”, then the reasons for 
believing p are the considerations that would help us answer the question of whether 
climate change is anthropogenic.  This would include facts such as “changes in CO2 
concentrations are linked to the recent proliferation of power plants” and “carbon sinks 
                                                
67 P. Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 9 (2005): 437–457. 
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are unable to accommodate ramped up emissions”.  
 The underlying justification of actional norms is importantly different from belief 
norms.  Actional norms are supported by reasons for action.  Reasons for action call for 
agents to perform certain actions given the circumstances and other relevant facts about 
the agent, such as what her desires or plans happen to be. Again, following Heironymi, 
reasons for action are helpfully understood as considerations that bear on the question of 
whether to Φ, where Φ is an action.  On this way of drawing the distinction between the 
two reason types, it is clear why reasons for action are important in practical deliberation.  
For example, when an agent is concerned with how to conduct herself given the risks 
posed by climate change, the relevant considerations are those that tell for or against 
doing things like buying a hybrid car and supporting climate-friendly public policies.   
 The interplay between reasons for action and reasons for belief is subtle and 
interesting.  For instance, an agent who is deliberating about how to act will, if she is at 
least weakly rational, want to have true beliefs about the relevant alternatives.  So settling 
the question of whether to act requires settling all sorts of questions about whether this or 
that proposition is true.  So when deliberating about whether to buy a hybrid, one must 
first settle the question of whether to believe that climate change is anthropogenic.  
Considerations like “changes in CO2 concentrations are linked to the recent proliferation 
of power plants” are relevant for settling whether to believe that climate change is 
anthropogenic.  As such these considerations are reasons for belief.  But, since the belief 
that is supported by this consideration is relevant for settling the question of whether to 
buy a hybrid, then it might be thought that “changes in CO2 concentrations are linked to 
the recent proliferation of power plants” also count as a reason for buying a hybrid.  As 
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such it would also count as a reason for action.  It might be thought, therefore, that there 
is no significant difference between reasons for belief and reasons for action that could 
ground the distinction I am attempting to draw between epistemic norms governing belief 
and actional norms governing actions that have epistemic upshots.   
 The distinction between reasons for belief and reasons for action can be re-
established by noting that, in the case described, the consideration that seemed to be both 
a reason for belief and a reason for action was relevant to the question of whether p, and 
the fact that p was relevant to the question of whether to act in a certain way.  The 
consideration that “changes in CO2 concentrations are linked to the recent proliferation 
of power plants” is relevant to the question of whether to buy a hybrid in a mediated way 
– it is relevant to the question of whether to believe climate change is anthropogenic, and 
this fact is what is relevant to the question of whether to buy a hybrid.  If CO2 
concentrations had nothing to do with the question of whether climate change is 
anthropogenic, then it would not be a reason for buying a hybrid.  Also, if the belief that 
climate change is anthropogenic was not relevant to the question of whether to buy a 
hybrid, then the consideration that “changes in CO2 concentrations are linked to the 
recent proliferation of power plants” would not count as a reason for buying a hybrid.  
Some considerations seem to pull double duty by counting as reasons for belief and then 
also as reasons for action when the belief is relevant to whether the agent should act.  But 
the sense in which these considerations are reasons for action is derivative.  These 
considerations seem to pull double duty only because they are reasons for holding beliefs, 
and these beliefs are non-derivatively relevant for a given action. 
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3.3.5 Reasons and ought claims    
 With this account of epistemic reasons on board, we can understand belief norms 
as requirements that derive their normative authority from reasons for belief.  This is a 
kind of buck-passing account since the normativity of the ought claim rests on the 
normativity of reasons that underlie it.  The locution ‘given the evidence, one ought to 
believe that it is raining’ captures in plain language the thought that reasons for belief, in 
this case evidence for the belief that it is raining, support obligations to the relevant 
beliefs.  In this case, we can imagine that there are strong, perhaps decisive, epistemic 
reasons to believe that it is raining.  This tight connection between belief norms and 
reasons for belief is not universally endorsed, and there is a fascinating literature on the 
relationship between reasons and requirements or obligations.68  Parfit seems to accept a 
buck-passing view of ‘ought’ in On What Matters.  His position is that there is a sense of 
‘ought’ that is intimately tied to normative reasons.  Although he formulates it strictly in 
terms of actional oughts and reasons for action, his account should apply to belief oughts 
as well: 
When we have decisive reasons, or most reason, to act in some way, this 
act is what we should or ought to do in what we can call the decisive-
reason-implying senses.  Even if we never use the phrases ‘decisive 
reason’ or ‘most reason’, most of us often use ‘should’ and ‘ought’ in 
these reason-implying senses.69 
 
Transposed to the belief case, when we have decisive reason or most reason to hold a 
                                                
68 Broome, D. (1999). “Reasons and Requirements”; Gert, B. (2009). Brute Rationality. OUP; Kolodny, N. 
(2005). “Why be rational?” Mind, 114, 509-563. 
69 Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters (p. 33). OUP. 
!!
87 
!
belief p, then we should believe that p.  Dancy also defends a buck-passing view of ought 
claims and mounts powerful arguments against those who maintain that the buck cannot 
be passed from reasons to oughts.70  While it is far beyond the scope of this project to 
mount a complete defense of the relationship between norms and reasons, I think there is 
strong philosophical precedent for such a view. 
 Since there are several different kinds of epistemic reasons, we might expect that 
a multitude of different epistemic norms, distinguished by the type of underlying 
epistemic reason.  It is clear that motivating reasons, cannot ground epistemic norms, 
since their primary role is explanation rather than justification.  Restricting our attention 
to normative epistemic reasons, we can recognize epistemic obligations that are grounded 
on subjective reasons, such as the agent’s other beliefs and desires.  That an agent 
believes that she is thinking may provide her with a decisive normative reason for 
believing she exists, and for this reason she might be obliged to believe that she exists.  
More controversially, someone might hold that an agent’s strong desire to beat cancer 
may give her a decisive normative reason to believe that she will beat it, and for this 
reason she might be obliged to believe that will beat it.  In both of these cases, an element 
of the agent’s psychology functions as the normative reason that underlies the epistemic 
norm.  This role can also be played by an objective epistemic reason.  The example given 
above of the obligation to believe that it is raining outside might be grounded on the 
strong evidential reasons for believing it.  If the agent is has all the relevant evidence, and 
there is no reason to think she is being deceived, then we might hold that she ought to 
believe that it is raining outside.  In this case, the epistemic reasons that underlie the 
epistemic norm are objective, perspective-independent facts about the atmospheric 
                                                
70 Dancy, J. (2004. Ethics Without Principles (chapter one). OUP. 
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conditions and the agent’s location with respect to them.  This last fact is important, since 
even really strong objective evidence for a given proposition might fail to establish any 
epistemic obligations for someone, if the evidence is unavailable to her.   
 There are also norms that require an agent to engage in some sort of belief-
producing action.  Since these are norms that require actions, rather than beliefs, they will 
be justified by normative reasons for action of either the subjective or objective type.  If 
an agent strongly wants to have true beliefs about some subject, and if she has no 
conflicting desires, she might have an obligation to believe seek evidence or to 
reflectively on the strength of the evidence she already has.  The basis of this epistemic 
norm is comprised by subjective reasons for action that are given by one of the agent’s 
desires.  By contrast an actional norm might be based on objective reasons for action.  
We might think that moral considerations having to do with avoiding preventable harm 
give an agent a strong reason to see whether her car tires are appropriately inflated.  Both 
of these norms are similar in that they require actions that have significant epistemic 
upshots.  In the first case, the underlying reasons are subjective, and in the latter they are 
objective. 
 This clearing of the conceptual space, though tedious and at some remove from 
questions of moral responsibility for ignorant action, will pay off in subsequent sections.  
The central question for this chapter and the next is which sort of epistemic norms are 
relevant to questions of culpable ignorance and moral responsibility.  The remaining 
portion of this chapter will focus on whether ignorance traceable to violations of actional 
epistemic norms is culpable.  I will first consider actional epistemic norms whose basis is 
subjective reasons for action.  By way of preview, I will argue that agents who violate 
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these epistemic obligations are not culpably ignorant in a way that would establish moral 
responsibility for action on her ignorance.  Then I discuss actional epistemic norms 
whose basis is objective reasons for action.  I show that agents who fall short of these 
norms can be culpably ignorant and morally responsible for action on that ignorance.  In 
the following chapter, I will discuss belief norms.  There I will argue that, given the 
nature of the epistemic reasons that ground belief norms, an agent who falls short of such 
expectations does not thereby show that she has a poor quality of will. 
  
3.4 AIM-RELATIVE ACTIONAL NORMS AND CULPABLE 
IGNORANCE 
Investigation is a paradigm belief producing action about which we seem to have actional 
norms.  We think that we have obligations to check the tire pressure before making a long 
drive and that people should keep track of the time if they have an upcoming 
appointment.  Consider the example of an agent trying to settle the question of whether to 
check the time.  This is an action that has a straightforward epistemic upshot.  If an agent 
performs it, then, on the assumption that one’s clock or watch is reliable, one will form a 
belief about what time it is.  The question of whether to check the time can be settled by a 
variety of considerations.  One class of considerations seems to be grounded in the 
agent’s desires, goals, or plans.  A true belief about what time it is will be relevant to 
someone who is baking a cake, running a marathon, or throwing a party.  Certain desires, 
goals, and plans can ground reasons for checking the time.  I will refer to reasons 
grounded in desires, goals, or plans as aim-relative reasons.  A second class of 
considerations that can ground actions such as checking the time involves facts that are 
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not about the agent’s aims.  The clearest examples of ‘objective’ reasons are moral 
reasons.  Consider, again, the child who has a curfew.  This time, assume that the child is 
morally obligated to avoid unnecessarily worrying her parents and that her parent’s will 
worry if she misses her curfew.  Since a true belief about what time it is will trigger the 
child’s memory of the curfew, and since she will avoid unnecessarily worrying her 
parents by remembering the curfew, we can say that she has a reason to check the time, 
even if at the moment in question she doesn’t have an intention, desire, or plan to check 
the time.  I will call reasons for action that are not grounded in the agent’s aims aim-
neutral reasons.  These reasons to act are grounded in facts that are ‘external’ to the 
agent’s desires or plans.  They might involve moral reasons, as the example with the 
curfew suggests.  But, they might also involve reasons related to the agent’s well being.  
When we say that an agent has a reason to inquire into the reputation of a graduate 
program that she is considering, we might be appealing to an external reason of this kind.  
Williams famously discussed external reasons that involve the plans and desires of other 
people.71  These are still grounded in the desires and plans, so there is a sense in which 
they are aim-relative.  However, they are still neutral with respect to the agent in 
question.  This is distinction is admittedly cursory, and it glosses over a huge range of 
debates about the source of reasons.  The aim-relative vs. aim-neutral distinction will 
suffice for the purposes of understanding different actional reasons and the different 
actional epistemic norms they might support.     
 Now that I have distinguished between two types of reasons for belief-producing 
actions, we can now think about the actional epistemic norms to which they correspond.  
                                                
71 B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons’, in His Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck, vol. 1981 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 101–113. 
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Aim-relative reasons for acting would support norms that call for a given action, so long 
as the agent has the relevant desire, goal, or plan.  In the case of checking the time, the 
norm would take the form of a conditional: If someone desires to keep an appointment, 
then she should check the time.  By building in the aim that grounds the reason for 
checking the time, the norm secures the appropriate application class – it does not apply 
to people who do not want to keep their appointments or to people who simply lack 
appointments.   The same schema could be applied in order to discover other kinds of 
epistemic norms.  Given an agent S, a desire, goal or plan D, and an action A with 
reliable epistemic upshot p: 
Aim-Relative Actional Norm: If S’s D would be satisfied or completed by 
believing truly that p, and if S would believe truly that p by A-ing, then S should 
A. 
The central question is whether an actional epistemic norm of this kind is relevant to the 
culpable ignorance thesis and the ignorant action thesis.  Are ignorant agents who fall 
short of aim-relative actional norms culpably ignorant, and does their culpable ignorance 
ground moral responsibility for subsequent actions on that ignorance?  I think that the 
answer to both of these questions is no.   
 It is important to focus on the fact that the culpability in the culpable ignorance 
thesis is supposed to be transferrable and establish culpability for the subsequent action.  
I will argue that the features of the agent that are revealed when an aim-relative actional 
norm of this kind is violated, do not establish culpability for subsequent action on that 
ignorance.  That an agent fails to comply with an aim-relative actional norm that is 
underwritten by aim-relative reasons for action such as those discussed above may reveal 
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something about the agent’s ability to satisfy her desires, fulfilling her goals, or 
complying with her plans.  Consider again the agent who wanted to keep an appointment, 
and imagine that she failed to check her watch, thereby falling short of the aim-relative 
actional norm requiring her to check it.  If this agent has a false belief about the time, 
then her ignorance is owed to her failure to act in accordance with an epistemic norm, in 
this case, an aim-relative actional norm.  Let’s assume that she is culpably ignorant 
because she fell short of this norm.  According to the ignorant action thesis, she would be 
morally responsible for any wrong action on the basis of that ignorance.  The problem is 
that her failure to check the time in this case tells us only that she is disposed to act in 
ways that frustrate her desires or plans.  That the agent possesses this disposition reveals 
that she suffers from a kind of prudential irrationality – she has certain goals and desires, 
and these desires function as the basis of actional epistemic norms that require certain 
investigations, periods of reflection, etc.  But this sort of prudential irrationality is a poor 
candidate for grounding the claim that and agent is morally responsible for subsequent 
wrong actions on that ignorance.  That an agent fell short of an aim-relative actional 
epistemic norm does not seem at all relevant to the question of whether she is morally 
responsible for subsequent ignorant action. 
 To see why this is so, consider the fact that agents form beliefs in prudentially 
irrational ways all the time.  We frequently fail to investigate issues that are relevant to 
satisfying our desires or ends.  People on diets fail to count calories, students fail to check 
paper deadlines, and mountain-climbers fail to check the weather conditions.  There is a 
straightforward sense in which the ignorance that results from these epistemic failures is 
attributable to them.  For example, we may want to criticize the dieter for not doing what 
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would further her dietary goals, but this criticism seems to be of an importantly different 
nature than the moral criticism that is directed at agents who are morally responsible for 
bad or wrong actions. Though these agents are falling short of aim-relative actional 
norms, this does not seem to bring the agent into contact with the wrongness of any 
subsequent wrong action in a way that justifies the claim that they are morally 
responsible.   
 Another way of understanding this gap is to focus on the agent’s reasons-
responsiveness.  As I discussed above, the reasons that support the dieter’s norm to count 
her calories are strictly aim-relative (on the assumption that she is not so overweight that 
she has health-related reasons to count calories).  It is only because the agent wants to 
lose weight or improve her fitness that she has a reason to count calories.  The agent who 
does not respond to these reasons is failing to respond to reasons she has and is subject to 
criticism.  However, as I have been assuming throughout this dissertation, the reasons 
that someone fails to respond to in the case of wrongful or bad action, are not aim-
relative in the relevant sense.  They are not grounded in features of the agent’s set of 
desires and goals.  It is possible that an agent whose ignorance is owed to failures to 
respond to the aim-relative reasons that underlie aim-relative actional epistemic norms is 
otherwise a moral saint, perfectly responsive to all of the moral reasons that make certain 
of her options bad or immoral.  In as much as questions of moral responsibility involve 
being responsive to moral reasons, an agent’s responsiveness to reasons for investigating 
and reflecting that are grounded solely by her desires and goals is irrelevant to the 
question at hand, namely whether and when ignorance that is traceable to failures to 
investigate make agents responsible for their ignorance and subsequent wrong or bad 
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action.  If this is right, then aim-relative actional epistemic norms are not relevant to 
culpable ignorance and moral responsibility.   
 A feature of recognizing this distinction between aim-relative reasons (with their 
corresponding norms) and aim-neutral reasons (with their corresponding norms) is that 
one can give accurate analyses of cases where an agent’s ignorance is both culpable and 
traceable to aim-relative actional norm violations but where the culpability does not seem 
to rest on these norm violations.  Consider an engineer who wants to perpetuate her good 
reputation in the industry by designing a highway overpass that is structurally sound.  
Because the engineer has this desire, she has an aim-relative actional epistemic norm to 
assess earthquake risk near the sight of construction.  To fill in the details of the case, 
imagine further that: 
a. She fails to assess earthquake risk   
b. She maintains the false belief that there is no earthquake risk 
c. She designs an overpass that is not resistant to earthquakes 
d. Drivers are killed when the overpass falls during an earthquake 
In this case, the engineer falls short of an aim-relative actional norm, forms or maintains 
a false belief and acts on it.  Intuitively, she is morally responsible for designing a bridge 
that is earthquake susceptible and for the deaths of the drivers. If this intuition is reliable, 
then what reason is there to resist the claim that the engineer was culpably ignorant 
because she fell short of an aim-relative actional norm and that her blameworthiness for 
the deaths traces to this culpable ignorance?  I think the reason is fairly clear, and it 
points toward an important feature of any viable account of the culpable ignorance thesis.  
Although it is true that the engineer has an epistemic norm requiring her to assess the 
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earthquake risk, this norm is supported by not merely by aim-relative reasons given by 
her reputational concerns, but by moral reasons as well.  This epistemic norm is 
supported by weighty moral reasons having to do with risk of harm that her ignorance 
presents.  It strikes me that one plausible explanation for the intuition that the engineer is 
morally responsible is the fact that the obligation to assess earthquake risk is underwritten 
by moral reasons, which themselves have nothing to do with the engineer’s desires or 
goals.  In this case, the aim-relative actional epistemic norm happens to coincide with an 
actional epistemic norm that requires the same investigation into earthquake risk.  
However, this second norm is underwritten by moral reasons that are neutral with respect 
to the agent’s aims.  In the final section of this chapter I will explore the possibility of 
grounding an agent’s blameworthiness for ignorant actions on the violations of epistemic 
norms that are backed by moral reasons.       
 
3.5 AIM-NEUTRAL ACTIONAL EPISTEMIC NORMS AND 
CULPABLE IGNORANCE 
Aim-relative actional norms, which were grounded by ‘subjective’ reasons involving the 
agent’s aims or plans, are naturally contrasted with actional norms that are grounded by 
aim-neutral reasons.  Although the class of reasons that might ground this subclass of 
actional norms is large, for the purposes at hand, I will focus here on moral reasons. 72 
Given an agent S, morally bad act or outcome B, and action A with reliable epistemic 
upshot p: 
                                                
72 I am obviously assuming the falsity of an egoism according to which one’s desires, plans, or goals do provide 
one with moral reasons.   
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Aim-neutral Actional Norm: If S would decrease the likelihood of performing 
action B by believing truly that p, and if S would believe truly that p by A-ing, 
then S should A. 
 
Consider the engineer case again.  Had she done the proper risk assessment it would have 
diminished the likelihood of people dying due to an earthquake induced bridge failure.  
On this basis, it seems reasonable to think that the engineer was subject to an aim-neutral 
actional norm requiring her to perform the risk assessment.  As I discussed above, aim-
neutral actional norms are grounded on reasons that might have no significant relation to 
the agent’s psychology.  In the case under discussion, these aim-neutral reasons are moral 
reasons – having false beliefs about the prevalence of earthquakes in the area increases 
the risk of death and injury to anyone who drives over the bridge.  If these reasons are 
strong enough to underwrite an obligation to investigate, then the lazy physician acts 
wrongly when she fails to undertake the requisite investigation.  This strikes me as clear 
grounds on which to think that the engineer is culpably ignorant and blameworthy for the 
tragedy.      
 Still, we might wonder whether I have actually established that someone who 
violates a morally grounded actional epistemic norm is morally blameworthy.  After all, 
the engineer in this case may have been negligent by failing to inform herself of the 
earthquake risk and blameworthy for that action – she should have assessed the risks but 
did not.  Whether she is blameworthy for the subsequent ignorant act of building a 
structurally unsound bridge that contributed to injury is another question.  Recall that the 
!!
97 
!
culpable ignorance thesis that is at the heart of many accounts of the epistemic condition 
merely states that ignorance is culpable if and only if it stems from an epistemic norm 
violation.  Here we are making the plausible assumption that the engineer did violate the 
aim-neutral actional norm to investigate earthquake risk.  So, we are in a position to 
concluded that she was culpably ignorant.  But, why think that this culpability will 
transfer to the subsequent wrong act of building a faulty bridge, an act that the engineer 
performed in ignorance?  There is still a potential normative gap here between culpability 
for the ignorance-producing action and subsequent action on that ignorance.  Bridging 
this gap also requires careful attention.   
 Fortunately, there are reasons to think that culpability can transfer from the 
epistemic norm violation to the ignorant action.  To see how, we need only focus on the 
moral reasons that underlie the actional epistemic norm in question.  Agents, who fall 
short of the aim-neutral actional norms that are underwritten by moral reasons, stand in a 
similar relation to their ignorant action as agents who wittingly act wrongly or badly.  
Consider the witting wrongdoer first.  An engineer who knew it was wrong to construct 
an unstable overpass but who did it anyway plainly meets the epistemic condition for 
moral responsibility.  There is no relevant ignorance that would function as an excusing 
condition, and there is no question about how she, qua agent, relates to the wrongness of 
her action.  She is connected to the wrongness of her actions because she failed to 
respond to the moral reasons that make it wrong to purposely construct an unstable 
overpass.  If we assume that the engineer does not meet some exempting condition, and 
that she meets any requisite control condition, then there seems to be no reason to 
withhold the attribution of blameworthiness.     
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 But notice that the same reasons that make it wrong to wittingly construct an 
unstable bridge, namely the increased risk of harm to those who will drive on it, also 
ground the aim-neutral actional obligation to assess earthquake risk.  The risk of harm to 
drivers underwrites both the moral prohibition against intentional endangerment and the 
actional epistemic obligation to assess earthquake risk.  In falling short of this epistemic 
norm, the ignorant engineer reveals that she too is unresponsive to this moral reason. 
Because this parity exists between the reasons that make it wrong to wittingly design an 
unstable bridge and the reasons that support the actional epistemic obligation to assess 
earthquake risk, we seem to have a way of showing how culpability for ignorance can 
transfer to culpability for ignorant action.  If an ignorant agent acts wrongly, and if her 
ignorance is owed to the violation of an aim-neutral epistemic norm underwritten by the 
same sort of reasons that makes her unwitting act wrong, then she seems connected in a 
salient way to the wrongness of the unwitting action.  This connection is indirect - the 
unwitting wrongdoer’s failure to respond to the moral reasons that make her unwitting 
action wrong occurs at some temporal remove from the unwitting act itself.  It is during 
the ignorant agent’s belief formation and evidence acquisition that her failure to respond 
to the relevant moral reasons obtains.  What is most important for my purposes is that I 
have shown how an ignorant wrongdoer can bear the same relationship to the wrongness 
of her action as a witting wrongdoer bears to hers.  If this is right then we have reason to 
think that the agent’s culpability for her ignorance transfers to her subsequent ignorant 
action. 
 Before moving on to discuss the other epistemic norm type, there are two 
important points to note about the argument I just gave.  Despite the parity that holds 
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between the witting wrongdoer and the culpably ignorant wrongdoer, there are two 
important differences.  The first is that, intuitively, the magnitude of the wrong seems to 
differ between the two cases.  Even though they both fail to respond to moral reasons 
involving the risk of harm, the engineer who wittingly endangers the drivers seems to be 
worse than the engineer who unwittingly endangered them, but who was culpable for 
failing to know that there was an earthquake risk.   It is natural to think that someone 
would willingly neglect one’s cognitive and investigational affairs but would never 
wittingly perform their negligent action.  A mother might fail to verify whether her 
child’s car seat is strapped in properly and thereby fail to ensure the child’s safety.  
However, the same mother might be incapable of wittingly placing her child in harms 
way.  Similarly, a physician who fails to stay abreast of the latest research would never 
knowingly give her patients drugs that would harm them.  On the basis of this difference, 
someone might dispute my account of how culpably ignorant wrongdoers are connected 
to the wrongness of their actions in a way that grounds moral responsibility attributions.  
In response, I simply point out that the parity thesis does not entail that the degree 
blameworthiness is merely a function of the type of moral reason flouted by the agent.  
Other factors may be relevant.  The fact that the negligent physician would not wittingly 
harm her patients shows that there are some circumstances where she would be 
responsive to the relevant moral reasons.  It takes a deeper failure of reasons-
responsiveness wittingly to harm someone.  It is deeper in the sense that, barring 
interference by others or failure to perform, you are acting with certainty that you will do 
something wrong.  If, counterfactually, the unwitting wrongdoer knew with certainty, that 
her ignorance would result in harm to her patients then this might cause her to comply 
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with the norm of investigation.  In this situation, the unwitting wrongdoer would be 
responsive to reasons.    This provides a reason to think that the witting wrongdoer is, 
perhaps, more blameworthy for her action that the unwitting wrongdoer is.  However, the 
fact that the unwitting wrongdoer is incapable of this kind of deep unresponsiveness is 
consistent with her being unresponsive to the moral reasons that underlie her epistemic 
obligations.  Her connection to the wrongness of her action may not be as profound as it 
is for her witting counterpart, but the connection is there. 
 The second point I want to make regarding ignorance that traces to the kinds of 
investigative failures I discuss in this chapter is that my account is vulnerable to the 
regress worries that I discussed in chapter one.  Rosen is a volitionist who maintains, in 
line with the account I’ve given here, that agents are culpably ignorant when their 
ignorance traces to failures to comply with “procedural epistemic obligations”.73  He 
recognized that many of these failures will themselves be ignorant actions, and thus, 
culpability for them will depend on whether the agent’s ignorance about being under a 
given procedural epistemic obligation was also culpable.  The account that I have 
discussed in this chapter is vulnerable to the same worry.  An agent who falls short of an 
aim-neutral actional epistemic norm and becomes ignorant may have also been ignorant 
of the fact that they were subject to such a norm.  In that case, it might not be so clear that 
her culpability for the ignorance that stems from the epistemic norm violation will 
transfer to the ignorant action.  Indeed, her ignorance of the fact that she is subject to an 
epistemic norm might be blameless.  It would certainly be odd to claim that an agent 
would be culpably ignorant for falling short of an actional epistemic obligation about 
which she was blamelessly ignorant.  There are two ways to avoid this regress.  The first 
                                                
73 Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.” 
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is to accept that the story I tell in this chapter only works in cases where agents are not 
ignorant about their actional epistemic obligations.  In other words, agents are culpably 
ignorant only when they wittingly fail to meet an aim-neutral actional epistemic 
obligation.  The second is to claim that agents are culpably ignorant even when they 
unwittingly fall short of an actional epistemic obligation but that their ignorance of the 
epistemic obligation is culpable for some other reason.  For instance, the negligent 
physician may not have believed that she was obligated to keep up with the latest 
research, but she should have believed that she was.  This latter claim – that she should 
have believed that she was subject to an epistemic norm – points to the existence of the 
second class of epistemic norms I will discuss in my dissertation.  Thus, a complete 
response to the regress worry will have to wait.  I return to these issues in chapter five, 
where, to anticipate, I argue that culpable ignorance must be traced to witting epistemic 
norm failures.    
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I tried to elucidate the role that epistemic norms plays for any account of 
the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that accepts the culpable ignorance thesis, 
which states that agents are culpably ignorant when they fall short of an epistemic 
obligation.  By drawing on the distinction between reasons for belief and reasons for 
action, and the idea that reasons provide normative authority to norms, I introduced an 
important distinction between belief norms and actional epistemic norms.  I then further 
distinguished between aim-relative and aim-neutral epistemic norms and argued that of 
those two, only the latter are relevant to the culpable ignorance thesis.  My reasoning was 
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that aim-neutral epistemic norms can be justified by moral reasons, and that agents can 
violate these norms by failing to respond to moral reasons.  In this way, they are 
importantly similar to agents who wittingly commit wrong actions.  This shows that an 
ignorant agent whose ignorance is owed to a failure to respond to the moral reasons that 
underlie some actional epistemic norm is connected to the wrong-making features of her 
ignorant action.   
   
Chapter 4: BELIEF NORMS AND CULPABLE 
IGNORANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Norms of True Belief and Evidence 
4.3 Dual Basis View of Belief Norms 
4.4 Belief Norm Violations are Necessary for Culpable Ignorance 
4.5 Dual Basis View and the Wrong Kinds of Reasons 
4.6 Dual Basis View and Epistemic Worthiness 
4.7 Defending the Modal and Ideal Claim 
4.8 Moral Belief Norms: A Special Case? 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will consider the relevance of belief norms to the culpable ignorance 
thesis.  According to the distinctions I introduced in the previous chapter, belief norms 
are understood as obligations to hold, form, or maintain beliefs.  I suggested that the most 
natural way of showing how these norms differed from action norms is by reference to 
reasons that underlie them.  I proposed that obligations to believe that p are underwritten 
by reasons for belief or considerations that bear on the question ‘whether p’.  My goal in 
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this chapter is to determine whether ignorance that stems from violations of belief norms 
can be culpable and related to that, whether agents who act on such ignorance can still be 
blameworthy for their wrongful action.  For instance, if we were to claim that an ignorant 
agent was morally responsible because they should have known better true even when the 
only epistemic norm they violated was a belief norm?  I already argued that such claims 
can be true when the relevant epistemic norm is an aim-neutral, actional epistemic norm 
underwritten by moral reasons.  In this chapter, I will argue that the prospects are not as 
bright for agents who fall short of belief norms. 
  
4.2 NORMS OF TRUE BELIEF AND EVIDENCE 
In order to see if belief norms are plausible candidates for the culpable ignorance thesis – 
the view that agents are culpably ignorant if and only if their ignorance results from 
epistemic norm violations - I will start simply.  This is perhaps the most basic belief 
norm: 
 
 Norm of true belief: X should believe that p, only if p. 
 
I say that this norm is the most basic belief norm because it expresses the link between 
belief and truth in a maximally perspicuous way.  Indeed, the norm of true belief is put 
forward as on way of understanding the idea that belief “aims” at the truth.  Nishi Shah 
and others suggest that the question “whether to believe p” is best understood as 
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synonymous with the question “whether p is true”.74    Falling short of the norm of true 
belief is easy to do; every agent who holds any false belief violates it.  As such, it is a 
very strict belief norm.  Consider facts about the number of moons orbiting Jupiter.  
Astronomers of the early 17th century, who were looking through the first telescopes, 
believed that Jupiter had 4 moons, a belief we now know to be false.  Though their belief 
was based on the best evidence available at the time, Galileo and his contemporaries still 
fell short of the norm of true belief.  Not much turns on this failure, however, if all we are 
concerned with is the evaluation of these astronomers as scientists.  We think that one 
important measure of a scientist’s achievement is that the theories they develop and the 
observations they report conform to the best available evidence.  That they fall short of 
the norm of true belief does not necessarily reflect on their scientific acumen. 
 Obvious problems loom for the culpable ignorance thesis, however.  If the norm 
of true belief were applicable to the culpable ignorance thesis, then all false believes 
would be culpable.  And if all false beliefs were culpable and if the ignorant action thesis 
is true, then every falsely believing agent is morally responsible for her ignorant action.  
This is wildly implausible, as it is just to deny that ignorance ever functions as an excuse.  
Thus, the norm of true belief is not pertinent to the culpable ignorance thesis, and I will 
set it aside. 
 Consider a different belief norm, one that was hinted at in the previous paragraph: 
 
 Norm of evidence: X should believe that p only if the available evidence on 
balance supports p. 
                                                
74 Shah, “How truth governs belief,” 447; See also: Hieronymi, “The wrong kind of reason”; Hieronymi, 
“Responsibility for believing.” 
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Though less strict than the norm of true belief, this is still a fairly strict belief norm.  This 
norm is consistent with Clifford’s famous dictum: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and 
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence”.75  It is less strict because 
Galileo does not fall short of it with respect to his beliefs about the number of moons 
orbiting Jupiter.  His belief seems to be supported by the available evidence and so it 
seems unmotivated to hold him accountable for getting things wrong.  The norm of 
evidence is still fairly strict, however, because it is still easy to fall short of it.  Human 
beings are notoriously bad both at acquiring evidence and at carefully weighing their 
evidence once acquired.  Since many cases of intuitively culpable ignorance involve 
violations of this norm, it is not a non-starter for my purposes.  Consider the parent who 
fails to remember whether her child is allergic to penicillin.  On the assumption that the 
evidence supports the proposition that her child is allergic and that the evidence was at 
one time made available to the parent, this agent falls short of the belief norm of 
evidence.  If this norm is pertinent to the question of responsibility for ignorant action, 
then according to the culpable ignorance thesis, the mother is culpably ignorant and is 
morally responsible for any harm that should befall her child upon the administration of 
penicillin.   
 Though the belief norm of evidence fails to yield counter-intuitive results in this 
case, it can readily be shown to be far too strong for our purposes here.  Consider a 
variant on the allergic child case.  
 
Neighbor’s child: Joe’s neighbor Sam once mentioned in casual conversation that 
                                                
75 Clifford, Lectures and Essays. 
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his son, Stan, was allergic to penicillin.  Two hours pass, and Joe find’s Stan with 
a laceration from skateboarding.  Since Sam is still at work and since the 
laceration is bleeding profusely, Joe takes Stan to the ER.  At the ER, the nurse 
asks if he is allergic to penicillin and Joe tries to remember if Sam ever told him 
about Stan’s allergies.  He remembers the conversation from two years ago but 
misremembers what Sam said.  He tells the doctor that Stan is not allergic and the 
nurse administers penicillin, which harms Stan. 
By believing that Stan is not allergic to penicillin, Joe clearly violates the norm of 
evidential belief.  When he is at the ER, he believes, contrary to evidence, that Stan is not 
allergic.  I have the intuition that in this case, Joe is not morally responsible for the harm 
suffered by Stan despite the fact that he fell short of the norm of evidence. After all, Joe 
was trying his best, and sometimes agents who are giving it their epistemic best will fall 
short of the norm of evidence.  If this intuition is right, then the belief norm of evidence 
cannot be relevant to the culpable ignorance thesis. If violations of the norm of evidence 
were grounds for thinking an agent culpably ignorant, then we would be unable to 
distinguish between the parent’s ignorance and the neighbor’s.  Since there does seem to 
be an important difference, the norm of evidence is also not pertinent to the culpable 
ignorance thesis.  
 So far, both belief norms I have discussed are too strong.  Some agents who fall 
short of them are ignorant but not culpably so.  Others fall short of the same norm, but do 
count as culpably ignorant.  Thinking carefully about the differences between the parent 
and the neighbor yields two possible responses.  The first is that the basis for the belief 
norm, by which I mean the considerations in virtue of which it is true that the norm is 
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applicable, differs in each case.  The parent’s ignorance is culpable because she fell short 
of the evidence norm that, in her case, is underwritten by both moral and epistemic 
reasons.  As I discussed in chapter three, many actional epistemic obligations are 
underwritten by moral reasons.  Similarly, someone might claim that the reasons why she 
should believe in accordance with the evidence is that the child depends on the parent to 
secure her well being and reduce the likelihood of avoidable harm.  The parent falls short 
of the norm requiring her to believe in accordance with the evidence, but given her 
standing vis-à-vis the child, she has moral reasons to comply with the norm.  The 
neighbor fell short of the exact same epistemic norm of evidence, but in her case it is 
underwritten solely by epistemic reasons.  The relationship between the neighbor and 
child in this case does not provide moral grounds for thinking she should believe the 
child has allergies.  This response makes sense of the contention that the neighbor and the 
parent are both not as they should be epistemically, since they each fall short of a norm 
that is supported by epistemic reasons.  It also makes sense of the further contention that 
the parent is not as she should be morally, since, in her case, the norm of evidence is also 
underwritten by moral reasons.  One of the central goals of this chapter is to explore this 
avenue of response.  I will consider whether claims about what agent should have known 
or should have believed can be understood as having a foundation in morality rather than, 
or perhaps in addition to, epistemology. 
 The second response is to grant that the evidence norm in both cases is 
underwritten solely by epistemic reasons, but that the parent falls short of a further norm, 
namely one that requires parents to act in a way that diminishes the likelihood of having 
false beliefs about things that are relevant to the well being of their children.  On this line 
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of response the parent’s culpability rests not on her failure to believe in accordance with 
the evidence, but on an earlier failure to carry a partial medical record for her child.  In 
the previous chapter, I considered the second way of establishing culpability for 
ignorance.  There, I argued that agent whose ignorance can be traced to a failure to 
comply with actional epistemic norms requiring such things as investigation or reflection 
can be culpably ignorant so long as the actional norms are underwritten by moral reasons.  
In this chapter I am interested in accounting for the intuitive difference between the 
parent and the neighbor in a different way.  Thus, I will now consider the prospects of the 
first proposal, namely that there are certain belief norms that are supported by moral 
reasons, or more generally, that these norms are another species of moral norm.76 
 
4.3 DUAL BASIS ACCOUNT OF BELIEF NORMS 
The proposal I will consider is that certain agents who fall short of belief norms are 
culpably ignorant only if the belief norm is underwritten by both epistemic reasons and 
moral reasons.  It is commonplace to talk about agents who stand in certain professional 
or care-giving roles as having role-specific obligations to act in certain ways.  For 
example, doctors and parents should act in ways that is conducive to the well-being of 
those in their care.  We also speak as if they have obligations to have certain beliefs or 
that they should avoid certain types of ignorance.  For example, parents should know that 
their children need sleep and certain essential nutrients in their diet.  It is important to 
recognize that these latter obligations are not necessarily obligations to act so as to ensure 
                                                
76 There is an interesting question here about whether it is possible for moral reasons to support a belief norm 
that is not also supported by epistemic reasons.  Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud suggest something like this in 
their discussions of epistemic partiality.  They hold that the duties of friendship may require us not to conform 
our beliefs to the best evidence.   
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that the agents have certain beliefs or avoid ignorance.  Rather, they are obligations to 
believe.  As I discussed in the taxonomy of epistemic norms in chapter 3, the verb that 
falls under the scope of ‘should’ is ‘believe’ as opposed to ‘act’ or ‘do’.  In the case I 
have been discussing, the parent has an obligation to believe what reliable medical 
professionals have told her regarding her child’s medical condition.  This belief norm is 
just a joint application of the more general norm requiring believers to believe in 
accordance with evidence and to defer to reliable epistemic authorities.  The mother and 
the neighbor fall short of the same belief norm, but, since it is underwritten by moral 
reasons in the parent’s case, the parent’s ignorance is morally significant.  This moral 
significance might form the basis for the claim that the parent’s ignorance is culpable and 
that she is responsible for any harm her child might suffer.  In the neighbor’s case, 
culpability is blocked because, though she falls short of the same belief norm, it is not 
underwritten by moral reasons.  Her ignorance is epistemically significant, to be sure.  
We think that it reflects on the neighbor qua believer, that her beliefs do not accord with 
her evidence.  This merely epistemic failure is not morally significant and seems like a 
less viable candidate for establishing culpable ignorance.  As a general strategy for 
figuring out which belief norm violations, if any, are relevant to the epistemic condition, 
we can simply assess whether the belief norm has a single basis in epistemic reasons, or 
whether it has a dual basis in both epistemic and moral reasons.  Of course, the feasibility 
of the dual basis view depends on whether we can make sense of the idea that moral 
reasons can support belief norms.   
 Unfortunately, there are reasons to think that this dual basis view of belief norms 
is not feasible.  The first simply that morality is typically understood to involve the 
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evaluation of actions. Most of our moral discourse and deliberation seems to be aimed at 
answering the question of what to do rather than what to believe.  Moreover, most 
contemporary discussions of moral reasons conceive of them as considerations that favor 
a certain action.77 Of course, many reasons theorists characterize reasons for belief in a 
similar way - as considerations that favor a certain belief.  However general their account 
of reasons might be, when the discussion concerns moral value or moral wrongness, the 
relevant reasons seem to be exclusively reasons for action.78  If this each of these 
reflections on morality is right, then how can we make sense of belief norms being part of 
morality?  Additionally, if moral reasons are understood as reason for action, can moral 
reasons underwrite norms requiring belief? 
 One obvious line of response to this worry is to note that the sphere of morality 
includes non-actional elements such as character traits and emotions.  In his defense of a 
position that is similar to the one I am considering here, Sher notes that, even granting 
that morality is primarily concerned with the assessment of actions, there is room for 
moral evaluation of other non-actional features79.  He says: 
 
Because the standards in terms of which we assess people’s traits, feelings, and 
attitudes clearly are offshoots of our moral scheme, it is evidently possible for the 
demands of action-guiding morality to ramify in many non-action-guiding 
directions.80 
 
                                                
77 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter one. 
78 Ibid., 153. 
79 Sher, ibid. p. 113. 
80ibid.  
!!
111 
!
If moral norms can require us to be generous or trustworthy, and if they can require that 
we feel disgust or shame, then there is no room for the argument that norms cannot 
require beliefs because that is to require a non-action.  With this expanded account of 
what can be required by morality, we cannot rule out belief norms on the grounds that 
they are not norms of action.   
 This response to the worry that moral reasons cannot underlie belief norms is 
unsatisfactory.  Simply pointing to the fact that there are types of moral evaluation that 
are non-actional is no positive defense of the claim that an agent’s beliefs can be morally 
evaluated as well.  The question confronting us is whether morality ramifies in a way that 
it includes belief norms.  The answer to this question might still be no, even if we accept 
that moral evaluation ramifies to other non-actional domains.  This is not say that what 
Sher says in the quotation is false.  It certainly does seem possible for our moral scheme 
to expand beyond action evaluation.  What we need are reasons to think that we should so 
expand it.     
 I think, however, that there is a central worry about extending or expanding 
morality so that it subsumes belief norms.  It might be thought that the normativity of 
belief is already fully accounted for by epistemic reasons and that any inclination to think 
that there are moral reasons for belief norms is actually a conflation of a two distinct 
normative domains.  I will refer to this as the conflation objection.  Continuing with this 
line of thought, what seem like moral reasons for belief are actually moral reasons for 
acting in a way that provides us with evidence for a certain proposition.  Once the 
evidence is acquired, however, our belief formation is governed by belief norms that call 
for forming beliefs in accordance with the evidence.  In this second phase we are not 
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acting at all.  We are simply forming beliefs in response to the evidence we now possess, 
and, ideally, we are forming beliefs in a way that conforms to belief norms.  This is a 
two-step process that should be familiar – there are moral reasons that support 
performing evidence producing actions and there are epistemic reasons for forming 
certain beliefs given the newly produced evidence.  This might be offered as an 
alternative proposal in every case where there seems to be a moral reason supporting a 
belief norm.  For example, in the parent case discussed above, rather than hold that there 
are moral reasons that underlie the belief norm that requires true beliefs about the child’s 
allergies, this alternative picture has it that the parent has moral reasons to act in a way 
that is conducive to maintaining her belief and that these actions provide her with 
evidence for her belief.  This strategy, if it is workable, has the attractive feature of 
keeping two seemingly autonomous domains of normativity distinct.  According to the 
conflation objection, the problem with the dual basis view of belief norms is not that 
moral reasons can only ground actional norms.  Rather, the conflation objection shows 
that it is unnecessary to appeal to belief norm violations in order to establish that some bit 
of ignorance is culpable.  In the next two sections, I hope to develop these claims much 
further.   
 In the absence of a positive argument for expanding morality in the direction that 
the dual basis view requires, and in the presence of the conflation objection, the idea that 
there can be belief norms are grounded on the same reasons as plain moral norms seems 
at best unmotivated and at worst stillborn.  In the next section, I evaluate an attempt to 
make a positive case for including belief norms in the set of norms that are relevant to 
assessments of moral responsibility.  This positive argument is that certain cases of 
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culpable ignorance can only be captured by appealing to belief norm violations.  That is, 
there are cases where the fact that an agent fell short of a belief norm is a necessary 
condition for their being culpably ignorant.  This is a direct challenge to the conflation 
objection.  If it is sound, it lends support to the idea that the belief norms are a central 
component of morality and our discourse about moral responsibility.  It supplies the 
necessary positive defense of the expansionist idea that there can be moral reasons to 
have certain beliefs. 
 
4.4 BELIEF NORM VIOLATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR 
CULPABLE IGNORANCE 
The defender of morality-based belief norms might argue that there are cases of culpable 
ignorance that are not explained by locating a prior failure to conform to an action norm.  
If these cases exist, the agent’s culpability must be grounded on the fact that she fell short 
of a belief norm.  Two things about each case must hold. 
  
(1) The agents are ignorant, but still morally responsible for their ignorant action. 
(2) Their ignorance is not traceable to a prior actional epistemic norm failure that would have 
provided them with evidence against their false belief. 
The first case I will discuss comes from Sher, though it should be stressed that he does 
not offer these cases as part of a defense of (1) and (2).  I utilize them only because they 
are useful and imaginative.  The first case is: 
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Hot Dog: Alessandra, a soccer mom, has gone to pick up her children at their 
elementary school.  As usual, Alessandra is accompanied by the family’s border 
collie, Bathsheba, who rides in the back of the van.  Although it is very hot, the 
pick-up has never taken so long, so Alessandra leaves Sheba in the van while she 
goes to gather her children.  This time, however, Alessandra is greeted by a 
tangled tale of misbehavior, ill-considered punishment, and administrative 
bungling which requires several hours of sorting out.  During that time, Sheba 
languishes, forgotten, in the locked car.  When Alessandra and her children finally 
make it to the parking lot, they find Sheba unconscious from heat prostration. 81  
 
Because she forgot, Alessandra is unaware that Sheba needs relief from the heat of the 
car.  Since unawareness is a kind of ignorance, and since many find it intuitive that 
Alessandra is morally responsible for Sheba’s condition, this case seems to meet the first 
condition above.  Alessandra’s ignorance about her need to remove Sheba would qualify 
as culpable only if she fell short of an epistemic norm of some kind.  In this passage Sher 
seems to suggest that the norm is a belief norm: 
 
“The reason Alessandra should have remembered Sheba is that she was under an 
obligation to protect the dog that she could not fulfill without remembering where 
the dog was.”82 
 
A norm requiring that Alessandra remember Sheba is probably best understood as a norm 
                                                
81 ibid. p. 24. 
82 ibid p.111. 
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requiring an occurrant belief.  Sher goes on to propose that this belief norm, which might 
be thought of as “purely epistemic” given that it requires a belief rather than an action, is 
“rooted in the “oughts” of morality and prudence”.83  The relevant question for our 
purposes is whether (2) is true – whether there are no prior fallings short of an actional 
epistemic norms.  If (2) is true, then the only epistemic norm on which Alessandra’s 
culpability can be based is the belief norm Sher mentions.   In this case, however, it 
seems clear that (2) is false.  In fact there may be several candidate actional norms to 
which Alessandra was subject, her compliance with which would have prevented her 
from forgetting Sheba.  Both of these turn on the idea that Alessandra was engaging in 
risky behavior.  The risk is constituted both by the hostile environment that Sheba is in 
and the fact that Alessandra is putting herself in a position where her memory of Sheba’s 
hostile environment is all she can rely upon.  Presumably, the fact that Sheba is in the car 
and that Alessandra is inside the school precluded her from hearing Sheba’s cries of 
distress.  Given this account of the risk Alessandra is running, the first actional epistemic 
norm that Alessandra violates is one calling for her to adopt some strategy that will aid 
her memory.  She could simply say over and over to herself as she walks into the school 
not to forget Sheba.  She could set a timer on her phone that would go off after a few 
minutes and almost certainly remind herself about Sheba.  Less obviously, she could take 
carry Sheba’s playtoy in her hand, which would also function as a reminder.  All three of 
these actions would have aided her memory and decreased the likelihood of forgetting 
Sheba.  Given the gravity of the risk that Alessandra was running, it is more than 
plausible to think that she had such actional obligations.  Since the actions that these 
norms require are belief-producing, these are standard examples of actional epistemic 
                                                
83 ibid p.112. 
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norms discussed in chapter three.  The fact that Alessandra did not perform any of these 
actions contributed to her temporary lack of awareness about Sheba.  Since there is an 
actional epistemic norm violation that leads to Alessandra’s ignorance, condition (2) is 
false.  Contrary to what defenders of morality-based belief norms might attest about this 
case, there is an actional epistemic norm violation that establishes Alessandra’s 
culpability both for her ignorance and her subsequent omission.   
 It is crucial to note that it does not matter for my purposes here that Alessandra 
was not aware of these actional epistemic norms.  The argument that I am objecting to 
holds that belief norms must be part of morality because there are cases of morally 
responsible ignorant agents whose only violation was that of a belief norm.  In the case of 
Alessandra, there are plausible actional epistemic norms that she also violated, and so the 
claim that the belief norm violations are necessary is, so far, false.  To object that the 
actional epistemic norms from which Alessandra falls short cannot ground her 
responsibility for her wrong action because she lacked awareness of them (the actional 
epistemic norms) is to impose a different kind of epistemic condition.  These 
“searchlighter” objections could be raised against both belief norms and actional 
epistemic norms, and, while searchlighter views definitely merit discussion, that 
discussion is orthogonal to the problem of deciding whether belief norms or actional 
norms are relevant to the epistemic condition of moral responsibility.  These matters can 
actually cross-classify.  You can be a searchlighter and maintain that belief norms are 
relevant to moral responsibility, though of course you would have to knowingly fall short 
of these belief norms.  Alternatively, a searchlighter might maintain that only actional 
epistemic norms are relevant.  Yet another alternative is to deny the searchlighter 
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condition while maintaining that belief norms are relevant to moral responsibility.  
Finally, one might deny the searchlighter view and affirm that only actional epistemic 
norms are relevant. What matters for my purposes here is to challenge the argument that 
belief norms are part of morality because they are necessary for explaining why agents 
like Alessandra are responsible for their ignorant actions.  This is claim can be challenged 
by showing that Alessandra also violated an actional norm, and the question of her 
awareness of the norm is irrelevant. 
 Another example that Sher discusses for which it would be natural to think that 
only a belief norm that is violated is: 
 
Home for the Holidays: Joliet, who is afraid of burglars, is alone in the house.  
Panicked by sounds of movement in her kitchen, she grabs her husband’s gun, 
tiptoes down the stairs, and shoots the intruder.  It is her son, who has come home 
early for the holidays.84   
 
As Sher notes in his discussion of Joliet, this is a straightforward example of negligent 
behavior.  In cases of negligence, an agent’s ignorance is enculpating because, although 
she does not believe that she was doing something wrong, we think that she should have 
believed this.  Presumably, Joliet thought it was permissible to shoot her intruder without 
asking who was there, though, given the risk of significant harm or death that shooting 
them poses, it is uncontroversial to think that she should have known it was 
impermissible to shoot first and ask questions later.  As stated, this is an example of a 
belief norm – it says that the agent should have believed that she was placing the intruder 
                                                
84 ibid p. 26. 
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at an unacceptable level of risk.  The important question for my purposes is whether this 
norm affords the only explanation for Joliet’s culpability.  I think that the answer is no, 
since there are several actions that she could have undertaken that would have provided 
her with evidence against her belief in the permissibility of her actions.  The most 
obvious example of this would be the act of asking the intruder to identify herself.  It 
seems more than plausible to accept that in cases such as this, there is an actional 
epistemic duty of this kind on the gun wielder.  Indeed, something like this norm is 
probably part of any gun safety curriculum.  Since this actional epistemic norm exists, it 
is not necessary to appeal to a belief norm in order to ground Joliet’s moral responsibility.   
 I have shown that in both of these cases there are actional epistemic norms that 
the agents fall short of, thereby obviating the need for the appeal to belief norms.  We can 
establish that an agent’s ignorance is culpable by reference to actional epistemic norms.  
In the two cases above, the agent’s ignorance was easily traceable to some failure to 
provide oneself with evidential considerations that would diminish the likelihood of 
believing falsely.  While I have only discussed two cases, I think there is a general lesson 
to take from them.  The claim that we must appeal to belief norm violations in order to 
establish culpable ignorance is a very strong claim.  Thus, it can be fairly easily 
undermined.  Since it is not a further condition on any successful counterexample that the 
agent be aware of the actional epistemic norm is violated, then it should be fairly easy to 
show that one exists.  This is obviously only a tentative conclusion for which I have 
provided inductive evidence.  Thus, I would like to buttress my conclusion with a 
formula for discovering actional epistemic norms that correspond with the alleged 
morally-grounded belief norm.  Take the target true belief and ask what action could the 
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agent have performed that would have decreased the likelihood of having that false 
belief.  If that action is not profoundly dissimilar from other standard norms of 
investigation or reflection, then there will be an actional epistemic norm requiring that 
action.  I say that it must not be profoundly dissimilar from other actional epistemic 
norms in order to rule out wacky ways of securing the relevant true belief.  For instance, 
Joliet would not have an actional epistemic norm requiring her to install under her son’s 
skin a special microchip that helpfully alerts anyone already in the house to his identity 
and presence.  As I discussed above, a simple question should suffice. 
 One last argument can be made in support of my contention that there will always 
be an actional epistemic norm.  Assume that for a given belief norm, that there is no 
action the agent could perform that would have decreased the likelihood of having the 
false belief.  If there was nothing that the agent could have done that would have 
functioned as an epistemic aid, then there is an important sense in which her false belief 
cannot be attributed to the agent.  If the reason that that prior actions are impotent in 
aiding the agent is that acquiring the belief in question simply outstrips the agent’s 
cognitive or emotional capacities, then I think it is implausible to think that there is a 
requirement that the agent form the target belief. 
  In this section, I argued against the claim that belief norm violations are 
necessary for handling certain cases of culpable ignorance.  This necessity claim was 
intended to show that there are cases where we are not conflating action norms, which are 
a non-controversial part of action-guiding morality and belief norms, which are not.  If 
sound, it would have offered a positive argument for the dual-basis view about belief 
norms.  Without this argument, the dual-basis view seems unmotivated.  In the following 
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section, I argue that prospects are actually worse for the dual-basis view. 
 Before moving on to these other objections, I must address an objection to the line 
of argument I have taken in this section.  It is simply that the agents in question might not 
have been aware of the actional epistemic norms that I enlist.  Let’s assume that I am 
right, and that Joliet, for example, was under an actional epistemic obligation to inquire 
into the identity of the person in her home.  My claim that the appeal to belief norms is 
not necessary in order to capture cases of culpable ignorance is seems vulnerable to the 
challenge that I have merely pushed things back a step.  Once again, the regress problem 
has reared its head.  If Joliet was unaware of the fact that she should have taken steps to 
identify the person in her home, then it seems natural to ask whether this ignorance is 
culpable.  Joliet’s ignorance about her investigative obligations might trace back to a 
witting wrong action, in which case the regress can terminate without appealing to a 
belief norm.  She may have chosen not to take the gun safety course, while she knew full 
well that she would be placing others at risk because she would be unaware of many 
serious moral obligations that come with gun ownership.  However, in the absence of this 
witting refusal to learn about gun safety, she might still have been ignorant.   In that case, 
it seems quite natural to claim that thought she did not know that she should have 
investigated the intruder’s identity, there was a belief norm that required her to do so.  In 
short, she should have known that she should have investigated.  If this is a live 
possibility, then I seem only to have postponed the necessity of belief norms for 
capturing the culpability of Joliet’s ignorance.  The same worry can be transposed to the 
case of Alessandra.  If her failure to set a reminder alarm on her watch was an unwitting 
failure, in the sense that she did not realize that she was under an actional obligation 
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requiring her to do so, we might be compelled to ground her culpability in the fact that 
though she did not know she should have set a reminder, she should have known.  As 
with Joliet, Alessandra would have fallen short of a belief norm requiring her to know 
what her actional epistemic obligations were.  In both cases, belief norms are still 
necessary. 
 Unfortunately, a complete response to this objection will have to wait until I 
consider the arguments of the rest of the chapter.  If these arguments succeed, I will have 
provided independent reasons for thinking that the belief norms I just alluded to – norms 
requiring agents to believe that they are subject to actional obligations – are problematic.  
In chapter five, I will take this result and apply it to cases that are similar to Alessandra’s 
and Joliet’s.  I will argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that culpable ignorance 
can be established via belief norm violations.  
 
4.5 DUAL BASIS AND WRONG KINDS OF REASONS 
In this section and the next, I will expose deeper problems with the dual-basis view that 
belief norms can be underwritten by moral reasons.  The dual-basis view presupposes an 
account of moral reasons according to which moral considerations, and in particular, an 
agent’s failure to respond to them, are relevant to the agent’s culpability for having a 
false belief.  A proposal such as this seems to run afoul of a variant of the wrong kinds of 
reason problem.  In its most general form, the wrong kinds of reason problem identifies 
those reasons are appropriate for holding or forming certain attitudes and which are not.  
When the attitude in question is that of belief, there are certain reasons for which it is 
clearly appropriate to form a belief.  To take an example that Hieronymi introduces, the 
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belief that the butler committed the crime is held for right kind of reason when the 
reasons for which the agent holds the belief are evidence for the truth of that belief.85  
Video footage of the butler committing the crime is pretty strong evidence for the belief 
in question.  If my reason for believing that the butler did it is that I have seen the video 
of him doing it, then I believe for a reason that is, intuitively, of the right kind.  By 
contrast, if the reason that I hold this belief is that it would be good for me if I believed it, 
then, intuitively, I hold this belief for the wrong kind of reason.  That it would be good 
for me if I believed that p is not the right kind of reason to believe that p.  If someone 
would kill me unless I formed that belief, then I seem to have a reason to get myself to 
form the belief, though I do not have a reason for holding it. 
 For the purposes of raising this objection to the dual basis view, I will adopt 
Hieronymi’s explication of the wrong kinds of reason problem.86  She frames it in terms 
of her own account of reasons.  On her view reasons are considerations that bear on a 
question.  A reason to believe that p is a consideration that bears on the question ‘whether 
p’.  Such considerations are called constitutive reasons for belief.  The video footage of 
the butler committing the crime bears on the question whether the butler did it, and so the 
video is a constitutive reason to believe that he butler did it. Hieronymi contrasts this with 
reasons for believing that p that do not bear on the question ‘whether p’ but which still 
favor believing that p.  In Hieronymi’s example, we are to imagine both that an agent’s 
life is in danger if she does not give convincing testimony that the butler is guilty and that 
the agent will succeed in this if she believed that the butler did it.  In this case, the agent 
certainly seems to have a really strong reason to believe that the butler did it – her life 
                                                
85 Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason.” 
86 Ibid., 448. 
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depends on it – but this consideration does not bear on the question of the butler’s guilt. 
Hieronymi calls reasons that favor holding a belief that p but that do not bear on the 
question ‘whether p’ extrinsic reason for the belief that p. This distinction is supposed to 
inform the distinction between the wrong kinds of reasons and right kinds of reasons for a 
given belief or other attitude.  Constitutive reasons for believing that p are the right kind 
of reasons for believing that p, and extrinsic reasons are the wrong kind of reason for 
believing that p.  She says: 
 
“Extrinsic reasons are not really reasons for believing p, we can say, because they 
are not the kind of reasons which, simply by finding them convincing, one would 
believe p.”87 
 
An important feature of Hieronymi’s view is that attitudes are formed by settling 
questions.  When we find a consideration that seems to us to bear on the question 
‘whether p’ convincing, we form that belief for that (those) reason(s). Her claim is that 
extrinsic reasons for belief will never settle the question ‘whether p’, and thus are not the 
right kind of reason for which to hold a belief.  In this explication of the wrong kinds of 
reasons problem, which I take to be the best and most sophisticated one on offer, 
Hieronymi provides a straightforward way of classifying reasons as the right or wrong 
kind for the attitude of belief. 
 These reflections on the wrong kind of reason problem provide the materials for 
an objection to the dual basis view of belief norms.  According to the dual-basis view, 
there are moral considerations that count in favor of having true beliefs about some 
                                                
87 Ibid p.448. 
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morally weighty issues.  In most cases, we think that parent ought to have true beliefs 
about her child’s allergies.  The moral consideration that seems to favor this belief norm 
is the risk of harming the child posed by the parent not knowing her child’s allergies.88 
But, this underlying moral reason, namely the risk to the child of the parent’s ignorance 
does not bear the belief required by the norm, namely that her child is allergic.  Thus, the 
belief norm’s underlying moral reasons are actually extrinsic reasons for holding the 
required belief.  Since bearing on the question of whether the child has allergies is co-
extensive with being the right kind of reason for believing the child has allergies, the 
child’s risk of being harmed cannot be a reason for believing she has allergies, which is 
to say, it cannot be a reason for that belief.  To be sure, this risk seems to be a moral 
consideration that counts counting in favor of bringing herself to have true beliefs about 
her child’s allergies.  The risk posed by ignorance bears on the question ‘whether to 
secure evidence that would reduce the likelihoods of ignorance’.  But, the dual basis view 
is a theory about belief norms.  It should concern its proponents that agents, who 
complied with it for the reasons that underlie it, are forming beliefs for the wrong kind of 
reason.     
 An obvious reply to this objection is that this discussion of the wrong kinds of 
reasons problem is off target.  The dual-basis view does not maintain that certain moral 
reasons could be epistemic reasons for a certain belief.  If this was the proposal, then the 
wrong kinds of reasons problem seems fatal to the view.  Rather, the dual basis-view 
states that moral reasons can ground an epistemic norm requiring a certain belief.  It does 
not require that agents comply with the norm by forming the relevant belief for this or 
                                                
88 I am assuming of course that the parent is living at a time and place where children are regularly tested for 
allergies.   
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that reason.  Indeed, one can consistently maintain that belief norms are underwritten by 
epistemic reasons and that agents should not form the required belief for these moral 
reasons, precisely because of the worry raised in the previous paragraph. Violations of 
these belief norms would still result in result in culpable ignorance on this view - the 
mother who fails to remember and thus fails to believe that her daughter is allergic to 
penicillin would be culpable for her ignorance and potentially responsible for any harm 
that she suffers.  Furthermore, if she does comply with the norm by responding to 
epistemic reasons for holding the belief, then it is of no concern, since the dual basis view 
need not prohibit this.  It is a view about what underlies requirements to hold certain 
beliefs, not a view about the reasons for which agents should form their beliefs.     
 
4.6 DEFENDING THE MODAL AND IDEAL CLAIMS 
The response in the previous section to issues about the wrong kinds of reasons is the best 
one for the proponent of the dual-basis view to make.  It makes clear that the moral 
reason is supporting a belief norm but does not masquerade as a reason for the required 
belief.  Though I think it is the best move available to the dual-basis defender, it is brings 
another problem to the foreground.  This way around the wrong-kinds-of-reasons 
objection highlights the fact that the moral reasons that ground or justify the belief norm 
are not themselves reasons for which the agent should comply with the norm.  This seems 
to show that the wrong kinds of reasons worries have merely been pushed back a level.  
In this section I will raise two different objections to the dual-basis view.  First, I will 
argue that if agents were capable of conforming to morally-grounded belief norms for the 
reasons that underlie them, then their beliefs would not me epistemically praiseworthy, 
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which is certainly an odd result for a theory of epistemic norms.  Second, and more 
seriously, I argue that in fact agents simply cannot conform to these norms by responding 
to the underlying reasons.   
 These objections are more subtle but can be brought out by comparing the belief 
norms I have been discussing to their moral analogues - morally grounded action norms 
with morally grounded belief norms.  In standard action cases, reasons that underlie 
norms, can function both as justifying reasons and motivating reasons.  They are 
justifying reasons simply because they lend support to the norm.  The ‘because’ in “an 
agent ought to Φ because of moral reason x” is the ‘because’ of justification.  The risk of 
harm to one’s child justifies the requirement to seek medical treatment when the child is 
ill.  Whether this justification is sufficient to ground the norm is a substantive question 
that need not be resolved in order to distinguish justifying and motivating reasons.  This 
same reason, namely the risk of harm, can also function as a part of the motivating reason 
for the agent.  Although I introduced the distinction between motivating and normative 
reasons above, I need to say a bit more about what these concepts entail.   
 Motivating reasons are commonly understood to be the psychological states of an 
agent that explain her action.  Michael Smith, for example, holds that motivating reasons 
to act are belief-desire complexes that motivate us.89  Since motivating reasons, so 
understood, are mental states of the agent and justifying reasons are facts or states of 
affairs, the claim that a reason that justifies an action can become a motivating reason 
requires some argument.  One way that a justifying reason can ‘become’ a motivating 
one, is when the content of the justifying reason finds its way into the content of the 
                                                
89 J. Kennett and M. Smith, “Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will,” Philosophy in Mind 
(1994): 141–157. 
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belief or desire that motivate us to act.  For example, a good parent might form a belief 
that there is a risk of harm to her child if she fails to seek medical treatment, and will 
desire that the child not be harmed.  The risk of harm in this example is a justifying 
reason – it justifies the obligation to seek treatment – and it is part of the motivating 
reason for the action that complies with the obligation – the parent both believes that 
there is a risk of harm and desires to avoid it.  Furthermore, when we ask for an 
explanation of why this particular parent sought treatment, the answer is that she 
understood what the reasons for action were, which is to say that the content of her 
motivating reason included the content of the justifying reason.  Of course, this 
correspondence between the justifying reasons and the motivating reason may fail to 
obtain without jeopardizing the intelligibility of the action.  If the mother’s motivating 
reason for seeking care is constituted by her belief that there are eligible and desirable 
bachelors working as physicians at the ER, then the reason why she acted is not also the 
reason that justifies her requirement to act.  But, although this lack of correspondence is 
common, and may be even be the norm, it does not dispute the modal claim advanced 
above that, where reasons for action and actional norms are concerned, the very reasons 
that justify the norm can be ‘internalized’ in the agent’s motivational structures.  In my 
discussion below, I will refer to this as the modal claim.  I plan to show that this claim 
cannot be made of belief norms that are grounded by moral reasons.   
 Before making this argument, however, I want to highlight another aspect of the 
distinction between justifying and motivating reasons that is relevant here.  In addition to 
the modal claim that justifying reasons can become part of one’s motivating reason, it 
seems plausible to maintain that a central feature of moral discourse involves getting our 
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interlocutors to ‘internalize’ the justifying reasons into their motivational states.  Not only 
do we try to get agents to see what the moral reasons are, we also try to get them to act 
for those reasons.  We want them to comply with the norms because they recognize the 
underlying reasons.  When an agent complies with an actional norm, but she is not acting 
‘for the right reasons’, all is not lost, since there is still something to be said for 
compliance.  Ideally, however, an agent does more than just comply with the norm.  The 
literature on moral worth is helpful here.  Julia Markovits has defended a conception of 
moral worth that she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’.90  She says: 
 
“My action is morally worthy if and only if my motivating reasons for acting 
coincide with the reasons morally justifying the action – that is, if and only if I 
perform the action I morally ought to perform, for the (normative) reasons why it 
morally ought to be performed.”91 
 
When Kant’s famous shopkeeper tells the truth to his customer because he is motivated 
by considerations having to do with honesty and respect, then his action has moral worth 
on Markovits’s view.  Of course, this is on the assumption that honesty and respect are 
among the normative reasons that make it impermissible to lie.  The shopkeeper’s 
motivating reasons for acting are coincident with the normative reason that requires so 
acting.  Arpaly defends a stronger view according to which right actions are morally 
worthy only if they are performed for the reasons that make them right.92  It is stronger 
because coincidence between one’s motivating reasons and the relevant normative 
                                                
90 Markovits, “Acting for the Right Reasons,” 205. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, Chapter 1. 
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reasons is only a necessary condition.  On Arpaly’s view, an agent must meet a further 
condition in order for her action to be morally worthy.  It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to adjudicate this debate, but my objection to the dual basis view does not 
hinge on a particular one of these theories being true.  The important point for my 
purposes is that something like the coincidence reasons thesis marks out a moral ideal in 
the case of action.  In the following discussion, I will refer to this as the ideal claim.   One 
question for the dual basis view is whether we would consider it an epistemic ideal if one 
were are to comply with the morally justified belief norm via the internalization of the 
moral reasons that underlie it. The coincident reasons thesis, applied to the realm of 
belief, says that beliefs are epistemically worthy when and only when the reasons for 
which the agent forms the belief are reasons to hold the belief.  I will argue below that 
this notion of ‘epistemic worth’ fails to obtain when agents comply with the moral belief 
norm ‘for the right reasons’.  
 I have described two features of morally grounded actional norms. The first is the 
claim that one can act in accordance with the norm by making the justifying reason part 
of one’s motivating reason.  I will call this the modal claim.  The second is the claim that 
agents whose motivating reasons are also justifying reasons are acting in an ideal way.  I 
will call this the ideal claim.  What I will now argue is that both claims are false for the 
proposal that belief norms grounded on moral reasons. 
 First, I will consider the modal claim.  It should be noticed that the claim itself 
does not apply straightforwardly to the belief case.  The modal claim is about the 
possibility of a correspondence between the normative reasons that justify a norm and the 
motivation of agents who comply with it.  Since the concept of motivation seems to be 
!!
130 
!
inherently linked to actions and intentions, it is simply inapplicable to the belief context.  
Securing correspondence between the justificatory reasons and the motivating reasons is 
already ruled out by the fact that beliefs do not relate in the right way to motivation.  
While one’s coming to hold a particular belief surely does have psychological 
antecedents, these antecedents are not belief-desire pairs as was the case with action.93  
But, the explanatory aspect of the justification/motivation distinction can be maintained.  
The modal thesis, rather than being about a correspondence between the reasons that 
underlie the belief norm and the reasons that motivate belief, will instead be about a 
correspondence between the reason that justify the belief norm and the reasons that 
explain the agent coming to have her belief.  Epistemologists call the relation that holds 
here between the reason and the agent’s belief is called the basing relation.  It is the 
reason on which the belief is based.  The literature on the basing relation is concerned in 
large part with the idea that a belief is justified only if it is based on an appropriate 
reason.94  For my present purposes, however, the basing reason that holds between a 
reason and a belief will function as the epistemic analogue for motivating reasons in the 
case of action.  The relevance of appropriately based beliefs to epistemic justification will 
become more important in subsequent discussion on epistemic worth. 
 According to the dual-basis view, the reasons that justify some belief norms are 
moral.  The risk of harm to her child is a moral reason that justifies the belief norm that 
the mother ought know what her child is allergic to.  The trouble with this account is 
apparent in the context of the explanation of the mother’s belief.  When the mother 
                                                
93 The point I am making here will hold whatever account of motivating reasons one accepts.  I utilize the 
belief-desire pair account just for the sake of consistency. 
94 For a comprehensive summary of different theories of the basing relation and their uses in epistemology, see 
Keith Allen Korez, “Recent Work on the Basing Relation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 2 (April 1, 
1997): 171–191. 
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believes in accordance with the norm, we are not inclined to explain her belief by 
appealing to the risk of harm to the child.  Her reasons for believing that her child is 
allergic to penicillin are not going to involve facts about the risk of harm.  The reasons 
that explain this belief might be that her physician informed her on a previous occasion 
and she accurately recalled this encounter.  Maybe the mother placed a medical bracelet 
on her child’s wrist that indicated her allergy.  Both of these reasons explain why the 
mother has true beliefs about her daughter, but they are plainly evidential reasons rather 
than moral ones.  They speak to the question of whether it is true that her child is allergic 
to penicillin.  In the belief case, therefore, we find that the reasons why someone 
complies with a morality-grounded belief norm is typically not the moral reason that 
justifies it. 
 The problem runs deeper, however.  According to recent work on the nature of 
belief, Heironymi has argued that the nature of the attitude that someone forms in 
response to their reasons depends on the question that is actually settled by the reasons.95  
She maintains that it is constitutive of believing that p that considerations that bear on the 
question “whether p” settled the question for the agent.  This is one way of understanding 
what it means to say that belief “aims at the truth”.  She discusses cases where agents 
seem to hold beliefs for what she calls extrinsic reasons, of which moral reasons is but 
one species.  We are to imagine that a juror has self-interested reasons for believing that 
the butler committed a murder but is not convinced one way or the other by the evidence.  
For the juror, the considerations that bear on the question whether the butler did it do not 
settle the question for the juror.  Rather, the fact that she has self-interested reasons does 
settle the question about whether it would be good to believe that the butler did it.  She 
                                                
95 Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason.” 
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thinks that in this case, the juror does not believe that the butler did it; rather, she believes 
that it would be good for her to believe that the butler did it.   
 Applying this to the case of a belief norm grounded by moral reasons has 
troubling implications for the prospects of establishing correspondence between the 
reasons that underlie the belief norm and the reasons that actually explain the agent’s 
belief.  Since the moral reasons that ground the requirement to have true beliefs about p 
do not settle the question whether p, an agent actually cannot believe that p for those 
reasons.  The mother is not in the state of believing that her child is allergic unless the 
considerations that bear on the question of whether she is allergic settle the question for 
her.  Since the moral reasons that underlie the belief norm do not bear on this question, it 
follows that the reasons why she believes that her child is allergic cannot correspond with 
the reasons underlying the belief norm.  Thus, the modal claim is false for morally 
grounded belief norms.  This result is significant because the modal claim expresses a 
deep feature of the connection between morality and the agents that are subject to its 
purview.  The reasons that provide the normative authority for morally grounded belief 
norms cannot figure in the agent’s deliberation leading up to and securing norm 
compliance.  Minimally, this shows that there is something peculiar about belief norms 
that are grounded on moral reasons.  More seriously, it reveals a deep problem with this 
kind of belief norm.  The reasons that lend it support are irrelevant for an agent 
concerned with complying with the norm.   
 The unattractive features of this view are brought into greater focus when we turn 
to the issue of advice and the epistemic analog of moral worth.  With regard to epistemic 
advice, if an agent’s interlocutor is concerned with getting an agent to believe a certain 
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proposition so that she would comply with a morally grounded belief norm, the 
interlocutor would not draw the agent’s attention to the moral reasons that do the 
grounding.  If, for instance we were trying to get the parent to hold true beliefs about her 
child’s allergies, we would adduce evidence for the proposition that she is allergic to 
penicillin.  We would not get anywhere by pointing out to them that there are strong 
moral reasons concerning risk to the child if they should have false beliefs.  By alluding 
to and emphasizing the moral reasons, the interlocutor might succeed in getting the parent 
to act in ways that would help them remember their child’s allergies, but again these 
actions would involve producing evidence for the belief.  The standard model for giving 
advice simply does not apply in the case of morally grounded belief norms.   
 Similar issues arise for the question of epistemic worth.  As I alluded to briefly 
above, there is an epistemic analog to the concept of moral worth according to which a 
belief is worthy if it is believed for the right reasons.  Compare the following two agents 
both of whom believe that climbing Mt. Everest is dangerous.  Mike is runs an expedition 
outfit that regularly guides adventurous alpinists to the summit of Everest.  His belief that 
climbing Mt. Everest is dangerous is based on a wealth of experience and his having 
undertaken a serious study of the atmospheric conditions on the mountain and the typical 
human physiological responses to such condition.  His belief complies with many 
different epistemic norms, and the reasons for which he believes are both strong and 
multifarious.  Because his belief is based on such reasons, we might say that his belief 
has a significant degree of epistemic worth.  Indeed, influential theories of epistemic 
justification hold roughly that what it is for a belief to be justified is for it to be based on 
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the right kinds of reasons.96  Things are markedly different with Page.  His belief that 
Everest is dangerous is based on a story that a new age-y friend told him about protective 
mountain gods who try to minimize encroachments on their holy space by placing a curse 
on every climber who attempts to summit.  This curse is supposed to be the reason why 
climbers have such a hard time climbing the mountain.  Page’s belief that climbing 
Everest is dangerous, though true, is based on really bad reasons.  Page has a true belief, 
but there is a sense in which it does not merit epistemic praise.  Just as actions have moral 
worth to the degree that they are performed for the right reasons, beliefs have epistemic 
worth to the degree that they are believed for the right reasons.   
 The situation is very different for agents who are subject to a belief norm that is 
grounded by moral reasons.  Earlier, I argued that agents couldn’t believe that p for moral 
reasons because the moral reasons cannot settle the question of whether p is true.  If we 
assume that my argument failed and that moral considerations can settle the question of 
whether p for a given agent, then we can ask whether that agent’s belief has epistemic 
worth.  Although it is difficult to even comprehend how an agent might form a belief by 
responding to moral reasons, imagine that a third outfitter named Jon, who is also 
planning on starting an Everest outfitting company, thinks that the fact that his 
customer’s well being is in his hands provides him with a strong moral reason to have 
true beliefs about the risks involved with an Everest summit attempt.  We can imagine a 
case where Jon, because of some strange inclination toward pessimism and risk aversion, 
reflects on the moral reasons (his future customers’ well being) and somehow forms the 
belief that climbing Everest is dangerous.  For this case to work, he must form this belief 
                                                
96 Keith Allen Korcz, “The Epistemic Basing Relation”, n.d., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/basing-
epistemic/#BasRelEpi. 
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only for the moral reasons that support the belief norm requiring him to have true beliefs.  
Imagine that Jon possesses a reliable introspective faculty and that when asked why he 
believes climbing Everest is dangerous, his answer is that his future clients’ well being is 
in his hands.  The question before us is whether Jon’s belief is more similar to Mike’s or 
Page’s.  My intuition is that Jon’s belief is more similar to Page’s.  Both of their beliefs 
are based on considerations that are plainly non-evidential.  In Page’s case it is based on 
hearsay from an unreliable source, and in Jon’s case it is based, rather inexplicably, on 
his belief about risks to future customers.  This result is significant because it shows that 
belief norms that are grounded on moral, rather than epistemic reasons have the peculiar 
property that agents who comply with them by responding to the reasons that underlie 
them are in doing something wrong.  Their beliefs have no epistemic worth as I have 
been discussing it. 
 Before moving on to discuss a class of beliefs that might avoid the problems I 
raise for the dual-basis view, I want to quickly take stock.  First, I suggested that the dual-
basis proponent fell victim to the wrong kinds of reasons objection.  After some 
clarifications, I showed the wrong kinds of reasons objection as typically posed against 
non-evidential beliefs was not a real threat to the dual-basis view, but that there are two 
related problems.  The first, which I called the modal claim, was that agents cannot 
comply with the belief norm for the reasons that underlie it.  This followed both from a 
plausible view about the nature of belief and from the notion that moral reasons that 
might ground an alleged obligation to believe that p would not be capable of settling the 
question whether p.  The second, which I called the ideal claim, stated that per impossible 
agents who could bring them selves to hold the requisite belief by responding to moral 
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reasons would not hold a belief that had epistemic worth.  These objections, if successful, 
show that there are strong reasons to doubt that belief norms fall under the extension of 
‘moral norms’.  In chapter five, I will discuss the implications of this in more detail.   
4.7 MORAL BELIEF NORMS: A SPECIAL CASE? 
In this section, I will discuss a class of belief norms that appear not to be vulnerable to 
the previous objections.  The problems with morally grounded belief norms stem from 
the fact that their underling justification is moral even though their command is 
epistemic.  Might this disconnect be avoided if the belief that the norm requires is about 
morality?  Do the worries that I raised in the previous chapter apply to a belief norm that, 
for example, required us to believe that it is wrong to torture a cat for fun?  In order for 
this example to get off the ground, I must assume a metaethical framework according to 
which there is evidence for certain moral claims and that these claims, like 
straightforward empirical claims are, true.  Moreover, I must assume that the evidence for 
these moral claims is such that normal agents can form moral beliefs by responding to it.  
In other words, I am accepting for the sake of argument that there are reasons for 
believing moral claims.97  With these assumptions on board, we can entertain the 
possibility that there are morally grounded norms that require us to hold moral beliefs.  In 
the case discussed above, it looked like the risk that a parent’s false beliefs posed for the 
child’s well being might ground a norm that requires the parent to have true beliefs about 
                                                
97 It is not lost on me that these are controversial assumptions, and though I don’t explore this question in the 
dissertation, the many elements of the view that I defend would still hold under different metaethical picture.  
Much of what I say would be inapplicable if there weren’t moral reasons that actually grounded moral truths 
like “it is wrong to torture cats for fun”.  Indeed, it seems like any account of culpable ignorance will resist 
application if, as non-cognitivist views seem to entail, agents can’t hold false beliefs.  In future work, I would 
like to explore the possibility of defending an account of the epistemic condition that makes fewer metaethical 
commitments.   
!!
137 
!
her child’s allergies.  In a similar fashion there might be risks posed by the holding of 
false moral beliefs that, if sufficiently strong, might ground a norm requiring agents to 
believe truly.  If this were possible, then there would be moral reasons to hold beliefs 
about certain true moral claims.  On such a picture, belief norms requiring moral beliefs 
might be part of morality, after all.  These norms would hold be over and above any 
purely epistemic belief norms that might require the same belief, which would be based 
solely on evidential considerations.  The question I will focus on in this section is 
whether these belief norms, which I call moral belief norms, are subject to the same 
worries I raise in section 4.6.  First, would we be able to comply with a moral belief norm 
for the reasons that underlie it (does the modal claim hold for these norms)?  Second, do 
beliefs that are based on the moral reasons underlying the moral belief norm have 
epistemic worth (does the ideal claim hold for these norms)?    
 Before answering these questions, I will offer a prima facie case for thinking that 
there are such norms.  The first thing to notice is that it follows from the metaethical 
assumptions I made above that certain considerations count as evidence for moral claims.  
These considerations bear on the question of whether it is, say, wrong to set a cat on fire 
for fun and as such count as reasons for that belief. On the assumption that there is an 
abundance of evidence for the truth of the proposition that it is wrong to torture a cat for 
fun, it is plausible to think that most agents what I have called a belief norm requiring 
them to believe it.  In effect, this belief norm is no different than any norm requiring us to 
hold a belief for which there is an abundance of evidence.  There is an abundance of 
evidence that Barak Obama is president and that he was born in the United States, and, 
given this evidential state of affairs, we should believe that he is president and that he 
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was born in the United States.  Similarly, a norm requiring us to believe that certain 
moral claims true might be established in exactly the same way as standard belief norms.  
When there is an abundance of evidence for the truth of some moral claim, and either no 
or very weak evidence against, then we ought to believe that moral claim.  However, this 
is not the proposal under discussion in this chapter.  I am concerned with norms that 
require us to hold moral beliefs, where the force of the requirement is moral.  In other 
words, I am interested in moral belief norms that are underwritten by moral rather than 
epistemic reasons.   
A prima facie case for moral belief norms that are underwritten by moral reasons 
can be developed as follows.  Consider whether there are moral reasons why we should 
believe that it is wrong to burn a cat for fun, and whether these moral reasons would be 
weighty enough to justify a norm requiring that belief.  It is plain that considerations such 
as the needless suffering of the cat are moral reasons that, in a many cases, would support 
the claim that is wrong to burn a cat for fun.98  In the terms I utilize above, these are the 
moral reasons underlying an actional norm that prohibits burning a cat for fun.  However, 
the question here is whether these moral reasons also support a belief norm requiring 
agents to believe that it is wrong to burn cats for fun.  An obvious candidate for moral 
considerations that support such a belief norm is the fact that this action causes the cat 
severe, unnecessary harm and that false beliefs about the moral impermissibility of 
burning will presents a risk of realizing these harms.  It seems plausible to suppose that 
the gravity of these moral considerations would support the claim that we (morally) 
should have true beliefs about the morality of burning cats.  I am obviously skirting over 
                                                
98 This claim is qualified, in part, because of cases where burning the cat is the only way to prevent the painful 
destruction of all sentient beings in existence. 
!!
139 
!
important issues here, but the basic principle to which I am appealing is that moral 
requirement to have true beliefs can be justified by the risk of having false beliefs, which, 
if acted upon, would realize serious moral wrongs.  A similar principle would hold for the 
parents of the child with allergies.  The risk to the child’s well being of having false 
beliefs about her allergies would justify a moral requirement to have true beliefs about 
her allergies.  The fact that certain false beliefs increase the risk of realizing wrong-
making features is a moral reason that for having true beliefs in those instances.  Notice, 
that the risk of realizing moral wrongs is also a moral reason for actional norms, viz. the 
risk of wrongfully harming or killing a bystander is a (probably decisive) reason not to 
drive drunk.  The proposal that I will consider here is whether moral belief norms that are 
grounded by risk-related moral reasons can avoid the problems I raised above for other 
belief norms.99 
With this picture of morally grounded moral belief norms on the table, I can now 
consider the first objection.  In the previous chapter, I argued that a morally grounded 
belief norm requiring a parent to believe that her child is allergic to penicillin is 
problematic because the parent could not comply with the norm for the reasons that 
ground the norm.  In the case of the parent, the moral reasons that seem to justify the 
norm requiring her to believe that her child is allergic to penicillin are that the child is 
completely dependent on the parent together with the fact that false beliefs about the 
child’s allergies pose a serious risk to her well being.  The seriousness of these moral 
                                                
99 With these brief remarks, I do not claim to have made a convincing case for morally-grounded moral 
epistemic norms.  I want simply to offer a way in which such norms might be defended so that I can evaluate 
their vulnerability to the objections I raised for other morally-grounded belief norms in the previous chapter.  
For all I say here, it might be that moral belief norms cannot be grounded in the way that I propose because 
the reasons do not weigh out in support of a moral belief norm.  Although the risk of acting wrongly gives us 
some reason to think we should believe moral truths, we might think that this reason is not sufficiently strong.  
For now, I will set this objection to the side.   
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reasons seems to support the claim that the parent should have true beliefs about her 
child’s allergies, where the normative force of this should is moral.  The problem is that 
these moral reasons are not themselves reasons for believing that the child is allergic to 
penicillin.  They are not considerations that bear on the question of whether the child is 
allergic.  Since beliefs are supposed to be based on reasons for belief, whereas the belief 
norm under consideration is underwritten by moral considerations involving risk of harm, 
the parent cannot comply with the belief norm by believing for the reasons that justify the 
norm.  Of course the parent can bring herself to comply with this norm by responding 
underlying moral reasons.  She may realize the gravity of her situation and do everything 
she can to remember what her child’s allergies are.  But, presumably these actions will 
simply provide her with evidential reasons to believe that her child is allergic, and it is on 
that basis that she will for that belief.  The risk of harming her child functions as her 
motivating reason for performing an action.  This action provides her with the epistemic 
reasons for which she believes that her child is allergic.  But, the problem is that the 
epistemic reason on which her belief was based is not coincident with the moral reasons 
that require her to hold that belief.  So far, this is just a summary of the argument in the 
previous section.   
 Interestingly, this issue does not seem to arise where the morally-grounded belief 
norm requires us to believe a moral claim.  The thought here is that the moral reasons that 
justify the morality-grounded belief norm might also be reasons for holding the belief 
that the norm requires us to hold.  Return to our moral obligation not to burn cats alive.  
When we are deliberating about what to believe with respect to the morality of burning 
cats alive, the relevant considerations are those that bear on the question whether it is 
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wrong to burn cats alive.  As I discussed above, these are considerations having to do 
with the pointless suffering that the cat will experience.  Most people would find that this 
consideration bears strongly on the question whether it is wrong to burn cats alive, and 
for many it settles that question and becomes the reason on which their belief is based.  
But, notice that cat’s needless suffering can also be part of the justification for a moral 
belief norm requiring us to believe that it is wrong to burn it for fun.  Having false beliefs 
about the morality of burning animals for fun presents a risk of realizing the very features 
of the action that make it wrong, namely the cat’s pointless suffering. If it is on the basis 
of mitigating the risk of causing pointless suffering that we are morally required believe 
that it is wrong to burn cats, then what follows of someone whose reason for believing 
that it is wrong to burn cats is the pointless suffering involved?  It looks as though, in 
contrast with the allergic child case, that the same consideration can function both as a 
reason for believing that it is wrong to burn cats and as a reason for thinking we are 
morally required to believe that it is wrong to burn cats.  The former is true because the 
pointless suffering is a consideration that bears on the question of the morality of burning 
cats.  The latter is true because allaying the risk of realizing pointless suffering is a 
consideration that bears on whether we (morally) ought to believe that it is wrong to burn 
cats.  If these two claims are right, then we might conclude that an agent can believe that 
it is wrong to burn cats for the same reason that grounds the obligation to believe it is 
wrong to burn them.  This is just a direct challenge of the modal claim I raised above as 
an objection to morally grounded belief norms.  
 In the case I have been discussing, the reason the agent believes it is wrong to 
burn cats is the pointless suffering it involves, and the reason justifies the obligation to 
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believe it is wrong to burn cats is that if you fail to hold this belief, you may actually 
commit this wrong action.  The relationship between the reason the agent believes and 
the reason that justifies the requirement to believe is closer in the case of moral belief 
norm, but not close enough to satisfy what I have called the modal claim – agents cannot 
satisfy the belief norm for the reasons that underlie it.  Thus, the modal claim fails to hold 
even for moral belief norms.   
 The second criticism that I raised for morally grounded belief norms was that the 
it failed to comport with the standard ways in which advice is given, when the goal is to 
get agents to comply with a moral norm.  I argued that we would not get agent to comply 
with a morally grounded belief norm to believe that her child is allergic by pointing to the 
moral reasons that ground the norm.  Instead we bring the epistemic reason for the belief 
to their attention, and hope that reflections on these evidential considerations elicit the 
relevant belief.  In the case of moral norms, things may seem less problematic on this 
front.  Again, this is because the considerations that are relevant to the question of 
whether some action is, say, morally wrong, are moral considerations that could also 
ground or justify the moral belief norm requiring that belief.  We might point to the 
obviously pointless suffering that the cat is experiencing in order to get them to believe 
that it is wrong to burn it.  And it is the risk of realizing this suffering that grounds the 
relevant moral belief norm.  Unlike the case of the allergic child, we do not have to 
change the subject when we are concerned to help agents comply with moral belief 
norms.  It is a moral discussion from beginning to end.  This is subject to the same 
objection I raised above however.  The considerations having to do with the risk of 
realizing the harms, which is plainly a moral consideration, is not the right kind of 
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consideration to point to.  The content of the belief that we are trying to get the agent to 
form is not about the risks associated with holding false moral beliefs.  Such risk-facts do 
bear on the question ‘whether it is moral obligation to believe that it is wrong to Φ’, but 
that is not the question we are trying to get our interlocutors to settle when our goal is to 
get them to comply with such an obligation.  Instead, we point them to considerations 
that bear on the question ‘whether it is wrong to Φ’.  To point to facts about risk of 
holding false beliefs is to change the subject.  Thus, moral belief norms also fail to 
capture the standard picture of moral advice according to which it is possible, and 
typically most effective to comply with a moral or epistemic obligation by pointing to the 
obligation’s underlying reason. 
 The third criticism that I raised for morally grounded belief norms is that agents 
who were capable of basing their belief on the reason that underlies the obligation to 
form the belief are not believing ‘for the right reasons’, and as such, their belief is not 
epistemically worthy.  It should now be clear that moral belief norms do not escape this 
criticism either.  Imagine that an agent forms a belief that it is wrong to burn cats for fun 
by thinking about the moral risks of holding the belief that it is morally permissible to 
burn cats for fun.  Perhaps, the person is risk averse to an epistemic fault.  She bases her 
moral beliefs, not on the considerations that bear on the truth of those beliefs but rather 
on considerations that bear on risk posed by being wrong.  In this case, she might think 
that there is no moral risk posed by believing that it is morally wrong to burn cats for fun 
if it is in fact morally permissible.100  But believing that it is permissible does pose a 
                                                
100 Of course this risk calculation leaves out the possibility that it might be morally obligatory to burn cats for 
fun, where this obligation is something like a Kantian direct duty.  I set aside this complication, since my point 
does not depend on the imagined agent being good at such calculations.  I am only trying to show how 
considerations of risk might become the basis for a given agent’s moral belief.   
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moral risk if it is in fact impermissible.  These reflections, however odd, might settle the 
question for someone who is risk averse and would be the basis for her belief that it is 
morally wrong to burn cats for fun.  The epistemic worthiness of her belief turns on 
whether her are actually good reasons to form that belief.  They are clearly not, since the 
risk of having false moral beliefs is not a consideration that bears on the question weather 
some moral claim is true.  When the agent forms her belief, she is responding to reasons 
having to do with the moral risks.  But, these are not reasons on which epistemically 
worthy beliefs would be formed in this instance.   
 In sum, the class of moral belief norms does not avoid the problems I raised for 
belief norms in previous sections.  Although we might be inclined to think that there are 
moral obligations to believe moral truths given the moral stakes, there are several 
important difficulties with an account such as that.  
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I considered the prospects of belief norms for filling in the culpable 
ignorance thesis.  I argued that several standard belief norms like the norm of true belief 
and the norm of ignorance would yield highly counterintuitive results.  I then introduced 
the dual-basis view, which states that the only belief norms that are relevant to culpable 
ignorance are those that are also based on moral reasons.  I raised two objections to the 
dual basis view of belief norms.  First, given the nature of belief and the ways in which it 
is possible to form a belief, we cannot form a belief for the reasons that underlie morally-
grounded belief norms.  This means that agents cannot comply with the norm by 
responding to the reasons that justify it.  This is surely a peculiar feature that calls into 
question the status of the dual basis view of belief norms.  The second objection is that 
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even if agents could comply with morally-grounded belief norms by responding to moral 
reasons, they would be doing something wrong epistemically, namely their belief would 
lack epistemic worth.  These two problematic features of the dual-basis view of belief 
norms, together with the observation that morality is in the business of recommending 
and justifying actions rather than beliefs, show that morally-grounded belief norms may 
not be relevant to the culpable ignorance thesis. 
 Of the several types of epistemic norms that I have discussed in this dissertation, 
the best candidate for justifying claims that ignorant agents are morally responsible 
because their ignorance traces to the violation of some epistemic norm is an aim-neutral 
actional epistemic norm that is justified by moral reasons.  This has implications for any 
view of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that accepts the ignorant action 
thesis.  In the last chapter, I will bring the conclusions of the last two chapters into 
contact with the quality of epistemic will view that I introduced in chapter two.  Then, I 
consider the implications of this fusion for the following types of ignorance: ignorance 
that seems to be based on one’s cultural upbringing, ignorance that arises because of 
deference to a non-reliable authority, and ignorance in really hard cases.  
 
 
Chapter Five: Application of the New Quality of Will Theory 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.2 MY VIEW 
5.3 IGNORANCE DUE TO PERSONAL HISTORY 
5.4 MORAL DEFERENCE  
5.5 IGNORANCE AND HARD CASES 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters, I defended the claim that aim-neutral actional norms are the 
only type of epistemic norm whose violation can transfer culpability from the agent’s 
ignorance to her subsequent ignorant action.  Paradigm examples of these are norms that 
call for investigation or reflection.  In the first part of this chapter, I will bring this result 
into contact with the view of the epistemic condition that I introduced and defended in 
chapter two.  Specifically, I will examine how my account of culpable ignorance fares 
when filled in with actional epistemic norms.  In the second part of the chapter, I will 
apply this view to different cases of ignorance.  I will discuss ignorance that stems from 
three different etiologies.  In Section 5.3, I discuss ignorance that stems in part from the 
agent’s personal history.  I take it as a given, that certain global or local features of a 
given agent’s environment might explain an agent’s ignorance of both empirical and 
moral facts.  On the empirical side, consider that 19th century physicians were profoundly 
ignorant about physiological and psychological facts that are currently well established.  
It is plausible that this ignorance was not the result of widespread epistemic vice.  
Physicians of the time simply were not well positioned to form true beliefs about the way 
the body and brain worked. 
 Things are even more interesting and perhaps more controversial when the 
ignorance in question is non-derivatively moral – when the content of an agent’s false 
belief references moral facts in a way that is not obviously parasitic on ignorance of 
morally-relevant empirical facts.  For example, citizens of Ancient Greece were 
profoundly ignorant about the moral obligations that society and individuals should have 
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toward women and slaves.  I am interested in cases where ignorance is not based on some 
false empirical belief, such as ‘women and slaves cannot feel pain’ or something similar. 
For the sake of discussion, we can call this pure moral ignorance.  The central question of 
the chapter is whether purely ignorant agents are morally responsible for actions on that 
ignorance.  I will show that my view entails that in many of the cases I discuss, agents are 
not morally responsible. 
 In Section 5.4, I discuss a second class of ignorance, namely ignorance that stems 
from deference to perceived epistemic authorities.  This class of ignorance subdivides.  
First, an agent might hold a false empirical belief because she deferred to someone who 
turned out to be unreliable.  Second, an agent might defer to someone as to the morality 
of some action and thereby come to hold a false moral belief.  Agents who recognize that 
some moral issues are profoundly complex may decide to defer to someone who seems to 
understand better what the stakes are and how moral reflection is best pursued.  The 
question for my purposes is whether such agents can be culpably ignorant and, if so, 
which actional epistemic norms are relevant to establishing their culpability.   
 The third and final case of ignorance that I will discuss strikes closer to home 
both for me and for many readers of this dissertation.  In Section 5.5, I take on ignorance 
that, because of the sheer difficulty of getting things right, persists in the face of deep and 
prolonged moral reflection and deliberation.  To be sure, many moral questions are not so 
hard – a moment’s reflection reveals that factors, such as a person’s eye color, are simply 
not relevant to morality.  Other moral questions resist easy answers, and our confidence 
in the answers we come to accept frequently falls well short of certainty.  My focus will 
be on the question of whether certain agent’s ignorance about difficult moral questions  is 
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culpable. 
  
5.2 MY VIEW  
In chapter two, I defended a theory of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that 
has the following form. 
 
Q2: An ignorant agent is culpable for her false beliefs only if her ignorance is 
traceable to an epistemic norm violation that occurred because the agent was 
unresponsive to the reasons that underlie the norm. 
 
This view has two central elements: (a) epistemic norm violations and (b) 
unresponsiveness to reasons that underlie or support the epistemic norms.  When I first 
introduced this account, I did not offer a complete specification of either the relevant 
epistemic norms or the kind of reasons that support them. In chapters three and four, I 
argued that aim-neutral actional epistemic norms are the relevant epistemic norm type for 
any theory of the epistemic condition that appeals to epistemic norm violations.  These 
are norms that require agents to act in ways that have epistemic upshots, where these 
upshots are supposed to either guarantee that the agent forms true beliefs or diminish the 
likelihood that she forms a false belief.  Obvious instances of such norms include the 
obligation to conduct investigation and the obligation to engage in reflection.  A parent 
should make sure that a given car seat is appropriate and safe for her child.  A doctor 
should keep abreast of the latest research on drug safety and dosage information.  As I 
argued in chapter three, norms such as these may be underwritten by moral reasons. 
!!
149 
!
 In chapter three, I also argued that violations of aim-neutral actional norms can 
connect the agent to the wrongness of her action because these norms are underwritten by 
straightforwardly moral reasons.  The moral reasons that support the obligation to 
investigate that are also moral reasons that explain why the agent’s subsequent ignorant 
action is wrong.  My view is that an agent is blameworthy for an ignorant action when 
she fails to respond to these moral reasons.  A salient relationship is thereby secured 
between the wrongness of her ignorant action and the agent’s reasons-responsiveness.  
The parent’s obligation to check the safety seat is underwritten by the risk of harm to the 
child.  Imagine a parent who is in a rush and fails to check the safety seat.  If this 
omission results in the false belief that her child is secure in the car, and if this omission 
occurred because she failed to respond to the moral considerations that underwrite her 
epistemic obligation, then she counts as culpably ignorant on my view.  Similarly, the 
doctor’s obligation to study the latest research is underwritten by the risk of harming her 
patients.  If the parent or physician falls short of these epistemic obligations because they 
are cavalier about the risk of harm that their epistemic failures present, then they fail to 
respond to straightforwardly moral reasons.  Just as non-ignorant agents who fail to 
respond to moral reasons are morally responsible for their witting wrong actions, ignorant 
agents who fail to respond to moral reasons that underlie actional epistemic norms will be 
morally responsible for their unwitting wrong actions.  In the non-ignorance case, their 
failure to respond to moral reasons that make the action wrong grounds their 
blameworthiness for the wrong action.  In ignorance cases, the failure to respond to moral 
reasons comes at an earlier point in time.  The ignorant agent fails to respond to the moral 
reasons that ground some actional epistemic norm and is thereby blameworthy for that 
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action.  When the subsequent wrong action is performed on the basis of the resulting 
ignorance, blameworthiness ‘transfers’ to this ignorant act.     
 One important feature of my account is that it allows for a degreed notion of 
moral responsibility.  As I presented it in chapter two, the quality of will account of moral 
responsibility indexes the degree of blameworthiness for wrong action to the degree of 
moral reasons-responsiveness.  According to this view, an agent who fails to respond to 
really strong moral reasons is more blameworthy for their action than someone who fails 
to respond to weaker reasons.  It is important to highlight this feature since there seems to 
be an intuitive difference in the degree of blameworthiness between an agent who 
wittingly does the wrong action and a culpably ignorant agent who unwittingly does the 
same action.  The thought is that the physician who wittingly harms her patients is more 
(perhaps much more) blameworthy than her counterpart who performs the same action 
unwittingly.  My view can accommodate this intuition.  In order for ignorant agents to be 
blameworthy, they must fail to respond to moral reasons to conduct some sort of 
investigation or reflection.  It doesn’t follow from this view that culpably ignorant agents, 
such as the negligent physician, are, by virtue of failing to respond to the moral reasons to 
investigate, just as blameworthy as the evil physician who wittingly harms her patients.  
Let’s grant that the moral reasons are similar in each case – they both involve harm.  Still, 
to wittingly harm the patient requires a stronger reactive failure.  It is entirely conceivable 
that the negligent physician would never be unresponsive to the degree that the evil 
physician is.  Fischer’s account of reactivity to reasons is instructive here.  The negligent 
physician who would not harm a patient in a possible world where he knew he would be 
causing harm is still somewhat responsive to harm-based reasons.  By contrast, the 
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witting wrongdoer seems to be resolutely unresponsive to harm-based reasons, since she 
knowingly chooses to bring about harm.101   
 Another way of securing the difference between the negligent physician and the 
witting physician is to claim that the reasons to which they failed to respond actually 
differ markedly in strength.  As I discussed in section 4.7, there are reasons to preserve a 
distinction between the reasons that make an action wrong and the reasons that make 
wrong to fail to investigate whether that act is wrong.  In the case under discussion, the 
wrong-making feature of the witting physician’s actions is the harm that her patient 
suffers.  The witting physician is simply failing to respond to these reasons.  However, 
the reasons that make it wrong for the negligent physician to fall behind on her journal 
reading involve the risk of harming her patients.  It seems plausible to maintain that the 
strength of these risk-related reasons is partially indexed to the level of risk.  If, for 
example, the physician knows that it is unlikely that a given pile of journals will contain 
information that will cause her to alter the services and care that she provides, then the 
risk that she is running by failing to read them is relatively low.  Still, she is flouting the 
moral reasons to investigate when she brushes off her investigative obligations.  Her 
failure to react to these reasons reveals the quality of her will and grounds her 
blameworthiness for subsequent ignorant action.  I contend, however, that the strength of 
the moral reasons to avoid the risk of realizing wrong actions in this case is low relative 
to the moral reasons not to hurt her patients.  If this is right, then we have the resources to 
claim that the evil physician who wittingly harms his patients flouts stronger moral 
reasons than the negligent physician who flouts risk-related moral reasons.  This serves as 
the basis for the claim that, though they are both blameworthy for harming the patient, 
                                                
101 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, Chapter three. 
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the evil physician is more blameworthy.      
 There is yet another important feature of my view that I would like to highlight 
before discussing cases of moral ignorance.  An agent who only falls short of a belief 
norm (i.e. a norm that requires the agent hold a certain belief) cannot be culpably 
ignorant according to Q2.  The conclusion of chapter four was that belief norms cannot 
be underwritten by moral reasons.  Falling short of belief norms underwritten by purely 
evidential reasons may reflect poorly on the agent qua believer, and there may be a sense 
in which such agents are epistemically responsible – they might be answerable for their 
belief and called to justify it.  However, these epistemic failures do not necessarily reveal 
any sort of unresponsiveness to moral reasons, specifically, those moral reasons that 
make the subsequent action wrong.  Agents with the utmost concern for forming true 
beliefs and for complying with actional epistemic norms may still fail to hold false 
beliefs.  According to my view, this ignorance is non-culpable and thus they are not 
morally responsible for subsequent wrong actions on that ignorance. 
 With this complete picture of my view on board, we can ‘apply’ it to interesting 
cases of ignorance.  Before doing that, however, it is important to note that this 
‘application’ is not as straightforward as one might expect.  In order to determine whether 
an agent is morally responsible for a given ignorant action, one must first establish the 
existence of a relevant aim-neutral actional epistemic norm.  Since these are really just 
standard moral obligations, establishing their existence amounts to an exercise in first 
order moral theory.  Agent’s need to weigh the relevant moral reasons and determine 
whether an they are obligated to act in an evidence-producing way.  Consider the case of 
the negligent physician.  Why think that there is an obligation to keep abreast of the latest 
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research on the treatments she prescribes?  Given the fact that patients are in position of 
epistemic inferiority with respect to their physician, and that the patient’s health 
outcomes depend in large part on the recommendations and advice that the physician 
provides, there is at least a prima facie case to be made for the existence of an actional 
epistemic norm requiring the physician to stay current on the latest research.  Like any 
exercise in practical ethics, the conclusions of these reflections should be tentative.  To be 
sure, there are certain actional epistemic norms that will seem more controversial than 
others, and there may be disagreement about the stringency of these norms.  Given the 
structure of my account, these disagreements will result in disagreements about whether 
the relevant agents are morally responsible.  This is to be expected.  It reflects way in 
which morality and moral obligations are embedded in the epistemic condition of moral 
responsibility.  
 It might be objected that having morality and moral claims at the heart of the 
epistemic condition of moral responsibility is a weakness of my account.  The objection 
might rest on the idea that a theory of moral responsibility is supposed to capture a 
specific metaphysical relation that obtains between an action and an agent.  And indeed, 
every account of the control condition of moral responsibility that has been defended in 
seems untainted by moral premises.  For example, we can figure out whether an agent 
meets Fischer and Ravizza’s account of the control condition without relying on the truth 
of any moral claims.  On their view, an agent is in control of her actions so long as the 
action issues from a reasons-responsive mechanism that is the agent’s own.102  According 
to an standard incompatibilist accounts of control, an agent is in control of an action just 
when that action is manifested by the special power of agent causation, which rules out 
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causal determinism.  In both of these cases, the explicated notion of does not imply the 
truth of any particular moral claims at all.  Another way of putting this worry is that while 
morality and moral reasons must be marshaled in order to determine the moral valence of 
a given agent’s action, morality and moral reasons need not be marshaled in order to 
connect the action to the agent in a way that makes her morally responsible.  This latter 
question is metaphysical, not moral. 
 In response to this worry, I will merely point out that the control condition of 
moral responsibility, which is the target for Fischer and Ravizza and many others, is but 
one necessary condition of moral responsibility.  The epistemic condition is another.  
That one might be able to defend an account of the control condition without relying on 
premises that have moral content does not entail that the epistemic condition is similarly 
devoid of moral content.  Being in control of an action might simply be a matter of 
standing in a certain metaphysical relationship to the action – it might be the effect of a 
reasons-responsive mechanism or of agent causation.  I contend, however, that the best 
account of the epistemic condition must include a premise that refers to the aim-neutral 
actional norms that I discuss above, and these norms are straightforward moral norms.  A 
view such as mine should not be ruled out by some antecedent classification of moral 
responsibility as a purely metaphysical inquiry.  Indeed, openness to this possibility is 
forced upon us after seeing the inadequacies of attributionism, the early benighting views, 
and certain strands of volitionism, all of which do not to rely on moral obligations in 
order to establish that an agent is culpably ignorant. 
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5.3 IGNORANCE DUE TO PERSONAL HISTORY 
The issue I will discuss in this section is a familiar one.  It involves the question of 
whether a person’s historical circumstances render her non-culpably ignorant.  There are 
two kinds of case for which this question is posed.  First, we might question whether an 
agent is morally responsible for ignorant actions when they formed their beliefs within a 
larger historical context that made it very difficult if not practically impossible for the 
agent to form true beliefs.  It is plain that an agent’s particular social and historical 
circumstances have a profound effect on the particular beliefs that an agent will form.  As 
I mentioned above, a doctor who practiced medicine in the 19th century is almost certain 
to have had false beliefs about certain important medical facts.  George Washington’s 
physicians, who were the among the best in the world at the time, practiced bloodletting, 
which was supposed to rid sick individuals of disease factors residing in the blood.  
Shortly before he died, Washington’s physicians removed 82 ounces of his blood (about 
half Washington’s total blood volume), which they considered an appropriate treatment 
for his throat infection.103  Draining this amount of blood likely contributed to his death 
soon afterwards.  The explanation that we might give for a given 19th century physician’s 
ignorance about the safety and efficacy of certain treatments would involve reference to 
general historical features that, presumably, would have led others to be ignorant as well.   
 The same sort of widely held ignorance might obtain with respect to 
straightforwardly moral ignorance.  An agent may be ignorant about what morality 
requires or permits where this ignorance is not based on ignorance of morally relevant 
empirical facts. Aristotle called such non-derivative moral ignorance, “ignorance of 
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George Washington, Papers of George Washington, n.d., http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/articles/wallenborn.html. 
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universals”.104  More recently Michael Slote and Michele Moody-Adams have discussed 
attitudes toward slavery in Ancient Greece.105  Moses Finley argues that the lack of 
condemnation of the general practice of slavery suggests that many people in Ancient 
Greece believed that slavery was morally permissible.106  It is plausible to assume that 
their ignorance about the morality of slavery was an instance of widespread non-
derivative moral ignorance.  As Slote notes, most Ancient Greeks were simply “unable to 
see what virtue required in regards to slavery”.107  It is natural to ask whether agents who 
act on this kind of moral ignorance are morally responsible. 
 A second way that historical circumstance might affect an agent’s responsibility 
for ignorant action involves distorting influences that are more local.  Perhaps an agent is 
not in a larger social or historical context that explains her false beliefs.  However, her 
ignorance, either of empirical facts or of morality, may obtain in part due to local factors 
such as the conditions of the home or the influence of a close friend, relative, or other 
epistemic peer.  We can imagine that someone raised in a family of naturopaths is likely 
to come to believe that drinking honey cures serious terminal illnesses.  An agent who 
formed her beliefs about the efficacy of allopathic medicine within the context of such a 
family will in all likelihood doubt the effectiveness of allopathic medicine and laud 
naturopathic remedies.  The role of the larger social context in such cases is not as 
relevant in explaining the agent’s ignorance, since we can imagine that her false beliefs 
make her an outlier in her society.  The aspects of the agent’s personal history that are 
relevant in this kind of case involve social units that are smaller than her ‘society’ writ 
                                                
104 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 39. 
105 Michael Slote, “Is Virtue Possible?,” Analysis 42, no. 2 (March 1, 1982): 70–76; M. M Moody-Adams, 
“Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance,” Ethics 104, no. 2 (1994): 291–309. 
106 Moses I. Finley, Classical Slavery (Psychology Press, 1987), 120f. 
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large.  Non-derivative moral ignorance of this locally-induced kind can obtain as well.  
The murderous Robert Harris, who is cited by Watson in his influential work on this 
moral responsibility and evil, would be a paradigm instance of this.108  Of course, his case 
is complicated, and the reasons why he acted as he did involved much more than just 
moral ignorance.  Indeed, there may be reason to think that he committed his crimes 
because they were wrong, which entails that he wasn’t actually ignorant of the relevant 
moral facts.  However, to the extent that his mother and father’s example led him to the 
belief that there was nothing wrong with his actions, Harris has the sort of locally-
induced moral ignorance that I am interested in.   
 There are two real-life cases of this kind of moral ignorance that I would like to 
note because of their recent prominence in the media.  The first is Michael Vick, an NFL 
football quarterback who participated in the brutal practice of dog fighting.  We can 
imagine that, though most people in United States believe that it is impermissible to fight 
dogs, Vick was heavily influenced by a particular individual or group of individuals who 
taught him that that there was nothing wrong with dog-fighting.  Indeed, in the fallout of 
his case, Vick’s defenders offered just this kind of explanation for his actions.  Another 
NFL quarterback stated in an interview that dog fighting was common in areas of the 
rural south and that the dogs were his ‘property’ and that they were “his dogs; if that’s 
what he wants to do, do it.”109 
 Another instance of this kind of moral ignorance is found among the members of 
the Westboro Baptist Church who are infamous for picketing funerals and other events 
                                                
108 G. Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Responsibility, 
Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. F. Shoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
268–271. 
109 Associated Press, “Redskins Players Defend Falcons Quarterback’s Dog Fighting Operation | Fox News,” 
Fox News, December 7, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,274636,00.html. 
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with signs whose content is, to put it mildly, inflammatory.  Their theologically 
motivated mission is to spread the message that God hates homosexuality, and He is 
bringing His wrath down on countries whose culture fails to condemn it.  These church 
members know that their signs cause significant emotional distress to the targets of their 
protests, but they do not believe that it is morally impermissible to cause such harm.  In 
fact, they believe that God commands them to ‘rebuke’ those who don’t embrace their 
religious and moral doctrine.  Disturbingly, the children of church members are 
encouraged from a very young age to engage in these protests and to ignore the claims 
made by many that it is wrong to inflict such blatantly unnecessary emotional distress on 
complete strangers.  Not surprisingly, several individuals who grew up in the church are 
now adults and leaders of the movement.  For my purposes, I am interested, in whether 
those who grew up in this environment are culpable for believing that it is permissible to 
cause emotional distress to the families of the dead.  
 The question for my purposes is this: If an agent acts wrongly or badly on the 
basis of ignorance that seems to stem from their social situation, is she morally 
responsible for her wrong actions?  In order to bring out the ways in which my view 
handles these historical cases, it will be instructive to focus on one particular example 
that has received the most attention in the literature.  The relevance of personal history to 
moral responsibility arises prominently in Susan Wolf’s critique of what she calls deep 
self views of moral responsibility.  These views hold, roughly, that agents are morally 
responsible for actions so long as they accord with the agent’s values110 or higher order 
desires111.  Wolf’s Jojo case, which I discussed at length in chapter two is supposed to be 
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problematic because Jojo is intuitively not responsible for his actions, even though he 
seems to meet the conditions spelled out by deep self views of moral responsibility.  
Jojo’s carefully controlled environment seems to explain the way Jojo acts as an adult, 
and, for this reason, Wolf maintains that Jojo is not morally responsible.  Before going on 
to discuss this case in more detail, I should note that Wolf is concerned to focus on the 
effects of Jojo’s moral education and experience on his values and desires rather than his 
beliefs.  But, we can also focus on the moral beliefs held by Jojo.  Although Wolf does 
not explicitly construct the case this way, we can assume that Jojo held the false belief 
that it was morally permissible to send people to prison on a whim.  This further 
specification of the case is helpful for the purpose of evaluating whether Jojo, given his 
personal history, is culpably ignorant and morally responsible for his wrong actions.  The 
force of Wolf’s intuition and her brief explanation of it seem to apply even on the belief-
version of the Jojo case.  Consider: 
 
In light of Jojo’s heritage and upbringing – both of which he was powerless to 
control – it is dubious at best that he should be regarded as morally responsible 
for what he does.  It is unclear whether anyone with a childhood such as his could 
have developed into anything but the twisted and perverse sort of person that he 
has become.112 
 
Wolf’s reaction to the case of Jojo shows that an agent’s personal history might be 
exculpating.  Wolf thinks that the intuition that Jojo is not morally responsible counts 
                                                
(January 14, 1971): 5–20. 
112 Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” 54. 
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against certain views of moral responsibility.  She targets so called ‘real-self views’ 
according to which an agent is morally responsible only if her action accords with her 
higher-order desires (i.e. the desires she desires to have).  We are supposed to imagine 
that Jojo is not conflicted about whether he should act as he does.  Since Jojo’s evil 
actions are perfectly in line with his desires and higher-order desires (he has a second 
order desire to want his first order desire to imprison people on a whim to be effective), 
he is morally responsible for them according to the real self view.  If our intuition about 
Jojo is veridical, then this is supposed to show that the real self view is false. 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to adjudicate the debate between Wolf and 
proponents of the real self view of moral responsibility.  What I hope to show is that my 
view affords a distinct and subtler way of thinking about Jojo and cases like it.  Jojo is 
morally responsible for acting from the false belief that it is permissible to imprison his 
subjects on a whim only if his moral ignorance is culpable.  On the view I have been 
defending in this dissertation, Jojo’s ignorance is culpable if and only if he violated an 
aim-neutral actional norm by failing to respond to the moral reasons that underlie the 
norm.  There are several norms that seem relevant to the case of Jojo.  First, it is plausible 
to think that there is an actional epistemic norm that requires some degree of 
investigation into the moral permissibility of our actions or to engage in deep reflection 
on our beliefs.  This actional norm is just an instantiation of the general prima facie 
obligation to perform some action that will reduce the likelihood of performing some 
other subsequent wrong action.  This obligation is also what grounds the physician’s 
obligation to stay current on her journals.  Also, like the physician’s investigative 
obligation, Jojo’s investigative obligation is prima facie and might be outweighed by 
!!
161 
!
other obligations.  The idea here is that everyone is under a prima facie actional 
obligation to investigate the moral permissibility of his or her actions.  This norm seems 
like it has near universal application and may have been violated in the case of Jojo.  
Indeed, it is plausible that a more stringent version of this norm applies in Jojo’s case 
given the power that he will eventually have in his country.  The fact that the 
repercussions of his actions will be potentially far reaching raises the stakes for him and, 
plausibly, increases the stringency of his investigative obligations in much the same way 
as a doctor who treats thousands of patients has a stronger investigative obligation to stay 
current than a doctor sees very few. 
 Another actional epistemic norm that might apply in Jojo’s case is one that would 
call, not for private investigation and reflection, but for the kind of public airing and 
discussion of his moral views to others.  Minimally, we might think he should do this 
with close associates or other government officials.  Less minimally, we might think he 
should publically engage the citizens of his country in a state-of-the-union-like speech.  
The social and political nature of this second actional norm raises deep and important 
issues related that are examined by Allan Buchanan in his work on social moral 
epistemology.113  Exploring these issues will take me too far afield, and so I will focus on 
the first investigative obligation. 
 Unfortunately for my purposes, Jojo’s case is under-described.  Since Wolf’s 
concerns were not mine, she did not need to provide a detailed account of how Jojo 
formed his beliefs.  We might imagine two ways of filling out these details that would 
yield different results for my view.  On each of the following stories, I will assume that 
Jojo is under a general actional norm that requires deep and serious investigation of one’s 
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moral beliefs.  I also assume that this requirement is underwritten by the hazards 
associated with having false moral beliefs.  This characterization of the norm and the 
reasons that underwrite it are admittedly imprecise, but this imprecision is not a problem 
for my present purposes.  All I am trying to show is how the quality of will view would 
settle the question of Jojo’s moral responsibility under two refinements of the case.   
Consider the following variants of the original Jojo case: 
 
Diligent Jojo:  Throughout the course of Diligent Jojo’s tightly controlled 
education, and while he was watching his father’s daily routine, he fit the 
stereotype of an overachieving and careful student.  At each turn, he questioned 
whether his father was relaying moral truths.  Furthermore, he engaged in much 
independent reflection and investigation about morality and what it requires.  In 
the face of what he recognized as decisions with morally significant 
consequences, he was careful to take the time to reflect on what he should do.  
Despite this Jojo adopts his father’s moral beliefs.  
 
Casual Jojo:  Throughout the course of Casual Jojo’s special education, and 
while he was watching his father’s daily routine, he fit the stereotype of a lazy and 
apathetic student.  He never questioned the veracity of his father’s education, nor 
did he engage in any independent reflection about morality.  In the face of what 
he recognized as decisions with morally significant consequences, he was too 
apathetic to reflect on what his moral obligations were.  As a result, he came to 
adopt, almost wholesale, his father’s false moral beliefs.    
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These two stories are intended to be consistent with the original Jojo story.  They merely 
fill in details about Jojo’s moral education.  Rather than elicit the reader’s intuitions about 
these cases, I simply want to show how my view would treat them.  Let’s consider 
Diligent Jojo first.  Whether Jojo is culpably ignorant turns on whether he fell short of an 
actional norm requiring him to engage in reflection or investigation about what morality 
requires.  Although I stated this norm imprecisely at the outset, it seems clear to me that 
Diligent Jojo meets this obligation.  As described, he is remarkably reflective about his 
moral beliefs.  He questioned his father’s pronouncements and did much of his own 
investigation.  Still, given the context within which his reflection and investigation 
occurred, one might think it unsurprising that Diligent Jojo would come to hold false 
beliefs about what morality requires.  Since he meets the relevant actional epistemic 
norms, Diligent Jojo does not meet a necessary condition of culpable ignorance.  His 
ignorance, which in this case happens to be non-derivative moral ignorance, is not 
culpable and he is not morally responsible when he acts on his ignorance.  
 Before discussing Casual Jojo, I would like to discuss a challenge to my treatment 
of Diligent Jojo.  The challenge is that I get the result that Diligent Jojo is non-culpably 
ignorant by applying a norm that is not stringent enough. Someone might grant that there 
is a norm requiring investigation and reflection but object that I have lowered the bar too 
far.  One might even argue that the evidence for this claim is that, despite his efforts, 
Diligent Jojo remains ignorant of what are obvious moral truths.  How can someone who 
is an assiduous student of morality come to believe that it is permissible to throw people 
in jail on a whim?   
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 This objection can be easily accommodated.  However high one wants to set the 
investigative bar, one can set it there, and then imagine another case where Jojo satisfied 
these stricter epistemic norms but remained ignorant of the relevant moral belief.  
Perhaps we are required to be much more thoughtful and reflective than Diligent Jojo 
was, especially when the moral stakes are high.  Maybe the relevant actional epistemic 
norm would require us to spend several hours a day engaging in moral investigation and 
moral discourse with others.  Maybe we should enroll in many moral philosophy courses 
that afford us the opportunity to debate moral issues, write papers, and engage in intense 
periods of moral deliberation.  However high one thinks the bar should be, it seems 
possible that someone like Jojo might meet this higher bar but remain ignorant about his 
moral obligations.  This version of Jojo, call him “Super-duper Diligent Jojo”, would still 
fail to meet a necessary condition for culpable ignorance because he met his now very 
demanding epistemic obligations.   
 Of course, one might object to the very possibility that Super-duper Diligent Jojo 
could remain ignorant after meeting the more stringent investigative norm.  It might be 
the case that whenever anyone discharges epistemic obligations that are this demanding, 
ignorance is ruled out as a realistic outcome.  If I triple-check whether it is raining 
outside, I will almost certainly not form a false belief about whether it is raining outside.  
On the assumption that the situation is the same for moral ignorance, someone who meets 
the more stringent epistemic norm would not form a false moral belief.  If Super-duper 
Diligent Jojo is still ignorant, then that very fact is evidence that he didn’t actually meet 
the relevant (highly stringent) investigative norm.  If actional epistemic norms worked in 
a way that the guaranteed that those who met them would have true beliefs, then non-
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culpable ignorance of the variety that obtains when agents satisfy their investigative 
norms but remain ignorant is simply ruled out as a possibility.  On this view, Diligent 
Jojo and Super duper diligent Jojo are ruled out as a possible cases.   
 In response to this, and by way of defending the analysis of Diligent Jojo I 
provide above, I want simply to question the motivation for setting the stringency of 
actional epistemic norms so high.  If it is simply to rule out cases of non-culpable 
ignorance by ensuring that all ignorant agents will fall short of some investigative norm, 
then the move is decidedly misguided.  Recall that the underlying bases for the sort of 
aim-neutral epistemic norms that are relevant to my view are moral reasons involving the 
risk of realizing certain wrongs by acting on a given false beliefs.  If someone is 
motivated to rule out cases of non-culpable ignorance because of a sense that there is 
something troubling about cases like Diligent Jojo, then they have not pointed to a reason 
of the right kind.  Facts about the desired strictness of one’s moral responsibility 
attributions are not the kind of moral consideration that can underlie actional epistemic 
norms. 
 If the motivation for thinking that our investigative norms are so strong is to 
minimize the moral risks that ignorant agents run of realizing certain wrongs, then the 
response that I just made will not suffice.  As we theorize about the stringency of the 
actional epistemic norms, the risk of realizing moral wrongs is a legitimate consideration.  
But, why think that the norms should be so strong that they all but guarantee that agent 
will form the relevant beliefs?  This norm seems to be too demanding along several 
different dimensions.  First, by focusing solely on the risk of realizing wrongs, this 
approach fails to take into account the profound epistemic difficulties faced by 
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individuals like Jojo.  Many people throughout history formed their moral beliefs within a 
context that is the moral analogue of the 19th century physician.  It is conceivable that, for 
individuals raised in these contexts, no amount of serious moral investigation or 
reflection would have resulted in the formation of true beliefs.  Second, a narrow focus 
on the risk of realizing wrongs associated with ignorance might lead to such stringent 
investigative norms that other areas of moral concern might be neglected.  There might 
be strong moral reasons conduct serious moral investigation, but there are also strong 
moral reasons to work at a homeless shelter and to provide for one’s children.  It seems 
patently implausible to think that our investigative obligations can be so strong that they 
are incompatible with living a life that is responsive to other moral reasons.  More 
plausibly, we have strong, even quite strong, investigative obligations that do not require 
actions or plans that crowd out other moral obligations.  Notice, however, that for every 
degree of moderation of these investigative norms, it becomes more likely that an agent 
will conduct the required investigation and remain ignorant.  Given this possibility, 
individuals with a personal history such as Diligent Jojo’s might well be ignorant about 
the moral permissibility of his actions despite having discharged his obligations to 
investigate.  For this reason, he is not culpably ignorant according to my view.  
 Casual Jojo differs from his diligent counterpart in that he actually falls short of 
an epistemic norm.  His ignorance results in part because he did not engage in any 
meaningful moral deliberation or reflection.  Before making any pronouncements about 
his failures, however, we must ask why he fell short of these norms.  As I described the 
case, he recognized the importance of moral deliberation and investigation but still could 
not be bothered to carry it out.  On this version, his apathy with respect to moral 
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deliberation results from a failure to respond to the significant hazards that false moral 
beliefs presents to anyone who would be affected by Jojo’s actions.  We might say, 
following that although Casual Jojo recognized the reasons to investigate, he failed to 
react to them by performing the requisite reflections.  This failure to respond to the 
reasons that underlie Jojo’s epistemic obligation is precisely what is necessary for being 
culpably ignorant according to my view.  It shows that Jojo’s ignorance is the result of a 
moral, not merely epistemic, failure.  In failing to respond to the moral reasons presented 
by the obvious risks of holding false beliefs, Casual Jojo is relevantly similar to someone 
who acted wrongly without ignorance - they both fail to respond to moral reasons.  The 
difference is that Casual Jojo’s moral responsibility for imprisoning his subjects on a 
whim is tied to a prior failure to respond to moral reasons that obtained when he failed to 
investigate the moral permissibility of these actions.   
 This way of understanding Jojo differs from the way that Wolf understands the 
case in several important ways.  Of course, the original Jojo case did not contain the 
details about his moral education.  With these details added, one can plainly see that my 
view will treat Diligent Jojo and Casual Jojo differently.  According to Wolf, however, a 
different feature is driving the intuition that Jojo is not responsible.  She maintains that 
Jojo is: 
“unable cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the world for 
what it is.  In our sense of the term, (his) deepest sel(f) is not fully sane.”114 
On her analysis, Jojo’s upbringing resulted in his lacking the ability to discern right from 
wrong.  Since Jojo is insane, he is not morally responsible.  Wolf’s analysis of the Jojo 
case is illuminating in some respects.  I do think that it succeeds as a criticism of the real 
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self views that were her targets.  Jojo possess all of the structural features that are 
sufficient for morally responsibility according to the real self views.  The case of Jojo 
exposes a vulnerability in these views, but in shoring up the real self view with the sanity 
requirement, Wolf fails to notice that the explanation for Jojo’s ignorance might be based 
on his failure to conduct the requisite moral investigation and reflection rather than his 
inability to discern right from wrong.  Of course, he might fail to conduct this 
investigation because he is insane.  But, as the case of Diligent Jojo helpfully brings out, 
profound moral ignorance is compatible with the kind of purposeful and planned study of 
which an insane person might not be capable.  When an agent like Jojo holds false 
beliefs, my view helpfully shifts our focus to a different, though no less important, 
explanation.  The effect of shifting this focus is that it offers a subtler and deeper analysis 
of agents whose beliefs are affected by their personal history, not because their historical 
circumstances rendered them insane, but, rather, because their historical circumstances 
provided significant epistemic challenges. 
 Someone might object that the application of my view to Casual Jojo works only 
because I’ve stipulated that he recognized the reasons to conduct the moral investigation.  
His failures were not primarily recognitional – after recognizing the relevant moral 
reasons, he failed to react to these reasons by conducting the requisite investigation.  As I 
have constructed the case, Casual Jojo is not ignorant about his investigative obligations 
or the reasons that he has to investigate.  Since issues of culpable ignorance do not arise 
here, the application of my view seems clear for this case.  By failing to react to the moral 
reasons to investigate (which he recognized), he meets the conditions of my account and 
would be culpably ignorant and, if the control condition for moral responsibility is also 
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met, blameworthy for actions on his ignorance.  What is unclear is how my view handles 
a version of Casual Jojo wherein he both fails to meet his investigative obligations and 
fails to recognize the moral reasons he has to investigate.  If Casual Jojo was also 
ignorant about whether he was under a moral obligation to investigate and reflect about 
the morality of his actions, then we seem merely to push things back a step.  In such a 
case, we can surely ask whether his ignorance at this earlier stage is also culpable.  Many 
philosophers writing on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility have addressed 
this potential regress.  In chapter one I criticized a version of volitionism that requires the 
trace to akratic action.  On this family of views, Casual Jojo would not be culpably 
ignorant unless his action could be traced back to a wrongful failure to investigate that 
was witting.  I argued that the volitionist’s argument for this position rested on an overly 
restricted notion of rationality and that it should be rejected.115  Other views avoid the 
regress by maintaining that despite someone’s ignorance about what their aim-neutral 
investigative norms were, they ‘should have known’ that they were subject to such 
norms.  This is an unworkable strategy, if the suggestion is that agents are subject to a 
moral norm requiring them to hold the belief that they are subject to some investigative 
norm.  In chapter four, I argued that belief norms with this structure (a moral obligation 
to believe that p) are not relevant to the epistemic condition.  Since the requirement to 
trace back to an akratic action is unmotivated and since the appeal to belief norms that 
require us to believe that we are subject to investigative norms is unworkable, we seem to 
be without a way of solving the regress threatened by Casual Jojo’s ignorance of his 
investigative obligations. 
 In response to these worries, I must concede that, according to the view that I’m 
                                                
115 See Chapter 1. 
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defending in this dissertation, Casual Jojo must recognize that there are reasons to 
investigate that he then proceeds to flout.  In other words, I am restricting the notion of 
reasons-responsiveness to reactivity to reasons as opposed to the compound formulation 
first proposed and defended by Fischer and Ravizza, that includes both recognition and 
reactivity.116  Since we are concerned with moral responsibility for wrong actions, and 
since moral responsibility for wrong action turns on the agent’s failure to respond to the 
moral reasons that make the action wrong, the clearest way to establish that an ignorant 
agent is morally responsible for an action on her ignorance is to show that she recognized 
the moral reasons to engage in investigation or reflection and the failed to react to them.  
In these cases, her failure to investigate was not itself an action about which the agent 
was ignorant.  It also follows from such a restricted notion of reasons that a version of 
Casual Jojo who fails to recognize that he had reasons to engage in moral investigation or 
reflection would not be morally responsible for his ignorant actions unless his failure to 
recognize his reasons for investigation was itself culpable.  Establishing culpability for 
this failure is also a matter of falling short of investigative obligations.  But, these prior 
investigative obligations would require Casual Jojo to investigate the question of whether 
he is under an obligation to investigate the morality of imprisoning his subjects on a 
whim.  Importantly, Casual Jojo’s failure to recognize that he had an obligation to 
investigate the morality of imprisoning his subjects on a whim, which I will call his first 
order obligation, is only culpable if he recognized that he was under an obligation to 
investigate whether he had any first order obligations.  I will call this his second order 
obligation.  In other words, he would have had to see that there are reasons to investigate 
whether he is obliged to investigate the morality of his actions but fail to react to these 
                                                
116 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control. 
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reasons.  Having flouted or ignored these reasons, Casual Jojo would not look into the 
question of whether he is obliged to investigate the morality of imprisoning his subjects 
and would thus fail to recognize the reasons grounding this proximal obligation.  Still, 
establishing moral responsibility in cases such as this requires a trace to an epistemic 
failure that the agent recognized.  This failure would have to be witting.  
 Before moving on to discuss another instance of ignorance that might be 
excusable because of personal history, I would like to adduce some considerations that 
show that the bullet I am biting with respect to these cases is not a flaw in my theory.  I 
will simply reiterate my earlier claim that simply failing to recognize that there are moral 
reasons to investigate one’s moral obligations is not sufficient for establishing 
blameworthiness for subsequent unwitting wrong action.  If we think that Casual Jojo’s 
culpability can be pinned to his failure to recognize the reasons to conduct what I’ve 
called first order epistemic obligations, we seem to be committed to the view that Casual 
Jojo simply should have believed that those reasons existed.  As I argued in chapter four, 
there are serious problems with the view that culpable ignorance, and subsequent 
blameworthiness for ignorant actions, is established merely by showing that an agent 
should have believed something.  I argued that the reasons that underlie belief norms 
such as this are not moral reasons and that agents who fall short of such a norm by failing 
to respond to them does not reveal herself to have a poor quality of will.  In order to tie 
the agent to the wrongness of her ignorant action, her ignorance must reveal that she is 
unresponsive to moral reasons in just the way that a witting wrongdoer does.  Tracing her 
culpability to a failure to respond to the straightforwardly moral obligation to investigate 
can establish the requisite similarity between the reasons that make her ignorant action 
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wrong and the reasons that the agent flouts or ignores in becoming ignorant.  Since cases 
of ignorant action that trace to failures to recognize reasons to investigate morality lack 
this requisite overlap, they do not show that the agent had a poor quality of will.  For this 
reason, it is a feature rather than a defect of my view that agents whose ignorance is 
traced to their falling short of a belief norm they do not recognize do not meet the 
epistemic condition for moral responsibility. 
 Having addressed the regress worry, we can see how this sort of analysis would 
apply to another standard case in the literature concerning individuals from the American 
ante-bellum south who held false beliefs about how blacks deserved to be treated.  
Arpaly, Zimmerman, and Rosen have discussed this kind of case,117  and much of what I 
say here will be consonant with these extant treatments.  The racist who believes that it is 
morally permissible to discriminate against black people is culpably ignorant only of she 
fell short of the sorts of aim-neutral investigational norms that will be familiar by now.  It 
is certainly possible that a racist who grew up in the antebellum south might hold false 
beliefs about how blacks deserve to be treated despite meeting her investigative 
obligations.  Perhaps her investigations led to non-veridical beliefs in part because of 
pervasive racism among her epistemic peers and those with whom she participate in 
moral discourse.  It is also possible that the epistemic ‘starting points’ from which she 
began her moral investigation greatly decreased the likelihood that even honest and 
serious consideration of the relevant moral issues would lead her to hit upon what we 
know to be moral truth – that race is an irrelevant factor in determining what we owe to 
each other morally.  Her belief that it is permissible to discriminate against black people 
                                                
117 Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage; M. J Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance,” Ethics 
107, no. 3 (1997): 410–426; Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.” 
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might have been inculcated in a deep way from early childhood.  So long as the relevant 
investigative norms require actions that do not guarantee true beliefs, agents such as those 
who lived in the antebellum south might meet them (indeed, they might greatly exceed 
what is required) but still be ignorant about what morality requires.  Since they met their 
investigative obligations, these agents will not be culpably ignorant and will not be 
blameworthy for subsequent actions on their ignorance.   
 On the other hand, if someone conducting her epistemic affairs in such an 
environment did not engage in the investigation and reflection that her epistemic norms 
require, and if this failure was due to her failure to react to the moral reasons that ground 
the norms – in this case, the risk of wronging African-Americans by acting on false moral 
beliefs - then her ignorance is culpable.  Thus, this person would be morally responsible 
for any racist actions on that ignorance.   
 
5.4 MORAL DEFERENCE   
Another important class of ignorance involves false beliefs that an agent holds because of 
deference to someone they perceive to be an epistemic authority.  Epistemic deference is 
a fact of life, and it is attended by many benefits and a few risks.  Epistemic 
specialization is enormously beneficial for obvious reasons.  One need only think of how 
daunting a task it would be to figure out for oneself whether a certain medication is safe 
or, less consequentially, whether Socrates was really born in 469 B.C.E.  Deference to 
reliable experts is pragmatically advantageous, since it allows us to outsource our 
epistemic burdens and thereby frees up time and energy for other projects.  Intuitively, 
deference to reliable sources is not problematic from a purely epistemic standpoint.  
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Many epistemologists accept that testimony, which is particular mode of deference, 
sometimes results in knowledge.118  For example, when my physician knows that a drug 
is safe and tells me that it’s safe, it seems like I thereby come to know that the drug is 
safe.  This attribution of knowledge seems unproblematic despite the fact that I do not 
hold the belief for the same reasons that my doctor does.  We can suppose that her 
reasons for believing the drug is safe are considerations that have to do with the 
properties of the drug itself and its effects on humans.  Having deferred to her, my reason 
for believing that the drug is safe is simply that my physician told me so.  Issues having 
to do with the alleged compatibility of deference and knowledge attributions have been 
well explored.  In this section, I will focus on how, if at all, deference affects an agent’s 
moral responsibility.  The class of cases that I am interested in involve agents who act on 
a false belief that they hold because of deference to someone they, perhaps mistakenly, 
take to be an expert. 
 Before discussing these cases, I would like to introduce two important 
distinctions.  The first distinction is between two ways someone can defer.  Epistemic 
deference can be personal, as when we defer to a particular person.  Alternatively 
epistemic deference can involve the appeal to a document or other source of information, 
which is the product of a particular epistemic authority or group authorities.  Since not 
much hangs on this distinction – they both involve someone forming a belief on the basis 
of someone else’s say so – I will assume for my purposes that they do not require 
separate treatments.  I raise this distinction simply to make clear that the discussion in 
this section has wide application.   
                                                
118 See F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 1983; R. Audi, “The place of testimony in the fabric of 
knowledge and justification,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 4 (1997): 405–422. 
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 The second distinction is more important, and it does raise interesting 
philosophical issues.  The least problematic kind of epistemic deference involves 
epistemic authorities on empirical, as opposed to moral, matters.  In cases such as the 
patient’s deference to her physician, the content of the belief that is relayed by the expert 
has no moral content.  I will call this kind of deference, empirical deference.119  A more 
problematic and controversial kind of deference involves the appeal to epistemic 
authorities on purely moral matters.  Consider someone who is grappling with the moral 
permissibility of a certain action and holds no relevant false empirical beliefs.  Despite 
being fully informed about the non-moral facts of the case, the agent may have no inkling 
as to what morality requires or, as the case may be, what it prohibits.  Alternatively, she 
might be weakly inclined to think that some moral fact obtains, but she may fail to trust 
this inclination for fear that she might not be thinking clearly.  In either of these 
situations, the agent might seek the counsel of someone who they take to be a moral 
authority.  Subsequently, she may form a belief about her moral obligations solely on the 
basis of the alleged authority’s say so.  I will call this kind of deference moral deference. 
 It is important to notice that some cases of empirical deference seem like moral 
deference because the information that the epistemic authority relays is assimilated into 
an episode of moral reasoning.  An act-utilitarian whose theory of the right obligates us to 
maximize happiness will have to rely on empirical facts about how much happiness 
various options will produce.  If, against the advice of sophisticated utilitarians, someone 
is using utilitarianism as a decision procedure, she is likely to find herself deferring to 
experts about the empirical facts upon which the moral facts supervene.  To borrow an 
                                                
119 I don’t mean to be begging any metaethical questions here.  If someone holds the view that moral facts are 
just a species of empirical fact, then they can adopt a more discriminating terminology. 
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example from Shelly Kagan, imagine that you are concerned about the morality of buying 
chicken at the grocery store.120  Imagine, further, that if your act of buying a single 
chicken will produce a comparatively low expected utility, you will forego purchasing 
the chicken on utilitarian grounds.  Prima facie, it seems to be an open question whether 
the act of buying a single chicken will actually make a difference.  Moreover, a moment’s 
reflection reveals that settling this question is no easy task.  Markets are complicated and 
their responsiveness to demand seems elastic.  Quickly feeling overwhelmed by the 
complicated nature of such calculations, you defer to Kagan who informs you that, given 
realistic assumptions about the way markets respond to consumer demand, the expected 
disutility of buying a single chicken is indeed the death of a single chicken.  Armed with 
this belief, you reason that it would be wrong to buy chicken.  The deference in this case 
is non-moral.  One simply wants to know the expected disutility of buying a chicken.  
This is a case of empirical rather than moral deference even though the agent was 
deferring for the purpose of settling some moral question.   
 There are two ways in which genuine moral deference might have occurred in that 
case.  First, the agent might have deferred to Kagan as to the truth of act utilitarianism.  
In this case the content of the transmitted belief is straightforwardly moral – it is the 
belief that act utilitarianism is true.  Second, an agent, perhaps flummoxed or made weary 
by the incessant demands of moral theorizing and complicated nature of theoretical 
application, might simply defer to Kagan as to the morality of buying chickens.  In this 
second case, the content of the transmitted belief is also straightforwardly moral – it is the 
belief that it is morally wrong to buy chicken. 
 This short taxonomy is important because I will discuss cases of ignorant action 
                                                
120 S. KAGAN, “Do I Make a Difference?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 2 (2011): 105–141. 
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where the agent’s ignorance is traceable to either empirical or moral deference.  In what 
follows, I will be concerned with the question of when deferential agents are culpably 
ignorant and thereby blameworthy for their actions on that ignorance.   
 Let’s start with empirical deference.  My view is that an agent is culpably 
ignorant if and only if her ignorance is traceable to the failure to react to the moral 
reasons that underlie the relevant actional epistemic norm.  There are some cases where 
my view applies straightforwardly and yields an intuitively plausible answer.  Consider a 
case of the most extreme deferential negligence wherein an agent defers solely for the 
purpose of providing the illusion of clean hands.  An heir, who is also in charge of 
making decisions for her sick parent, might knowingly choose to see a charlatan whose 
medical recommendations are more likely than not to be detrimental to her father’s 
health.  Imagine that, on the advice of the charlatan, the daughter forms the belief that 
spreading honey on her father’s melanoma will cure it.  Armed with no information to the 
contrary, the daughter comes to believe in the efficacy of such remedies.  Imagine that 
she acts on this false belief, and the father succumbs to what was an otherwise curable 
skin cancer.  In this sort of case, the daughter knew she was placing her father at 
increased risk of harm by deferring to a quack.  Intuitively, her false belief about the 
efficacy of honey application for melanoma is non-innocent.  In order for my quality of 
will view of the epistemic condition to capture this intuition, there must be some actional 
epistemic norm underwritten by moral reasons of which the daughter fell short.  One such 
norm that suggests itself is:  
No reckless deference - when serious moral hazards attend the formation of false 
beliefs, deference to grossly unreliable authorities is impermissible. 
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In the case of the negligent heir, imagine that the daughter realizes that the charlatan is 
uncredentialed and has a poor track record.  Despite this initial assessment, it is easy to 
imagine that she comes to believe that the honey remedy will work.  The strength of this 
belief might be attenuated by her recognition that the charlatan is unreliable.  But, absent 
any evidence to the contrary, it is certainly not outside the bounds of psychological 
possibility for her to form the belief that she should apply this remedy.   
 The principle of no reckless deference would also apply in cases where a 
company CEO knowingly farms out research into the safety of her company’s products to 
a firm that tends to recommend very permissive standards.  If the CEO defers to the 
findings of this firm and comes to believe that her products are probably safe, then she 
seems to fall short of the no reckless deference norm.  Her ignorance would qualify as 
culpable and she would be morally responsible for any harm that is suffered by the 
stakeholders.  
 It is important to note that agents who fall short of this norm are culpably ignorant 
only if they recognize the reasons not to defer to unreliable epistemic authorities but fail 
to be moved by them.  In the two cases described, we can imagine that the prospect of a 
windfall inheritance and the increased profit margin weighed heavily in the minds of the 
daughter and the CEO, respectively.  The reason why their falling short of no reckless 
deference needs to be witting is that an agent who fails to recognize that there are moral 
reasons not to defer to unreliable epistemic authorities does not fail to respond to the right 
kind of reasons.  As we saw in the previous section and in chapter four, it is vital for my 
theory that a given agent’s false belief reveals a deficient quality of will.  If they are to be 
blameworthy for the moral wrong they commit by acting on their ignorance, their 
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ignorance must reflect a moral, not merely epistemic, shortcoming.  We might want to 
say about an agent who simply was unaware of the fact that reckless deference presents 
serious moral risks that she should have known this fact.  But, her ignorance of this fact 
would be culpable only if she failed to respond to moral reasons underlying a different 
actional epistemic norm that called for her to investigate or reflect about what moral 
norms of deference there are.  If the CEO simply failed to realize that by choosing an 
unreliable research company she would be increasing risks to the stakeholders, then her 
culpability for this ignorance must rest on some other epistemic failure, specifically, a 
prior failure to react to the moral reasons that underlie an epistemic norm requiring her to 
investigate whether risky deference is morally permissible.  On my view, it is certainly 
possible for an agent to be culpable for this failure to believe that there are reasons to 
avoid deference to unreliable authorities and, on this basis, we might argue that the CEO 
is culpable for acting on his false beliefs.  However, making this case will require tracing 
back to a prior moral failure.  In the absence of such a trace, we cannot say that the heir 
or the CEO is culpably ignorant on the basis that each should have known that reckless 
deference ruled out because of attendant moral risks.  
 But what about an agent who falls short of no reckless deference because she 
fails to recognize that the person she pegged as an epistemic authority was in fact 
unreliable?  If the decision-making heir simply failed to recognize the charlatan for what 
she was, then does her falling short of no reckless deference entail that she is morally 
responsible for the harm suffered by her father?  Again, her failure to recognize whether 
the charlatan was unreliable is culpable only if this false belief is itself traceable to the 
falling short of a different epistemic obligation – one that, perhaps, required her to assess 
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the credentials and expected reliability of different authorities.  Alvin Goldman has 
argued that there are several different sources of evidence that we can look to in order to 
discover reliable experts.121  Goldman suggests, quite plausibly, that novices can 
investigate an expert’s ‘track-record’, look for evidence of bias, and appeal to consensus.  
It might be the case that there are moral obligations to look into these sources of evidence 
before deferring to a putative expert, especially when the empirical issue about which the 
agent is deferring is being used to make a moral decision.  As we saw in the previous 
section, these moral obligations might be underwritten by the moral hazards associated 
with false beliefs on these matters.  If someone recognized these avenues for vetting 
potential experts, but failed to respond to them, they increase the likelihood of deferring 
to an unreliable (non)-expert and coming to believe something that is false.  The 
implications of my view are clear in cases such as this - blameworthiness for ignorant 
action requires the recognition and subsequent flouting of moral reasons and the wittingly 
negligent deferential agent seems to meet this condition.  However, if an agent failed to 
see that they had reasons for assessing the reliability of the various experts in something 
like the way that Goldman suggests, then their false beliefs about the reliability of the 
expert they choose are not culpable.  Simply failing to believe that a given person is an 
unreliable epistemic authority does not establish that the agent is connected to the wrong-
making features of any subsequent ignorant action. 
 Moral deference raises interesting philosophical issues, even outside of concerns 
about the epistemic condition of moral responsibility.  The most prominent worry, 
discussed at length by Julia Driver and Sarah McGrath is that there is something uniquely 
                                                
121 Alvin I Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 
1 (July 1, 2001): 93. 
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discomfiting about moral deference as opposed to epistemic empirical deference.122  
There are several reasons why one might think that moral deference is uniquely 
problematic.  While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these issues in detail, 
the set of concerns taken at a general level are relevant to cases of moral responsibility in 
the wake of pure moral deference, and so I will spend some time spelling them out.  After 
briefly discussing one of these concerns, I will go on to show how my view applies to 
cases of moral deference. 
 The first concern about pure epistemic deference is that, unlike deference in 
empirical matters, it is really hard to discern moral experts from non-experts.  The 
educational and credentialing systems in medicine make it fairly easy to identify experts 
on questions related to health and disease.  By contrast, there is no easy or reliable way of 
identifying moral experts.  On the assumption that there are moral facts about which 
some person or set of persons can develop expertise, it is not clear what life or 
educational experience is conducive to expertise acquisition.  Religious leaders have long 
been exalted for their moral facility.  Community elders are also relied upon for 
imparting moral wisdom.  But, it is hard to judge whether or when this trust is misplaced. 
McGrath suggests that moral expertise is especially problematic because we lack 
independent access to the moral facts that would allow us to establish that someone is an 
expert.123  The only available way, it seems, is to check the moral judgments of an expert 
against those of our own.  There are two serious problems with this strategy.  The first is 
that this approach only establishes the reliability of the moral expert on the assumption 
                                                
122 Julia Driver, “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise,” Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 128, no. 3 (April 1, 2006): 619–644; S. McGrath, 
“Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism,” The Journal of Philosophy 108, no. 3 (2011): 
111–137. 
123 McGrath, “Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism,” 128. 
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that our own judgments are reliable.  Showing that our moral judgments are truth tracking 
is no easy task itself.  The second, more serious problem is that this strategy completely 
breaks down right when it is most needed.  We only seek out moral expert in those cases 
where we are not confident about the veracity of our own judgments.  When confronted 
with a difficult moral issue someone might recognize the need to defer to a moral expert 
precisely because she is not sure what the moral facts are.  This means she is poorly 
situated to check the ‘qualifications’ of the moral expert in the very instances where the 
experts are required.  This is an interesting problem for moral deference and dealing with 
it adequately it is beyond the scope of this chapter.  What it does reveal, however, is that 
moral deference may be an overall riskier endeavor than non-moral deference, and for 
that reason the norms that permit deference might be more stringent.  This is an important 
consideration to keep in mind as we discuss the implications of my view for cases 
ignorance that is traceable to moral deference.  Since the risk of realizing harms is an 
important moral reason that underlies many of the investigational norms that I have 
discussed throughout my dissertation, these reflections on the purported riskiness of 
moral deference are of prime importance.       
 The application of my view to cases of moral deference is the same, and should at 
this point be predictable.  A particularly reckless kind of moral deference would involve 
an agent who recognizes the moral hazards associated with false beliefs, but chooses to 
defer to someone who she suspects will tell simply tell her what she wants to hear.  
Imagine that the CEO from the previous case might be concerned about the moral 
permissibility eliminating their companywide sustainability program.  We can imagine 
that, rather than seek the council of someone who has given a lot of thought to questions 
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in environmental ethics and our duties to future generations, the CEO defers to someone 
who was a well-known climate change skeptic and who has a record of dismissing the 
central issues that concern climate ethicists.  For the purposes of seeing how my account 
would handle this kind of case, we can assume that it is morally impermissible for the 
CEO to cut her company’s sustainability program.  If the CEO comes to believe the 
opposite on the basis of deference to the known climate skeptic and proceeds to cut the 
sustainability program, she will, by hypothesis, act wrongly.  The central question, again, 
is whether her ignorance about the permissibility of her action is culpable. 
 This question will turn on whether, in deferring to the known climate change 
skeptic, the CEO falls short of an actional epistemic norm because he failed to react to 
the moral reasons that underwrite it.  It seems clear that the no reckless deference norm 
would rule out deference to the alleged authority in this case.  To evaluate the case, 
however, it matters whether the CEO recognized that the climate skeptic was biased and 
potentially unreliable about the morality of sustainability programs.  If she did, then by 
deferring to the skeptic in the face of this recognition, she fails to respond to the moral 
reasons that ground the no reckless deference norm, namely the risk of realizing a moral 
wrong.  According to my view, she would thereby count as culpably ignorant and would 
be blameworthy for subsequent wrong action.  The fact that the CEO recognized that she 
was increasing the risk of holding false moral beliefs by deferring to the climate skeptic 
but ignored or flouted these reasons shows that she has an absence of good will.   
 Alternatively, the CEO might be unaware of the fact that the climate skeptic is an 
unreliable moral authority.  If this is the case, then the relevant question is whether this 
lack of awareness is itself culpable.  How might it be the case that the CEO’s failure to 
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recognize that the skeptic is unreliable reflects on the quality of her will?  As we saw in 
the empirical ignorance cases, we have moral obligations to investigate the reliability of 
potential experts.  These moral reasons are underwritten by moral reasons involving the 
risk of realizing moral harms.  A CEO who recognizes and ignores the moral reasons to 
vet potential experts fails to meet her investigational obligations and would be culpably 
ignorant for her failure to recognize that a given putative moral expert was in fact 
unreliable.  Again, in the absence of this trace to a prior witting wrong action, the agent 
cannot be culpable for holding a false belief – in this case the belief that an unreliable 
person is a moral expert. 
 Consider another case of moral deference that yields a different conclusion.  
Imagine a case of moral deference that occurs only after the rigorous investigation and 
vetting of potential moral experts.  For the sake of argument, imagine that Singer is right, 
and that it is morally obligatory to donate a substantial percentage of our income to 
famine relief.124  Michel is talking to his neighbor who is an applied ethicist about his 
charitable obligations and is concerned that he might not be giving enough.  On his 
neighbor’s recommendation he reads a couple of philosophy articles on the topic, but still 
fails to settle the issue from himself.  After doing a cursory web search, he realizes that 
there are scores of articles on this subject and that the arguments seem turn on esoteric 
metaphysical debates about actions and omissions and seemingly intractable debates 
about integrity and impartiality.  This leaves Michel feeling truly at sea with respect to 
what morality requires with respect to charitable giving.  Michel also discovers that his 
neighbor holds a distinguished chair in applied ethics at a reputable university (which is 
how he knew which articles to recommend) and that he has published several articles on 
                                                
124 P. Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–243. 
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this very subject.  Thus, he decides to defer to his neighbor and comes to believe contra 
Singer that it is permissible to keep much of one’s wealth.  Assuming for the sake of 
argument that this is false, and that Singer is right about the stringency of our moral 
demands, we can ask whether Michel is morally responsible for wrongfully keeping most 
of his income. 
 Michel is morally responsible for this ignorant action only if his ignorance is 
traceable to a failure to respond to moral reasons that underlie an epistemic norm.  But, it 
is difficult to think of an epistemic norm that Michel violates in this case.  After all, he 
thought about the issue on his own for some time, he investigated his neighbor’s 
qualifications, and he did both of these things with a concern for getting things right.  I 
submit that there is no relevant investigational norm or norm of deference that Michel 
violates.  It follows that his ignorance is not culpable and that he is not morally 
responsible for his failure to donate sufficiently to charity.   
 At this point, one might object that moral deference of the kind that I’ve been 
discussing is never permissible.  Given the problems with moral deference that I briefly 
discussed above, someone might conclude that, as moral agents, we should never defer to 
putative moral experts.  If this is right, it entails both that Michel violated an epistemic 
norm by deferring to his neighbor and that, on this basis, his ignorance and subsequent 
failure to donate to famine relief is culpable.  My response to this is to simply point out 
that the only other alternative, namely that Michel just make a guess as to what morality 
requires (he cannot simply not act, since this is, by hypothesis, a morally impermissible 
omission), has very little to say for it.  More strongly, I think that by deferring in this 
case, he reveals himself to have more concern for morality than someone who just makes 
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a guess.  Moreover, it is not obviously true that there is an epistemic norm prohibiting 
moral deference.  In the absence of compelling reasons to accept such a norm, it seems to 
me that the intuitive reaction to Michel should stand.  Having violated no investigative 
norm or norm of deference, his ignorance about the morality of famine relief simply is 
not a reflection of the absence of good will. 
 As I discuss in the previous section, there is still much interesting philosophical 
work do be done in order to figure out what the norms of deference are.  I have shown 
how my view would treat cases on either end of the spectrum – some versions of the 
CEO and the heir obviously violated a norm of deference, and Michel obviously did not.  
An assessment of how my view would apply to other cases, including much more 
quotidian cases of empirical or moral deference, would require a much more through 
treatment than I have provided in this chapter.  I hope, however, that the work I have 
done here serves as a helpful starting point for this sort of enquiry. 
       
5.5 MORAL IGNORANCE AND HARD CASES 
In this final section of the dissertation I will focus on agents who have false moral beliefs 
in cases where it is extremely difficult to get things right.  One indication that a moral 
problem or judgment is falls into this category is the existence of disagreement that 
survives prolonged and honest debate.  Although the implications of moral disagreement 
on metaethical questions have received much attention in the literature, its relevance to 
questions of moral responsibility has been unnoticed.  In this section I will argue that the 
application of my quality of will view of the epistemic condition is rather straightforward. 
I will also show that the results are surprising from the point of view of certain influential 
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theories of moral responsibility that are competitors with my own.   
 For a prime example of the kind of ignorance I am concerned with in this section, 
let’s reconsider Kris, the ethicist from an earlier example.  Her views on our moral 
obligations to give to famine relief are quite developed.  Kris has thought about the case 
from many different angles.  She has followed and contributed to the literature on the 
subject.  Although she can feel the force of the considerations raised by philosophers like 
Singer, she thinks that our moral obligations to give to famine relief, though strong, do 
not require her to give up very many of the luxuries she currently enjoys.  On the 
assumption that there is some moral fact of the matter in this case is, and on the 
assumption, which we entertained in the case of Michel above, that something like 
Singer’s view is actually correct, Kris acts wrongly whenever she uses her money to 
support her relatively luxurious lifestyle.  Despite careful and honest reflection, 
philosophers frequently make mistakes, and Kris is an illustrative example of how such 
mistakes have real moral upshots.  Her false beliefs about our obligations to give to 
famine relief have survived honest, intense, and protracted scrutiny.  They have also 
survived the airing of her views in various professional forums.  Given all of this, is Kris 
blameworthy for wrongly failing to give the obligatory amount of her resources to famine 
relief?   
The application of my view to this case should be (painfully) obvious by now.  
Kris’ blameworthiness for wrongly keeping money for herself turns on whether her 
ignorance about what morality requires is blameworthy.  It seems clear to me that in 
coming to form her beliefs about the morality of famine relief, Kris did not fall short of 
any investigative epistemic norm.  However stringent our investigative norms are, Kris 
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meets them, if anyone does.  I find it hard to imagine that the risk of acting wrongly 
would underwrite investigative obligations so onerous that someone who dedicates 
hundreds of hours to the task of moral inquiry still fails to meet them.  If Kris meets (and, 
indeed, greatly exceeds) her epistemic obligations, then her ignorance is not culpable and, 
thus, her failing to give sufficiently to charity is not blameworthy.   
It is important to notice that these considerations generalize to most philosophers 
and probably to almost everyone who has, say, actively participated in an introductory 
ethics course.  Arguably anyone who has given serious thought to the difficult moral 
issues that populate undergraduate course syllabi and who continues to subject their 
views to some degree of serious scrutiny meets her investigative obligations and is, for 
that reason, non-culpable for any ignorance that results.  As I have described several 
times above, the project of establishing the stringency of our investigative obligations is 
yet another difficult task the field of practical ethics.  The project of discovering what 
these obligations are will have important implications for the epistemic condition of 
moral responsibility.   
Someone might object to my treatment of difficult cases as follows.  They might 
say that what is revealed by the fact that Kris comes to hold her false belief just is the 
kind of unreceptiveness to moral reasons that typifies the absence of good will.  As I 
discussed in chapter 1, attributionists like Scanlon125 and A. Smith126 maintain that the 
judgments an agent makes are a reflection of their practical identity and that it is this 
notion of practical identity that is central to questions of agency and moral responsibility.  
The fact that Kris judges that it is permissible to act in a way that is ex hypothesi wrong 
                                                
125 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter 6. 
126 Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes.” 
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reveals that she is not sensitive to the moral reasons that make this action wrong.  
Moreover, the fact that her false moral belief survived the intense scrutiny to which it was 
subjected seems to show these judgments are more strongly linked to the agent’s practical 
identity than other judgments that are more tentatively accepted.   
The resources for this line of objection to my treatment of Kris can also be found 
in Arpaly’s quality of will account of moral responsibility.127  Her view, which I 
discussed at length in chapter two, is that agents are blameworthy to the degree that they 
fail to respond to the moral reasons by virtue of which, we are assuming, failing 
substantially to give to famine relief is wrong.  Since Kris fails to respond to moral 
reasons, she would be blameworthy on Arpaly’s view.  Although she suggests that there 
might be cases where the failure to respond to moral reasons is not indicative of the 
absence of good will, it is not clear that a case such as Kris’ would be one of them. 
A virtue of my own account is that, by shifting our focus to morally underwritten 
epistemic norms, or what I’ve called aim-neutral actional epistemic norms, we can 
appreciate the sense in which agents like Kris have laudable, indeed unimpeachable 
moral concern.  Hard cases such as those that make up much of the practical ethics canon 
afford us the opportunity to see how the holding of false moral beliefs is compatible with 
a quality of will that is adequate if not admirable.  The view of the epistemic condition 
that I have defended offers the best way of accommodating this datum.   
It is instructive to think about Kris in the context of Derek Parfit’s observations 
that “non-religious ethics” at a very early stage in development.128  Given that we just 
haven’t been studying ethics in a systematic fashion for very long, it shouldn’t be 
                                                
127 Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, Chapter 2. 
128 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1986), 453–454. 
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surprising that well-meaning and honest moral inquiry will frequently fail to result in 
moral knowledge.  The question for my purposes is whether, in addition to being ignorant 
about what morality requires, agents like Kris would also be blameworthy for acting on 
their false moral beliefs.  I take it to be a virtue of my view that it can distinguish between 
agents who have false beliefs because they do not care about morality from agents who 
have false beliefs despite caring quite a lot.  By linking culpability for ignorance to the 
agent’s responsiveness to moral reasons that underlie her epistemic obligations rather 
than to their responsiveness to the reasons for belief that are provided by putative moral 
facts, my view improves upon its predecessors.  I say this with all due trepidation of 
course, since we have been thinking about the epistemic condition of moral responsibility 
for even less time than practical ethics.  If, despite this all this work, the view that I have 
defended is wrong, I hope that my ignorance does not reflect the lack of a strong concern 
to get things right. 
 
5.6 OBJECTION 
In this last section, I would like to discuss an important objection to the view that I 
defend and apply in this chapter.  Though I don’t think it threatens my account, the 
objection is instructive because it highlights the fact that future work is needed in order to 
apply my account to actual cases. 
5.6.1 Moral inquiry is itself a risk? 
Throughout much of the dissertation, I appeal to morally grounded norms that require 
moral or empirical investigation.  One might object, however, that there are certain 
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traditional moral perspectives that would actually proscribe the sort of moral inquiry that 
I assumed Jojo and Michel were expected to undertake.  Interestingly, this proscription 
might be underwritten by the same reasons, namely the risk of realizing wrong actions 
that were presented as the basis for the obligation to investigate.  The idea here is that, 
given the track record of secular moral inquiry, which has yet to yield much consensus, 
an agent who believed that their traditional or religious moral perspective was correct 
might view moral inquiry as a threat.  A quotidian non-moral version of this worry is 
contained in the advice given to students not to over think their test answers.  It is natural 
to worry that when the process of coming to the answer is complicated and difficult, 
further testing and inquiry might lead one away from the right answer.  In these cases, 
further inquiry might actually lead one away from true beliefs rather than towards them.  
Interestingly, this worry applies more broadly than those who hold traditional moral 
views.  If someone holds a true moral belief, then further inquiry, if it presents the 
possibility of changing the person’s mind, would actually be morally risky.  An obvious 
candidate would be the moral prohibition against torturing human children strictly for 
fun.  If any moral belief is true than this one is, and a norm that required us to scrutinize it 
might actually lead someone to disbelieve it. 
 My response to this worry is two fold.  First, I maintain that wherever we have 
reason to believe that further inquiry will lead someone to change from a true moral 
belief to a false moral belief, then the moral reasons, which I described in chapters three 
and five, simply don’t exist. There just wouldn’t be moral obligations to investigate one’s 
moral beliefs if these moral beliefs are in fact true.  Of course, the antecedent in this 
claim is crucial.  If some group or tradition has hit on the set of true moral beliefs, then 
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they would not have a moral obligation to investigate their moral beliefs.  If, however, 
this antecedent is false, then their investigative obligations would hold, and if they 
wittingly failed to comply with them, they would be culpably ignorant for any false 
beliefs that result.  Of course, these speculative claims about what our actional epistemic 
obligations are for specific cases are prima facie plausible members of the set of true 
morally grounded epistemic norms.  Whether or not these would actually survive the sort 
of rigorous practical moral theorizing that I don’t take on in my dissertation will only be 
determined by engaging in that theoretical work.  Importantly, my uncertainty about 
whether these prima facie investigative obligations are real obligations does not call into 
question the fundamental structure of my account of the epistemic condition.  Since I see 
this project as distinct from inquiry into what our moral obligations actually are, I am 
happy to incorporate only those obligations that survive scrutiny. 
 Second, this objection helpfully illustrates another way in which someone might 
be non-culpably ignorant.  On the assumption that someone who holds traditional moral 
beliefs is wrong about what morality requires, her ignorance may be non-culpable even 
though she sees moral inquiry as a threat to her beliefs.  Recall that Diligent Jojo failed to 
have true moral beliefs but was still non-culpably ignorant because he never wittingly 
failed to meet an investigative obligation.  Though his moral beliefs are false, they are not 
traceable to a witting failure to comply with an epistemic obligation.  As such, they are 
not indicative of a lack of moral concern or poor quality of will.  The same thing might 
be true of those who are part of a tradition that proscribes the sort moral inquiry that 
features in many of the examples in this dissertation.  If they never knowingly fail to 
comply with an investigative obligation, in the way that Casual Jojo does, then their 
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ignorance will not reveal a poor quality of will.  Thus, an agent who is brought up to 
believe that she is already privy to all relevant moral truth and who thus fails to conduct 
any amount of moral investigation will not be culpably ignorant on my view. 
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